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INTRODUCTION

I am the father of three daughters, two of whom have
significant cognitive disabilities. The oldest, Josephine, was born
February 28, 1983, with a chromosomal abnormality that led to
the development of acute hydrocephalus which was shunted
successfully at the regional hospital in Rapid City, South Dakota,
when she was ten months old. She is moderately mentally
retarded. The youngest, Ingrid, born December 7, 1986, was
diagnosed as autistic when she was two. Autism is a life-long,
neurologically-based disability. Both Josephine and Ingrid have
been the recipients of special education services since before age
two. Consequently, special education programs have profoundly
influenced the course of my family's life for almost twenty years.
Throughout these years, my wife and I have also had the joy of
parenting our third child, Eleanor, who is a first year student at
Mount Holyoke College.
It has been my good fortune that my wife, Ann Jones, is a
responsible partner who has fully shared the struggles of raising
children with disabilities. We have worked through numerous
IEP 2 planning meetings. Our school districts have served us well.
Many excellent administrators, teachers, specialists, and aides
have helped our daughters along the way. For these dedicated

2 Individualized Education Programs required by 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d), discussed in
detail in Part II.B.2 of this article.
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persons, we have been and remain very grateful. 3 Their sacrifices
and hard work have borne fruit in our children's lives.
When children have significant cognitive disabilities, parenting
never really ends. Neither Josephine nor Ingrid will ever be
independent in any normal meaning of the term. They have
lived, and to some extent will continue to live, sheltered lives.
Their daily routines have always been managed for them, and so
far as we can foresee, this will be always be the case. Each will
delight in spending nickels, dimes, quarters, and even dollars,
but most of their resources are, and will primarily remain, in
someone else's control. 4 So far as we can fathom, their respective
worlds in time and space are very small. The fact is: both
5
Josephine and Ingrid are significantly, mentally disabled for life.
Josephine and Ingrid differ in one important respect.
Josephine's world includes many friends and acquaintances. She
is gregarious. In her own way, she can charm people. She visits
people and people visit her. Ingrid relates to her immediate
family, her teachers, some dedicated care givers, a couple of
classmates, her van drivers, and our cats, Dinah and Betsey.
Ingrid has never had a friend of her own age and choosing with
whom she could communicate or play spontaneously. This does
not mean that children have been unwilling; in fact, a few little
girls tried hard without success. Ingrid simply has no interest in,
perhaps no ability for, anything akin to a normal friendship with
anyone of her own age.
Chiefly, she enjoys schoolwork,
storybooks, videos, going out for pizza, tandem biking with her
Dad, and recently practicing simple piano lessons with her Mom.
Our family passed through hard times, especially with Ingrid.
Starting at age ten, Ingrid went through two terrible phases:
first, of physically self-abusive behavior, and second, of physically
aggressive behavior. We investigated residential placements
3 Above all we thank Chris Healey, Ingrid's tutor for three years at Alcott School in
Concord, Massachusetts. Chris weathered the worst of Ingrid's stormy behaviors with
equanimity. We also thank Joanne Delaney, the special education coordinator for our
school district, who has skillfully and cheerfully helped us to secure the most appropriate
placements for our daughters.
4 Ann and I are guardians for Josephine and will become guardians for Ingrid when
she turns eighteen. We have established guardianships for the time after our deaths.
5 As will be explained in Part I.B. the word "handicap" and its derivatives were in
fashion for a time, but currently the word "disability" and its derivatives are more
popular. I use these words and their derivatives interchangeably in this article.
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very seriously at these points. We decided to try to work things
out at home. We struggled, and with the help of teachers,
caretakers, physicians, and a psychologist, eventually Ingrid
calmed down. 6 She successfully came through her days of selfabuse and aggression and emerged as a happy and generally
7
cooperative teenager.
Josephine's troubles were less dramatic even in their worst
manifestations. She was at seven or eight a one-person home
demolition expert, clearing shelves and counters randomly and
frequently. She also went through crying phases when, for
unfathomable reasons, she cried for hours at a time. But, she
came through her times of low-level destruction and sadness. At
age twenty-one, Josephine is a reasonably well-adjusted young
woman in a residential placement.8 She went there when she was
ready, not because she became too difficult. She is a frequent
and refreshing presence in our family home for holidays and on
weekends.
To an outsider, this family predicament might seem pathetic or
even tragic. It is neither. After twenty years of struggle, I can
say as confidently as I could testify to any fact in court, that our
youngest and oldest daughters are intriguing, interesting, fun,
and generally good company.
With steady training,
encouragement, and carefully made connections, Josephine and
Ingrid have learned to enjoy their lives at school and at home.
They are valued members of their school communities. Each has
learned in small ways to be useful. Josephine is able to
participate in productive work in her residential school. She does
contract work that involves sorting items and stuffing envelopes
6 We never were able to gain a clear picture of everything that ailed Ingrid during the
days of her worst troubles, but we know she had bad bladder infections, intermittent and
severe constipation (common among autistic children), and suffered terribly with the
onset of puberty. We are especially grateful to Ingrid's pediatrician, Dr. Edward Saef, and
to her psychiatrist, Dr. Beth Brownlow, both of whom practice in Concord. They allowed
us to be partners in problem-solving. We have also had the good fortune to receive very
special help from talented caregivers over the years, for which we are truly grateful. The
selfless contributions of the following four women to our daughters and to our family life
have been remarkable; they are Colleen Foley Ingersoll, Kelly Jaracz Weene, Sherri
DiPippo Clark, and Heide Marquardt. They enriched our lives immeasurably.
7 Ingrid turned 17 on December 7, 2003, while I was editing this article.
8 At this time of this writing, Josephine lives at the Cardinal Cushing School in
Hanover, Massachusetts, where she lives in an apartment with three other young women
under supervision. This has to date proved to be a very fine placement.

2004]

MANDATE FOR EDUCATING DISABLED CHILDREN

681

and on occasion works in the school's thrift shop. Ingrid cleans
tables and sweeps floors in her school's lunch area. 9 She is
learning to do increasingly difficult filing tasks. Josephine sings
in a choir. Ingrid has played on after-school athletic teams.
Ingrid's reading and her basic math skills continue to expand.
She truly enjoys academic accomplishments. Ingrid started
piano lessons at age sixteen and is slowly gaining skills. Given
their disabilities, each is doing quite well.
It is true that we have been, and still are, a burden on society
in a monetary sense. Our daughters have been costly for our
school districts. Long-term, state and federal programs will
probably expend money to help meet some of their needs. 10 With
familial and societal supports, both Josephine and Ingrid can
have long, satisfying, and useful lives. But, while each will take
much from society, each has much to give if society can receive it.
To this possibility, I will return at the end of this article.
However, at this point, I feel that I must justify the foregoing
paragraphs as an introduction to a law review article.
My purpose has been to provide the reader with a context for
my intense interest in the law of special education. The law of
special education helped to rescue our family from disaster. The
requirements of special education law, state and federal, helped
to save Josephine and Ingrid from the real possibility of
mundane or meaningless lives. I cannot easily imagine what
their lives would have been to date without the mandates that
have required school districts to develop meaningful special
programs for persons such as Josephine and Ingrid. 1 I have
chosen to write an article about the federal mandate and selected
state mandates because they often come under attack, principally
on account of costs. 12 Moreover, the meaning of the federal and
9 Ingrid attends a private day school, Melmark School, in Woburn, Massachusetts.
10 Supplemented, we hope, by the proceeds of considerable life insurance we have put
in place.
11 For a discussion of the federal mandate, see Part II of this article. The federal
mandate and state mandates are discussed in much greater detail in connection with case
discussions in Parts III - VII.
12 One school committee member in a Boston suburb, who will not be named here, is
reported to have publicly stated very recently, that if the mandates are too costly, we
must simply rid ourselves of the mandates! Since the mandates are anchored in state and
federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection, a sudden extinction of the mandates
is unlikely, but the attitude betrayed is apparent.
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state mandates for special education are constantly the subject
matter of discussion, negotiation, mediation, and litigation. The
subject of funding to meet the mandates has generated debates
13
in local, state, and national political controversies.
These political controversies have stirred up legal questions
worthy of academic consideration. Two closely related questions
are the following: (1) what does the federal mandate that a child
14
with a disability be provided a "free and appropriate education"'
really mean? (2) have heightened state mandates, meaning state
requirements for special education more rigorous than the
federal mandate, 15 truly made a difference for children with
disabilities? The latter question became especially important in
Massachusetts in 2000 when the legislature decided to repeal,
and did repeal, our heightened mandate. At the time, my hunch
was that the change, driven by a desire for cost-cutting, was
probably ill-conceived and unlikely to cut very many costs, since
the federal mandate, rightly construed, would usually require
equal or similar programs and placements.
I remained
uninvolved in the political fray.
When the opportunity came, I decided to use my academic
freedom to investigate the question of whether or not heightened
state mandates, or their repeal, have made significant differences
in the lives of children with disabilities. For a sabbatical project,
I undertook a comparative study of case law arising from
placement disputes in five jurisdictions having heightened state
mandates. For comparison, I studied cases decided under the
federal mandate showing the most progressive interpretations of
that mandate, especially cases decided by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals. On the basis of that comparative study of pertinent
case law, I have concluded that the heightened state mandates

13 Probably the best known and most dramatic political decision largely driven by
concerns about funding special education was the decision by Senator Jim Jeffords, U.S.
Senator from Vermont, to leave the Republican party to become an Independent in June,
2001. His frustration grew over many weeks as his colleagues refused to negotiate
seriously about federal funding for special education. See Christopher Graff, An Inside
Look at a Party Switch That Changed History, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at A14.
14 The statutory language of the federal mandate and related concepts are discussed
in detail in Part II of this article.
15 Heightened state mandates are discussed in detail in Parts III through VII of this
article.
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have not generally required placements different from those
required by progressive interpretations of the federal mandate.
I have further concluded that the federal mandate, as
developed by some very able federal appellate judges, can serve
as an acceptable, workable mandate for the education of children
with disabilities. Consequently, in most states, political battles
over the wording of state statutory mandates will not near-term
be a necessary or worthwhile pursuit for advocates who care
about special education. However, the federal circuit courts of
appeal are not uniformly interpreting the federal mandate. The
courts would do well to emulate the reasoning and careful
implementation of the mandate undertaken in the Third Circuit.
Moreover, through the course of research, I have come to believe
that there are legal frontiers for special education advocates
which merit more attention than has been given to date. Hence,
my quest for a meaningful mandate, as the title implies, has
given rise to a set of conclusions which I hope to justify in the
pages following.
I. THE ORIGINS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW
A. Exclusion From Public Schools as the HistoricalNorm
Mandatory public education for children with serious
disabilities is a recent development. In the 19th century and for
much of the 20th century, the case reports show students with
physical and mental disabilities being excluded from public
education solely on account of their disabilities. An oft-cited
example is Watson v. City of Cambridge16 where a student was
excluded from a public school in Cambridge, Massachusetts, by
school officials "because he was too weak-minded to derive profit
from instruction." 17 The suit that followed was pled in tort for
wrongful exclusion.' 8 The trial judge allowed a jury to decide
whether or not the school was liable, and the jury found for the
plaintiff, meaning they concluded that the exclusion was a
16 157 Mass. 561 (1893).
17 Id. at 561 (quoting records kept by school committee for City of Cambridge).
18 Id. at 562 (exhibiting plaintiff sought damages for wrongful exclusion and not being
able to "enjoy the privileges of the school").

684

ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:3

tortious act. Yet on appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reversed and upheld the exclusion in deference to
the statutorily granted powers of the city's school committee.1 9
As recently as 1958, the Supreme Court of Illinois explicitly
approved the exclusion of children with cognitive disabilities
from public education. 20 This ruling arose in a case commenced
by the Illinois Department of Public Welfare seeking
reimbursement for the costs of keeping the defendant's son,
Richard, in the Lincoln State School. 21 Under a state statute,
relatives were liable for the cost of keeping residents, in this case
$60 per month. The defendant father, not a wealthy man,
argued, inter alia, that the Illinois constitution required the
legislature to provide a system of schools, "whereby all children
of this state may receive a good common school education," and
"that the constitutional mandate embraces mentally deficient
children as well as those of normal intelligence." 22 Therefore,
claimed the father, the state was merely doing what it was
constitutionally obliged to do, and as a consequence he owed
nothing to the state. His argument was unavailing. 23 The trial
24
court granted summary judgment for the Department.
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, and citing state
precedent, in relevant part justified the decision as follows:
19 In fairness to the court and to the school officials, their concern was the good order
and learning environment for other students. The evidence tended to show that the child
was "troublesome to other children, making uncouth noises, pinching others etc." and that
he was "unable to take the ordinary decent physical care of himself." See id. at 561-62.
The court concluded:
The management of the schools involves many details, and it is important that a
board of public officers, dealing with these details and having jurisdiction to regulate
the internal affairs of the schools, should not be interfered with, or have their conduct
called in question before another tribunal, so long as they act in good faith within
their jurisdiction. Id. at 563.
I find it interesting that the exclusion of a pupil with disabilities was justified on
grounds similar to the rationale employed for the exclusion of an Afro-American girl from
the Boston public schools in the 1840s. See Sarah C. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass.
198 (1849).
20 See Dep't of Public Welfare v. Haas, 154 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ill. 1958) (noting right to
common school education implies one must have capacity to receive such training).
21 See id. at 270-71 (remarking the court classified Lincoln State School not as part of
state school system but rather as hospital for mentally deficient).
22 Id. at 270.
23 Id. at 270 (explaining that legislation does not require state to provide free
education programs for mentally deficient children, and that constitutional mandate
claimed by plaintiff has no application).
24 See id. at 274 (concluding no legitimate issue of fact was presented in pleadings).
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These cases hold that the constitution requires that the
school system and schools provided thereunder shall be free
to all children of the State for the purpose of providing a
good common school education, and that the legislature has
the power to determine what shall constitute such education.
While this constitutional guarantee applies to all children in
the State, it cannot assure that all children are educable.
The term "common school education" implies the capacity, as
well as the right, to receive the common training;otherwise
the educational process cannot function. Defendant has
admitted that his son was properly adjudicated incompetent
and that the boy is described as "mentally deficient or feeble
minded." Existing legislation does not require the State to
provide a free educational program, as a part of the common
school system, for the feeble minded or mentally deficient
children who, because of limited intelligence, are unable to
receive a good common school education. Under the
circumstances,
this constitutional mandate has no
25
application.
It could scarcely be clearer that a child with a cognitive
deficiency was simply outside of the state constitutional mandate
and any rights to education afforded the rest of the children.
Earlier, in the neighboring state of Wisconsin, a child with a
normal intelligence was excluded from a public school because he
suffered from a severe neurological impairment and related
motor problems. 2 6 Teachers and other students thought the boy,
Merritt, was annoying, even nauseating.27 The school officials
offered a segregated placement in a program designed for
students with hearing and speech defects. His father declined
25 Id. at 270 (emphasis added) (citing People ex. re. Leighty v. Young, 309 Ill. 27, 33
(1923) and People v. Moore, 240 Ill. 408, 412 (1909)).
26 State ex. rel. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ. of Antigo, 172 N.W. 153, 153 (Wis. 1919)
(presenting in facts that child appeared mentally normal).
27 According to the summary of the facts provided in the opinion written for the
majority of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin:
Merritt [Beattie] has been a crippled and defective child since his birth, being
afflicted with a form of paralysis which affects his whole physical and nervous makeup. He has not the normal use and control of his voice, hands, feet, and body. By
reason of said paralysis his vocal chords are afflicted. He is slow and hesitating in
speech, and has a peculiarly high, rasping, and disturbing tone of voice, accompanied
with uncontrollable facial contortions, making it difficult for him to make himself
understood. He also has an uncontrollable flow of saliva which drools from his mouth
on to his clothing and books, causing him to present an unclean appearance. He has
a nervous and excitable nature.
See id. at 153.
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and litigated, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the school
board to reinstate his son in a regular public classroom. 28 A jury
found for the petitioning father. 29 But, in deference to school
officials, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and upheld
the exclusion stating, "[t]he right of a child of school age to attend
the public schools of this state cannot be insisted upon when its
'30
presence therein is harmful to the best interests of the school.
The school board decided the best interests of the school. There
31
was a dissenter who would have deferred to the jury's verdict. It
is interesting to note that in this case and in Watson, the
common sense of the jurors favored inclusion, meaning that
persons with disabilities should be granted a right to go to school.
32
It was judges applying the law who ousted the children.
These reported cases convey clear statements about societal
values.
Disabled children, especially cognitively disabled
children, were deemed a nuisance.
Children with motor
impairments were an annoyance. Neither normal children nor
teachers nor administrators wanted to be bothered with any of
them. Many educators, perhaps most, genuinely believed that
bringing children with significant disabilities - especially
cognitive disabilities - into the public schools would disrupt the
good order of the schools and thereby diminish the educational
opportunities of non-disabled pupils. Indisputably, for many
generations the doors of the country's public schools were closed
to students such as those described above. Our Josephine would
likely have been barred on account of her moderate mental
retardation and occasional tendency to drool slightly. 33 Ingrid's
autism, her greatly impaired ability to express herself verbally,
and her worst phases of self-abuse and physical aggressions,
would have barred her from any regular public school classroom
28 See id. at 155 (exhibiting father's view that his son was being denied Constitutional
right of public education).
29 See id. (claiming it was error for trial court to state School Board's opinion was
reviewable and subordinate to jury's opinion).
30 Id.at 154.
31 See id. at 155 (Eschweiler, J., dissenting) (opining there is no power vested within
school board to determine whether or not there was an unreasonable interference with
plaintiffs rights; hence, it should be within jury's discretion).
32 For that particular point, I am indebted to Professor Mark Weber, DePaul
University School of Law, who wrote comments on an earlier draft of my article.
33 Josephine has had absence seizures which caused slight drooling but the seizures
are generally controlled with medication.
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in an earlier era. The unpleasant truth is that over many
generations, millions of children with cognitive and physical
disabilities were barred by law from public schools. 34 Private
alternatives were not publicly funded. No doubt rich parents
sometimes made compensatory arrangements. Poor and middle
class parents did their best at home or committed their children
to state institutions where their lives were lived well outside of
any serious public scrutiny and were often lives of degradation
35
and misery.
B. Civil Rights for the Handicapped:A Quest for Access & Equal
Protection
Progress for the disabled came about mainly as a spin-off of the
civil rights movement which sought equal treatment for AfricanAmerican children in public schools. This movement gained its
landmark victory in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.36 In
Brown, the Court put power into the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection clause in the context of public education by
recognizing that if black children were educated separately, even
with best efforts directed toward equalization of teaching and
facilities, their education was inherently unequal.37 This was
necessarily so because of the stigma attached to separate
education and the deprivation of interaction with the
mainstream children. In the generation that followed, advocates
for children with disabilities picked up the equal protection
38
argument and won important victories in courts.
34 See, e.g., Christine Moyles Kovan, Issues in the Third Circuit: Casebrief: Disability
Law-Susquentita School District v. Raelee S., Pendent Placement and Financial
Responsibility Under the Individuals With DisabilitiesAct: The Third Circuit's Extension
of Burlington, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1867, 1871 (1997) (quoting Judith Herman, Assistant
Secretary for Secretary of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, "I was one of
more than one million disabled children who were being denied the right to go to school.").
35 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1310-12 (5th Cir. 1974) (describing
filthy conditions and brutal environment at state institution for children with mental
retardation).
36 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that in the field of public education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" is no longer applicable).
37 See id. at 495 (indicating that segregation of children in public schools solely on the
basis of race deprives those children of equal educational opportunities).
38 The story of the great cases preceding statutory special education law, along with
the story of the evolution of federal and state statutory law has been told in whole or in
part in many treatises and primers. The following have been of enormous value to me in
understanding the evolution of special education law, especially federal law, and they are
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Two federal district court cases in the early 1970s were
especially important, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Citizens v. Pennsylvania (PARC) 39 and Mills v. Board of
40
Education of the Districtof Columbia.
PARC was a class action suit against the Pennsylvania state
board of education and others 41on behalf of mentally retarded
children.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were
meeting neither their state statutory obligations nor their federal
Constitutional equal protection obligations with respect to the
education of mentally retarded children. 42 After a trial on the
merits, PARC was resolved by a consent decree. The defendants
agreed to provide a free public education for mentally retarded
children between the ages of six and twenty-one in a manner
calculated to meet the legal challenges advanced under the equal
43
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
rich in citations to great case law. See generally RICHARD DAUGHERTY, SPECIAL
EDUCATION (Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. 2001) (detailing the development of
special education law); STEVEN S. GOLDBERG, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW (Plenum Press
1982) (indicating the manner in which special education law has evolved); THOMAS F.
GUERNSEY & KATHE KLARE, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW (Carolina Academic Press, 2001
ed.) (providing an overview of special education law); MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF
SPECIAL EDUCATION (Oceana Publications, Inc. 2000) (evincing the evolution of special
education law); N. MURDICK, B. GARTIN, & T. CRABTREE, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW
(Prentice Hall 2002) (describing the growth of special education law); EILEEN L. ORDOVER,
EDUCATION RIGHTS OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES (The Advocado Press 2001)
(delineating the expansion of special education law); ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR., LEGAL
ISSUES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION (Allyn & Bacon 1996) (exploring the growth of special
education law); LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW (2d ed. Longman
Publishers 1995) (tracing the maturation of special education law); JAMES A. SHRYBMAN,
DUE PROCESS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION (Aspen Systems Corporation 1982) (recounting the
unfolding of special education law); MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION
(Merrill, 1998) (chronicling the advances in special education law); MARK C. WEBER,
SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE (LRP Publications, 1992).
39 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (entering judgment upon the consent decree); 334
F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (indicating that Pennsylvania may not deny any mentally
retarded child access to a free public program of education and training).
40 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that denial of publicly supported education
to mentally retarded children violatedthe Due Process Clause).
41 See PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1258 (maintaining that among the defendants were
many officials and thirteen school districts in Pennsylvania).
42 See id. (using the term "retarded" instead of "disabled" to designate the Plaintiffs).
43 Points proved or stipulated to and the main points in the consent decree were
summarized by Mitchell L. Yell as follows:
Witnesses for the plaintiffs established four critical points. The first was that all
children with mental retardation are capable of benefiting from a program of
education and training. Second, education cannot be defined as only the provision of
academic experiences for children (this legitimizes experiences such as learning to
clothe and feed oneself as outcomes for public school programming). A third point was
that, having undertaken to provide all children in the Commonwealth of
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The Mills decision arose out of a class action in the District of
Columbia against the District School Board. The parents and
guardians of seven children with various disabilities claimed that
these children, and approximately 18,000 other children with
disabilities, were excluded from public schools in the District.
The court entered a judgment that mandated a free public
education for all children with disabilities (who except for their
disabilities would have been admitted for a public education) and
further ordered due process safeguards against arbitrary actions
by administrators. 44 The court was not swayed by pleas from the
Board that the relief ordered was not affordable. The equal
protection argument successfully employed was consistent with
PARC, but the due process safeguards were a judicial innovation
in Mills. 45 Advocates in other jurisdictions were encouraged and
46
filed suits which were often successful.
Congress took up the cause and after two lengthy hearings,
Congress passed and on November 29, 1975 President Gerald
Ford signed into law, the Act -The Watershed Legislative Act upon which the educational rights of the disabled have rested for
more than twenty five years, Public Law 94-142. 47 Thereafter it
was commonly referred to as the Education for All Handicapped

Pennsylvania with a free public education, the state could not deny students with
mental retardation access to free public education and training. Finally, it was
stipulated that the earlier students with mental retardation were provided education,
the greater the amount of learning that could be predicted....
PARC was resolved by consent agreement specifying that all children with mental
retardation between the ages of 6 and 21 must be provided a free public education,
and that it was most desirable to educate children with mental retardation in a
program most like the programs provided for their peers without disabilities.
YELL, supra note 38, at 59-60.
44 See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 877-83 (fashioning an extensive post-judgment role for
the Court in the enforcement of the judgment).
45 See id. at 877 (indicating the novelty of the post-judgment role for the Court).
46 See Panitch v. Wisconsin., 444 F. Supp. 320, 323 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (detailing that
mentally retarded children be provided with an education at public expense which is
sufficient to their needs and generally equivalent to the education provided to nonhandicapped children); In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 448 (N.D. 1974) (maintaining
generally that mentally retarded children are entitled to education where they reside); In
re Downey, 340 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973) (indicating that generally the
State has a duty to use all means and measures necessary to adequately meet the
physical and educational needs of handicapped children).
47 The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 (1975)
(redressing special education policy because the needs of children with disabilities were
not being fully met).
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49
Children Act (EAHCA). 48 There were amendments in the 1980's
and in 1990; Congress passed a major modification which
changed the Act's title to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA).50 Throughout the Act, amendments
changed the word "handicap" to "disability" and accordingly
derivatives of those terms were also changed. 51 Of importance for
our family, autism was specifically recognized as a cognitive
impairment entitling a student to services. The Act has been reauthorized by Congress periodically. Re-authorization was in
progress at time of this writing. 52 Since the Act's enactment in
1975 one fact has been constant: a child with a disability has a

right to a

53
free and appropriate public education (FAPE).

However, the meaning of a FAPE in many contexts is not
apparent, so the question keeps recurring. What does the federal
FAPE mandate require?

48 The Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380 (1974)
(designed as an amendment to Title IV - B of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act).
49 The Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457
(1986) (providing for the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to parents who
prevail in litigation).
50 The 1990 amendments have been summarized by Mitchell Yell as follows:
The 1990 amendments to P.L. 94-142 renamed the EAHCA the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The IDEA included the following major changes:
(a) the language of the law was changed to emphasize the person first, including the
renaming of the law to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, as well as
changing the term "handicapped student" to "childlstudent/individual with a
disability"; (b) students with autism and traumatic brain injury were identified as a
separate and distinct class entitled to the law's benefits; and (c) a plan for transition
was required to be included on every student's individualized education program.
(IEP) by age 16.
YELL, supra note 38, at 63.
51 The Substitution of "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act" for "Education of
the Handicapped Act" Act of 199C, Pub. L. No. 101-476 (1990) (requiring the substitution
of the term "handicap" for the term "disability").
52 See H.R. 1350, 108th Cong. (2003) (detailing the re-authorization of The
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); S. 1248, 108th Cong. (2003) (providing for
the re-authorization of The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act).
53 The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (1975) (maintaining the general proposition that all children are entitled to a
free and public education).
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II. THE FEDERAL MANDATE FOR A FREE & APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC EDUCATION
A. Main Points in the FederalStatute
I will often refer to the "Act" as shorthand for the IDEA and its
predecessor. 54 The Act is a funding statute, meaning that the
states can receive federal funds for special education only by
complying with its requirements. States can receive federal
funds if they develop educational plans that are in accordance
with the Act's requirements. What follows is an overview of the
Act as a preparation for discussing state and federal cases that
55
interpret and apply its requirements.
While the Act is intricate, there are six concepts of special
significance for this article. I could say six rights of special
significance but will avoid doing so because the word right is not
universally affixed to each of the six concepts, and because the
obligations of parents and guardians (such as meeting time
limits) are inextricably connected to rights for children with
disabilities. The six concepts are as follows: (1) Free and
appropriate public education (FAPE); (2) Written individualized
educational program (IEP); (3) Least restrictive environment
(LRE); (4) Related services, meaning that an IEP must include
services such as physical and occupational therapy, therapeutic
recreation, counseling, and assistive technology services if these
are appropriate for a FAPE; (5) Due Process, meaning that a
parent or guardian who rejects an IEP (or a change in placement)
has a statutory right to an administrative due process hearing;
and (6) Judicial Review, meaning that the Act allows for judicial
review of administrative decisions in either state or federal
54 Under the Act, there are re-authorizations at intervals. There were amendments
with the 1997 re-authorization as there will be with the pending re-authorization. The
amendments that will accompany the 2004 re-authorization will probably not diminish
the substantive rights that are the focus of this article except for students with
disabilities subject to expulsion for disciplinary reasons. Special education advocates
rightly have expressed concerns about this area.
55 Experienced educators know the many facets of this statute well and need no
tutelage; moreover, lawyers practicing in this area seem comfortable with most aspects of
the Act. However, for readers not familiar with the Act or those with only a passing
familiarity, a discussion of case law arising from the Act will be largely unintelligible
without an overview of its main provisions.
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courts. Understanding the case law requires a familiarity with
the foregoing concepts. For each, I will set forth the pertinent
statutory language and follow up with summary comments and
56
occasional cross-references.
B. A Summary Analysis of the Main Concepts
1. Free and appropriate public education (FAPE)
According to the federal statute,
The term "free and appropriate public education" means
special education and related services that (A) have been provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary,
secondary education in the State involved; and

or

(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized
education program required under section 1414(d) of
57
this title.
Subsection (A) is not especially problematic and need not
detain us. Subsection (B), with its incorporation of state
standards,has proved interesting and challenging. In subsection
(B), Congress provided an open door to heightened state-created
mandates. Thus, if a state legislature or a state department of
education creates a standard for the education of children with
56 See generally Laura Ketterman, Comment, Does the Individuals with Disabilities
Act Exclude Gifted and Talented Children with Emotional Disabilities? An Analysis of
J.D. v. Pawlet, 32 ST. MARY'S L. J. 913, 921-27 (2001) (explaining the statutory history
and main provisions of the law). In the course of making re-authorizations and
amendments over the past twenty-five years, some subsections have been moved so
citations in the textual discussion may not correspond to citations made in some of the
judicial opinions which follow. However, with respect to rights discussed in the text, the
substance has been more or less constant, with a few enhancements, since EAHCA, now
IDEA, was enacted.
57 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (2003) (defining "free and appropriate public education"
through four different elements).
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special needs, that standard becomes part of the state's federal
obligation because the state standard is incorporated by
subsection (B) into the federal requirements for a FAPE.
Subsection (B) should be read in close conjunction with the
introductory word "appropriate" and in conjunction with the
definition of "special education" in § 1401(25) which states:
The term "special education" means specially designed
instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of
a child with a disability, including(A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in
hospitals and institutions, and in other
settings; and
58
(B) instruction in physical education.
In light of this language, while trying to define in varied
contexts what the right to a FAPE means, two questions have
arisen: (1) What substantive requirements for a child's education
are implicit in the word "appropriate" in this federal mandate?
(2) To what extent can standards in state legislation and
regulations lift the substantive requirements for a child's
education above the federal mandate? Several states, by statute
or regulation created language with the potential to raise the
requirements for the education of disabled children above the
FAPE mandate.5 9 In hundreds of reported cases, courts have
struggled to find a workable substantive meaning of
"appropriate" to flesh out the full meaning of FAPE. In a lesser
number of cases courts have struggled to discern the correct
meaning of state mandates which are incorporated into the
foregoing federal definition of a FAPE.
Subsection (C) of 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(8) quoted supra, simply
points toward the breadth of the FAPE requirement from
preschool through completion of secondary school. Subsection (D)
states explicitly that a FAPE requires an education and related

58 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25) (2003) (identifying which types of instruction qualify as
"special education").
59 The states wherein the courts have detected higher mandates are Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, and New Jersey. The case law from each is discussed
later in this article. Other states have statutory language susceptible to interpretation as
a heightened mandate but the courts have made nothing of it. See infra note 104 and
accompanying text.

ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

694

[Vol. 18:3

services in conformity with an individualized education program,
60
a concept fundamental to the Act.
2. Individualized education program (IEP)
It is impractical to quote the whole definition.
are the most salient requirements:

What follows

The term "individualized education program" or "IEP" means
a written statement for each child with a disability that is
developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with this
includes:
and
that
section
(i) a statement of the child's present levels of educational
performance....
(ii) a statement of measurable annual goals, including
benchmarks or short-term objectives, related to (I) meeting the child's needs that result from the child's
disability to enable the child to be involved in and progress
in the general curriculum; and
(II) meeting each of the child's other educational needs
that result from the child's disability;
(iii)A statement of the special education and related services
and supplementary aids and services to be provided to the
child, and a statement of the program modifications or
supports for school personnel that will be provided for the
child

-

(I) to advance appropriately toward attaining the annual
goals;
(II) to be involved and progress in the general curriculum
in accordance with clause (i) and to participate in
extracurricular and other nonacademic activities...
(iv) an explanation of the extent, if any, to which the child
will not participate with non-disabled children in the regular
class and in the activities described .... 61
For parents, schools, and children with disabilities, the IEP
requirement is the core of the Act. Rightly drawn, an IEP
60 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (D) (2003) (requiring that free appropriate public education
is provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under
section 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)).
61 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2003) (defining and explaining the features and requirements
of Individualized Education Programs).
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accurately describes a child's unique needs and charts an
appropriate path for meeting those needs.
The IEP is
inextricably interwoven with the placement decision, e.g. regular
classroom, segregated classroom, out-of-district placement.
Critical to the development of a good IEP is the "IEP team" also
defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) to include: the parents of a child
with a disability, a regular education teacher of the child (if any),
a special education teacher of the child, a representative of the
local educational agency (LEA), a person who can interpret child
evaluations for pedagogical purposes, the child (when
appropriate) and, in the discretion of the parents and LEA, other
persons who have special knowledge or expertise regarding the
child with disabilities. 62 The development of an IEP is critical.
My wife and I have tried to attend all IEP meetings together. In
our experience, the IEP teams have varied greatly, but have
nearly always consisted of persons of integrity and expertise who
have made good partners in working toward IEPs for our
children.
However, case reports illustrate that the IEP
development stage is where relationships between parents and
schools commonly break down, resulting often in parental
rejections of IEPs ultimately proposed by the remainder of the
63
team consisting of the school personnel and often consultants.
3. The least restrictive environment (LRE)
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (5) slips in this requirement as a condition
for federal funding with the words:
A state is eligible for assistance under this subchapter for a
fiscal year if the State demonstrates to the satisfaction of the
Secretary that the State has in effect policies and procedures
to ensure that it meets each of the following conditions....

(5) Least Restrictive Environment
62 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (B) (2003). Note that the person required for interpreting
evaluation results can be one of the teachers or someone with special expertise brought in
from the outside.
63 But see Judith Deberry, Comment, When Parentsand Educators Clash; Are Special
Education Students Entitled to a Cadillac Education?, 34 ST. MARY'S L. J. 503, 505-07
(2003) (noting that conflicts often arise when school districts reject a parental request for
a specific IEP for their child).
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(A) In general
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with
disabilities, including children in public or private
institutions or other care facilities, are educated with
children who are not disabled, and special classes,
separate schooling, or other removal of children with
disabilities from the regular education environment occurs
only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child
is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary64 aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.
This least-restrictive-environment (LRE) requirement (which
can also be labeled as a child's right) has played a powerful role
in channeling
placements, hence,
in influencing IEP
development. It arose as an amendment to the Education of the
Handicapped Act (EHA) of 1974 introduced by Senator Robert
65
Stafford of Vermont and was later incorporated into the Act.
Schools must make a good faith effort to place and keep special
education students in the least restrictive setting compatible
with meeting their special needs. Two words, "mainstreaming"
and "inclusion" are often used interchangeably with the phrase
"least restrictive environment" but this is misleading.
"Mainstreaming" and "inclusion" both refer to placement of
children with disabilities in regular education classrooms with
children without disabilities. Regular classrooms are deemed the
mainstream. "Inclusion" implies the opposite of segregation,
hence, "mainstreaming" and "inclusion" can rightly be viewed a
synonymous but they are narrower than "least restrictive
environment" which can have many meanings, depending upon
the placements which are possible for a disabled child. 66 For a
child with severe physical or mental impairments, a hospital
room might be the least restrictive environment available, but
this would not be inclusion or mainstreaming. As case law will
show, the LRE rule has often resulted in the validation of schools'
64 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2003) (requiring that children with disabilities be placed
in the least restrictive environment which includes placing children with disabilities in
classes with non-disabled children when appropriate and removing disabled children from
these classes only under certain circumstances).
65 YELL, supra note 38, at 244.

66 The textual discussion of terms is largely derived from Mitchell Yell's discussion.
See id. at 244-45.
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plans for mainstreaming against the protests of parents and
occasionally,
on
parental
insistence,
has resulted
in
mainstreaming against the protests of educators. In my view, the
least-restrictive-environment
requirement
is
not always
beneficial to children with disabilities, but it plays a very
important role in contemporary judicial reasoning, and I think,
on the whole it has had a positive influence on schools.
4. Related services
A FAPE may require "related services" defined in § 1401(22) as
follows:
The term "related services" means transportation, and such
developmental, corrective, and other supportive services
(including speech-language pathology and audiology services,
psychological services, physical and occupational therapy,
recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work
services, counseling services, including rehabilitation
counseling, orientation and mobility services, and medical
services, except that such medical services shall be for
diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required
to assist a67 child with a disability to benefit from special
education.
As the teenagers would say, this list is awesome. Developing
an IEP to provide a FAPE may require a great deal more than
simply figuring out the right placement for a child. The unique
needs of a child may require any imaginable combination of
related services in order for an IEP to provide a FAPE. Hence,
the IEP team may need to include persons with expertise on
related services. It ought not be forgotten that the definition of a
FAPE in 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(8) specifically includes a reference to
"related services."
Developing a reasonable combination of
"related services" can be a major part of developing an acceptable
IEP.

67 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (2003). Related services include a broad range of supportive
services designed to further enhance the education of a child with disabilities. For a
discussion of related services at length, see YELL, supra note 38, at 195-18.

698

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:3

5. The right to a due process hearing
20 U.S.C. § 1415 contains a well-developed array of procedural
rights, including most importantly parental rights to notice at
various points. I have decided to pluck from the myriad strands
of this section one right important for understanding case law,
namely, the right to a due process hearing.
Section 1415 states in pertinent part:
(a) Establishment of procedures
Any State educational agency, State agency, or local
educational agency that receives assistance under this
subchapter shall establish and maintain procedures in
accordance with this section to ensure that children with
disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural
safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate
public education by such agencies....

(b) Types of procedures
The procedures required by this section shall include....
(6)an opportunity to present complaints with respect to
any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child, or the provisions of a
free appropriate public education to such child....

(f) Impartial due process hearing
(1) In general
Whenever a complaint has been received... the parents
involved in such complaint shall have an opportunity for
an impartial due process hearing, which shall be
conducted by the State educational agency or by the local
educational agency, as determined by state law or by the
State educational agency. 68
It is evident that the right to a due process hearing, e.g. when
parents reject a proposed IEP, is a federal right, but the due
process tribunal and any reviewing processes must be created by
state law.
Special education law, procedurally as well as
substantively, is an exercise in cooperative federalism. States
have handled the due process hearing requirement differently.
Massachusetts, for example, has created a Bureau of Special
68 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415 (a), (b), (f) (2003) (highlighting various important procedural
rights).
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Education Appeals (BSEA). A well-trained lawyer serves as a
hearing officer who hears the case in the first instance. 69 In New
Jersey administrative hearing officers play the same role, but
may hear other kinds of cases as well. 70 In Missouri, a panel of
three members, generally composed of two educators and one
71
lawyer, hear evidence and arguments.
As to administrative appeals, § 1415(g) states in relevant part,
"If the hearing required by subsection (f) of this section is
conducted by a local educational agency, any party aggrieved by
the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal
such findings and decision to the state educational agency."
Many states provide for administrative review though this is not
required if a state agency provides personnel to hear the case in
the first instance. Fundamental fairness requires that hearing
officers and reviewing officers be independent of administrative
and policy making personnel in the state departments of
72
education.
6. The right to judicial review
Section 1415 (i) (2) allows:
(A) In general
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made
under subsection (f) or (k) of this section [subsection k deals
with placement changes] who does not have the right of
appeal under subsection (g) of this section, and any party
aggrieved by the findings and decision under this section,
shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the
complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action
may be brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction

69 See Seth Stern, Circuits Divided On Disability Education Action; The 1st Circuit
Held FERPA Does Not Guaranteea PrivateRight of Action, W. MASS. L. TRIB., Jan. 2002,
at 2 (stating that in Massachusetts, the Bureau of Special Education handles due process
appeals from administrative hearings concerning IDEA).
70 See Geis v. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 575, 578 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining independent
agency, New Jersey Office of Administrative Law, hears due process hearings, including
those involving educational issues).
71 See Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 610-11 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting
Clyne's administrative hearing in Missouri, panel of two educators and one lay person
"applied the federal legal standard under IDEA").
72 See, e.g. supra Part VII where North Carolina law is discussed in detail.
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or in a district court of the73United States without regard to
the amount in controversy.
(B) Additional requirements
In any action brought under this paragraph, the court(i) shall receive the records of the administrative
proceedings;
(ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party;
and
(iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the
evidence, shall
grant such relief as the court determines is
74
appropriate.
The right to judicial review in state and federal courts has
proved to be very important for the implementation of the Act.
The federal courts have played a major role, probably more than
state courts. In this context, it is important to remember that
the EACHA was a radical statute, designed to reach millions of
children. It was a significant extension of civil rights to children
with disabilities, as accorded to persons of minority races.
Viewed from a political perspective, it was an attempt to alter a
nation's views and practices with respect to a significant part of
its population. As with other statutes aimed at serious societal
change,
the
tasks
of interpretation
and
meaningful
implementation became tasks for state and especially federal
judges. When the first case requiring a judicial interpretation of
the Act's FAPE mandate was decided by the Supreme Court,
there was widespread disappointment, and in some cases
pessimism, anger and even despair.
C. The Rowley Decision: The Supreme Court Allows Access and
Waffles on Substantive Requirements
Board of Education v. Rowley 75 is necessarily the starting point
for discussing the meaning of a FAPE. The factual summary
73 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2) (A) (2003). Subsection (i) (1) (B) makes it clear that an
aggrieved party may file a civil action after a final administrative decision under
subsection (g).
74 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2) (A), (B) (2003) (mandating that any party who is dissatisfied
with the proceedings may file a civil action which has additional requirements that must
be complied with).
75 458 U.S. 176 (1982). For the district court's findings and disposition of the case, see
Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) and Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483
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76
which follows is based mainly upon the district judge's findings.
Amy Rowley was "handicapped" within the meaning of the Act.
She was deaf from birth, albeit with some residual hearing in
lower frequencies.
Her measured IQ as a child beginning
elementary school was 122. Her parents were both deaf and
speedily became her able advocates and tutors. They raised Amy
with the use of "total communication" involving a wide range of
communicative methods including amplification, signing,
touching, visual cues, and mouthing words. During the year
preceding kindergarten, Amy's parents alerted their local public
school (where Amy's brother with normal hearing was enrolled)
about Amy's needs. The school's personnel responded positively
and constructively. A number of teachers and administrators
took a mini-course in sign language interpretation.
They
conferred with Amy's parents to work out a program for her. The
school installed a teletype phone in the principal's office to
facilitate home-school communications.
By agreement, Amy started kindergarten in a regular
classroom for a trial period without any support services. This
was intended as a data-gathering time. At the end of this trial
period, it was mutually agreed to provide Amy with a wireless
hearing aid. In the middle of her kindergarten year, the school
placed a full-time sign language interpreter with Amy for a twoweek trial period. The interpreter concluded that Amy did not
77
need his services.
Amy went into first grade without the sign interpreter in class.
Her parents worked as part of a Team to develop an IEP. 78 The
IEP draft presented in December of Amy's first grade year placed
her in a regular classroom, required continued use of the wireless
hearing aid, provided the services of a tutor for the deaf for one
class hour per day, and speech therapy for three one-hour
F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y 1980). The Second Circuit's opinion is Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 632
F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
76 Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 529-31 (detailing plaintiffs handicap and educational
history).
77 Id. at 530 (mentioning that this interpreter limited his conclusion to the particular
class in which he served, basing it upon the extraordinary sensitivity of the teacher and
Amy's resistance to the interpretive services, and not ruling out the advisability of a sign
interpreter in other classes or later years).
78 Id. at 530-31 (noting that the team was made up of a psychologist, an educator, a
physician and the parent of a handicapped child, but did not include a sign interpreter).
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sessions per week. The proposed IEP did not provide for a sign
language interpreter for Amy in her classroom. On this point
Amy's parents and the school came to loggerheads.
Amy's parents demanded a due process hearing as allowed by
the Act. When the decision went against them, they appealed to
the New York Commissioner of Education who upheld the initial
examiner's decision.
Having exhausted their administrative
remedies, Amy's parents went to federal district court where
their case came before an able and attentive judge. Taking
account of current scholarship, the judge wrestled with the
meaning of the FAPE mandate.7 9 The judge set up the
interpretive problem and a workable solution as follows:
An "appropriate education" could mean an adequate
education - that is, an education substantial enough to
facilitate a child's progress from one grade to another and to
enable him or her to earn a high school diploma. An
"appropriate education" could also mean one which enables
the handicapped child to achieve his or her full potential.
Between those two extremes, however, is a standard which I
conclude is more in keeping with the regulations, with the
Equal Protection decisions which motivated the passage of
the Act, and with common sense. This standard would
require that each handicapped child be given an opportunity
to achieve his full potential commensurate with the
opportunity provided to other children. Since some
handicapped children will undoubtedly have the intellectual
ability to do better than merely progress from grade to grade,
this standard requires something more than the "adequate
education" described above. On the other hand, since even
the best public schools lack the resources to enable every
child to achieve his potential, the standard would not require
them to go that far.80
Applying this equal-opportunity-to-achieve standard, the judge
found for Amy and her parents. It seemed to the judge that Amy
was channeling much of her energy in class into compensating
for her deafness, and accordingly, "if the need for some of that
79 Id. at 533-35 (citing the very fine article, Enforcing the Right to An Appropriate
Education: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV.
1103, 1125-27 (1979)) (pointing out that it has been left entirely to the courts and the
hearing officers to give content to the requirement of "appropriate education").
80 Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
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compensation were eliminated, her energy could be channeled
into greater excellence in classroom performance. It is unfair
and contrary to law to penalize her for her own efforts and those
of her parents, by which she has remained slightly above the
median in her class."8' In the judge's view, it was Amy's handicap
(not any lack of energy or eagerness) that prevented her from
fully understanding what was said in class. According to the
judge, this was "precisely the kind of deficiency which the Act
addresses in requiring that every handicapped child be given an
appropriate education."8 2 The gap between perceived potential
and measured achievement impressed the judge even though
Amy was doing better than average in her peer group, and was
occasionally helping other students.
The case went on appeal to the Second Circuit which affirmed
with a succinct and deferential majority opinion.8 3 There was a
dissent that ran several pages.8 4 The judges voting to affirm
agreed with the trial court that the interpreter was necessary "to
bring her [Amy's] educational opportunity up to the level of the
educational opportunity being offered to her non-handicapped
peers."8 5 The majority believed that the decision was clearly
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.8 6 However,
considering the unique facts of the case, the affirming judges
expressly limited the holding to the facts of the case and stated

81 Id. at 535.
82 Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
83 Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that not only were the
district court's findings of fact not clearly erroneous, but that they are adequately
supported by the evidence) (emphasis added).
84 See id. at 948-55 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (promulgating the theory that the act
in question already defines a "free appropriate public education", that the standard
adopted by the district court was erroneous and impractical, and that state education
authorities should have been able to submit their own determination before the case was
decided).
85 Id. at 948 (quoting Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 535).
86 See id. at 948 (stating that "[s]ection 1415(e) (2) provides that the district court's
decision must be based on a preponderance of the evidence," and proffering the opinion
that the decision in this case was not only clearly supported by such evidence, but that
the judge weighed and evaluated that evidence with great care and meticulously applied
the standard prescribed by Congress)
86 See id. at 948 n.7 (reaffirming the panel's May 1, 1980 decision to preclude citation
of this decision as authority in any other case, recognizing what they believed to be the
"lack of precedential character" of the decision in view of the unique facts of the case).
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87
that the decision was not intended to have precedential value.
The dissenting judge thought that the district court ignored
statutory language and federal regulations, had not exhibited
sufficient respect for the educational expertise of state
educational
authorities, and had improperly considered
8
8
affidavits. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
Five justices voted to reverse and joined in Justice Rehnquist's
opinion; Justice Blackmun concurred, and Justice White
dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice
Rehnquist insisted that the Act itself defines "free and
appropriate public
education." 89 Moreover,
said Justice
Rehnquist, "[L]ike many statutory definitions, this one tends
toward the cryptic rather than the comprehensive, but that is
scarcely a reason for abandoning the quest for legislative
intent."90 His opinion exhibits an attempt to parse the statutory
language, but also turns to legislative history in the quest for
intent, implicitly acknowledging interstices or at minimum an
ambiguity.
In the legislative history, Justice Rehnquist
discerned a heavy stress upon allowing access to public schools. 91
In short, "Congress' desire to provide specialized educational
services, even in furtherance of 'equality', cannot be read as
imposing any particular substantive educational standard upon
the States. '92 Accordingly:

87 See id. at 948 n.7 (reaffirming the panel's May 1, 1980 decision to preclude citation
of this decision as authority in any other case, recognizing what they believed to be the
"lack of precedential character" of the decision in view of the unique facts of the case).
88 See id. at 948 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (proffering an evidentiary error regarding
what the dissenting judge considered "crucial hearsay affidavits" as additional
justification for the dissenting opinion).
89 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 (1982) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18))
(rejecting explicitly the conclusions or assumptions which had driven the lower courts,
stating: "We are loath to conclude that Congress failed to offer any assistance in defining
the meaning of the principal substantive phrase used in the Act. It is beyond dispute that,
contrary to the conclusions of the courts below, the Act does expressly define 'free and
appropriate public education'.").
90 Id. at 188.
91 See id. at 191-200 (citing Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v.
Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971)); Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of the District of
Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C. 1972) (explaining that the relevant legislation followed
these landmark court cases establishing in law the right to education for all handicapped
children, but not imposing equal opportunity substantive requirements on educational
programs for the handicapped).
92 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.
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When the language of the Act and its legislative history are
considered together, the requirements imposed by Congress
become tolerably clear. Insofar as a State is required to
provide a handicapped child with a "free appropriate public
education," we hold that is satisfies this requirement by
personalized instruction with sufficient support services to
permit the child to benefit educationally from that
instruction. Such instruction and services must be provided
at public expense, must meet the State's educational
standards, must approximate the grade levels used in the
State's regular education, and must comport with the child's
IEP. In addition, the IEP, and therefore the personalized
instruction, should be formulated in accordance with the
requirements of the Act and, if the child is being educated in
the regular classrooms of the public education system,
should be reasonably calculated to enable the child93 to
achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.
Justice Blackmun concurred in the result, but he contended
that the legislative history stressed equality of educational
opportunity in a way the majority opinion denied. 94 Justice
White's dissent was strong, strident at times, especially where he
stressed that the majority had not taken seriously the
Congressional intent "to give handicapped children an
educational opportunity commensurate with that given other
children" and had allowed an inappropriately low substantive
standard to pass muster."95 Justice White wrote scathingly:
Because Amy was provided with some specialized instruction
from which she obtained some benefit and because she
passed from grade to grade, she was receiving a meaningful
and therefore appropriate education.

93 Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
94 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist's opinion evidences a deep conflict on reading the
legislative history. The opinion concludes:
Assuming that the Act was designed to fill the need identified in the House Report that is, to provide a "basic floor of opportunity" consistent with equal protection neither the Act nor its history persuasively demonstrates that Congress thought that
equal protection required anything more than equal access. Therefore, Congress'
desire to provide specialized educational services, even in furtherance of "equality,"
cannot be read as imposing any particular substantive educational standard upon the
States.
Id. at 200-01.
95 Id. at 214.
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This falls short of what the Act intended. The Act details as
specifically as possible the kind of specialized education each
handicapped child must receive. It would apparently satisfy
the Court's standard of "access to specialized instruction and
related services which are individually designed to provide
educational benefit to the handicapped child,".. .for a deaf
child such as Amy to be given a teacher with a loud voice, for
96
she would benefit from that service. The Act requires more.
Justice White's dissenting words with his italicized emphasis
on some benefit portended the anger generated in the
communities of persons who cared about special education.
Perhaps more than the fact that federal law did not require an
interpreter for Amy, the language which seemed to approve a
minimalist substantive standardwas the major cause of distress.
D. Reaction to Rowley: Anger and Seeds for Fresh Growth
Many observers thought the Act had been gutted by a judicial
majority which read legislatively history selectively and refused
to accept the radical implications of the Act. For example, a
practicing lawyer from Arizona wrote in the Journal of Law and
Education:
The obvious rationale for the Court's blatant disregard of
Congressional intent was its unspoken fear that a contrary
result would have opened the floodgates by allowing every
seriously handicapped child in the nation to receive full-time
individualized
educational assistance
where needed.
Although the ultimate effects of requiring the states to
comply with the Act may, indeed, have served to place
overwhelming constraints on the states' ability to provide
educational services to all children, the Court is not
empowered to ignore the clear legislative mandate
recognized by the district court, the Second Circuit and the
one concurring 97 and three dissenting members of the
Supreme Court.
This angry lawyer was not alone in her strong criticisms of the
majority opinion. A student commenting in the Rutgers Law
96 See id. at 214-15 (emphasis in original).
97 See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central
School District v. Rowley: Utter Chaos, 12 J.L. & EDUC. 235 (1983).
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Journal concluded: "The Supreme Court's decision in Rowley that
handicapped children receive a free and appropriate public
education under the EAHCA when they benefit from specialized
instruction is likely to have a negative and far-reaching impact
on the rights of the handicapped."9 8 Other commentary expressed
caution and concern.9 9 Summing it up several years later,
Professor Mark Weber wrote:
The statute was truly radical in attempting to bring a large,
previously ignored segment of the population into the
mainstream of public education. To make that social
transformation work, the Act conferred new, enforceable,
and well-funded rights upon the children's parents.
Advocates for handicapped children, who had worked so hard
for change, exulted in their congressional victory.
Seven years later the Supreme Court turned that
enthusiasm into despair. In Board of Education v. Rowley,
the Court ruled that the Education of the Handicapped Act
requires merely that schools provide services "sufficient to
confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child."
The Court found that "the intent of the Act was more to open
the doors of public education to handicapped children...
98 See Patricia L. Arcuri, Comment, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 989, 1010 (1983). The whole of
the comment takes issue with the majority opinion's interpretation of legislative intent.
Arcuri concludes, "[tihe conservative posture of the Court in Rowley seems inconsistent
with the aggressive judicial and legislative activity which preceded it." Id. at 997. Later
she reiterates, "[t]he Court's conservative posture, influenced by fiscal and federalism
concerns, has resulted in an uncertain standard for future litigants and reviewing
courts... Rowley seriously undercuts Congress' intent to provide equal educational
opportunity to the handicapped through the EAHCA; although there are practical policy
reasons for the court's decision, the Court has exceeded its authority in rewriting that
congressional intent." Id. at 1010.
99 See Margaret Corning Brodrick, Free Appropriate Public Education of
Handicapped Children Requires PersonalizedInstruction and Support Services to Produce
Beneficial Results but Does Not Require Reaching Full Potential of Handicapped Student,
14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 425 (1983) (arguing that that the Court's failure to set substantive
standards by which to analyze laws that disadvantage handicapped children, in
conjunction with their refusal to delineate "handicapped" as a suspect classification under
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, strips the class of judicial
safeguards); see also Kathryn M. Coates, Comment, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 51 (1985); Elena
Gallegos, Beyond Board of Education v. Rowley: Educational Benefit for the
Handicapped?, 97 AM. J. EDUC. 258 (1989); Martha McCarthy, The Pennhurst and
Rowley Decisions: Issues and Implications, 49 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 517 (1983); Karen
Meador, What's Left After Rowley: The Future of Advocacy in Special Education,
EXCEPTIONAL PARENT 59 (1983); John Myers, The Meaning of Appropriate Educational
Programming Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 9 S. ILL. U. L.J.
401 (1984); Mark Yudof, Education for the Handicapped:Rowley in Perspective, 92 AM. J.
EDUC. 163 (1984).
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than to guarantee any particular level of education once
inside." Handicapped persons and advocates were aghast at
the decision. Prominent scholars complained that the Court
had gutted the statute ....100
Looking back more than twenty years later, viewing Rowley
from a father's perspective, not only as a lawyer, I think much of
the rhetoric was a little overheated. True, there was unfortunate
limiting language in Justice Rehnquist's opinion, but there was
also language in his opinion indicating openness to results
tailored to the nuances of fresh facts. For example, Justice
Rehnquist stated:
The Act requires participating States to educate a wide
spectrum of handicapped children, from the marginally
hearing-impaired to the profoundly retarded and palsied. It
is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of
the spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable
by children at the other end, with infinite variations in
between. One child may have little difficulty competing
successfully in an academic setting with non-handicapped
children while another child may encounter great difficulty
in acquiring even the most basic of self-maintenance skills.
We do not attempt today to establish any one test for
determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred
upon all children covered by the Act. Because in this case we
are presented with a handicapped child who is receiving
substantially specialized instruction and related services,
and who is performing above average in the regular
classrooms of a public school system, we confine our analysis
to that situation. 10 1
These words could be construed as signals recognizing
possibilities for fresh developments in case law as new fact
patterns challenged courts to further draw forth the meaning of
the Act in changed circumstances. One person who perceived
fresh possibilities was Professor Perry Zirkel who wrote in the
Maryland Law Review:

100 See Mark C. Weber, The Transformationof the Education of the HandicappedAct:
A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 351-52
(1990).
101 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982).
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At first reading, the Supreme Court's decision in Rowley
seems to sound a dramatic retreat, if not all-out defeat, for
the advocates of handicapped students. Upon closer
examination, however, the majority opinion provides the
elements for the common law evolution of a multifactor test
for determining the meaning of "appropriate education." This
test might include such factors as the nature and severity of
the handicap, the level of local resources and results, and the
evaluation by educational experts.
Thus, rather than ignoring the rights of handicapped
children, in crafting a narrow and ambiguous decision the
Court provided room for full and timely interpretation. An
agenda-setting case like Rodriguez, Rowley invites
immediate experimentation and variation at the state level,
based primarily on state education statutes. It also allows
eventual expansion and consolidation at the federal level by
legislative, administrative, or judicial action. 102
Hence, Professor Zirkel and others who shared his view
perceived grounds for positive lines of evolution in case law, and
noted also that some state statutes with mandates more
challenging than the federal mandate post-Rowley invited
experimentation. 10 3 When Rowley was decided, several states
including, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, and
North Carolina appeared to have heightened mandates in their
special education statutes. 10 4 For example, Massachusetts
required that an IEP be designed and implemented to provide
the maximum possible development for each handicapped
pupil. 10 5 This statutory formulation and similar phraseology in
other state statutes seemed to aim higher than Justice
Rehnquist's "some benefit" requirement so understandably,
advocates looked to these statutes and argued for particular
102 See Perry Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education from Board of Education v.
Rowley: Razing the Door and Raising the Floor,42 MD. L. REV. 466, 494-95 (1983).
103 See Part I. B, supra (noting that the federal FAPE definition incorporated state
educational requirements that in several cases demanded, or appeared to demand, more
than the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Rowley).
104 See Parts III through VII of this article, infra, which discuss the five states'
mandates.
105 See MA. GEN. LAWS. ch. 71B, § 2 (1999), amended by MA. GEN. LAWS. ch. 159, §
154 (making the state mandate equal to the federal mandate); see also Part III, infra,
(discussing the heightened mandate and Massachusetts' legislative repeal thereof).
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placements and services for handicapped children that went
beyond the minimalist interpretations
of the Rowley
requirements. 10 6 Thus, advocates for disabled children in states
with heightened mandates placed their hopes on the state
mandates as a means of lifting special education requirements
above the minimum "some benefit" in Rowley. Parts III through
VII of this article consist of a comparative study of cases arising
07
from five states with heightened mandates.
In portraying the results of my study, I have gone case by case
identifying each child involved as set forth in the reported
opinions because I want to center the inquiry upon the children
with disabilities. 0 8 I have provided a description of the child's
diagnosis and practical learning difficulties as well as a
procedural history leading to the court opinion(s) that resulted. I
confess that putting forth many case histories makes a heavier
burden for a reader than abstract summation does. Yet, in my
own inquiries as a father, two works which mainly set forth cases
proved exceptionally instructive. The first was Leo Kanner's
article entitled "Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact."'10 9
Dr. Kanner shared in detail his observations of eleven children
(eight boys and three girls) whose behaviors were extraordinary.
The children had been presented as idiots, imbeciles, feebleminded, or schizophrenic. It was Leo Kanner's genius to discern
something different from those labels, namely, a rare syndrome
which came to be described by the word autistic which appears in
the title of his article. For me the value of the article lies mainly
106 See generally Zirkel, supra note 102 at 476 (stating that many advocates
considered the Rowley guidelines insufficient to the point of being a "step backwards" for
the rights of handicapped children).
107 The states in order of consideration are Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New
Jersey, and North Carolina. I have placed somewhat more stress on Massachusetts than
the other states for two reasons. First, our family's experiences with special education
have been mainly in Massachusetts and I feel comfortable writing about our state's law.
Second, the Massachusetts cases, including federal cases decided on the basis of
Massachusetts law, cover nearly every major issue that surfaces in other states; hence, a
study of case law in this jurisdiction is a solid introduction for study of case law
elsewhere.
108 In a few of the cases "young adult" would be more descriptive than "child." For
example, in David D. v. Dartmouth School Comm., 615 F. Supp. 639 (D.Mass. 1984), the
plaintiff was seventeen years old at time of the grievance that spurred his lawsuit.
109 See LEO KANNER, Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact, THE NERVOUS CHILD
(1941), available at http://www.ama.org.br/kannerengl2.htm (detailing case studies of
autistic children).
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in its detailed accounts of the eleven children's behaviors. No
abstract summation could replace the stories of those eleven
children. Later, preparing for my normal daughter's (Eleanor's)
entry into the teenage years, I read the classic, Reviving Ophelia,
by Dr. Mary Pipher. 110 The power of this book lies in its concrete
and often gritty stories of the lives of girls and young women.
I am under no illusions that my storytelling, or re-rendering of
stories told in courts, will be as interesting as the works
mentioned above. But, I mention these works as examples of
truth-telling through simple stories. The most important truths
about children with disabilities cannot be captured in statistics.
To rely heavily upon statistics in ignorance of the children's
stories is to substitute cheap abstractions for very rich realities.
The abundance of stories that follow carry their own truths. The
conclusions I draw can have no meaning apart from the concrete
stories.
III. MASSACHUSETTS: THE '"MAXIMUM POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT"
MANDATE

A. The Beginning: Enactment of Chapter 766

The Massachusetts legislature acted earlier than did Congress
to meet the educational needs of children with disabilities in a
comprehensive way. The special education statute commonly
known in Massachusetts as Chapter 766 was enacted in 1972,
effective September 1, 1974.111 Its language in relevant part

required the state Department of Education (DOE) in cooperation
with other departments to promulgate regulations designed "to
assure the maximum possible development" of children with

110 See MARY PIPHER, REVIVING OPHELIA: SAVING THE SELVES OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS,
(Ballantine Publishing Co. 1994) (looking at the myriad social evils that plague teenage
females).
111 MA. GEN. LAWS. ch. 71B, § 2 (1999). For early cases discussing the enactment and
earlier implementation of this act, see Stock v. Mass. Hosp. School, 467 N.E.2d 448, 452
(Mass. 1984); Amherst-Pelham Regional School Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 381 N.E.2d 922,
928 (Mass. 1978); Isgur v. School Comm. of Newton, 400 N.E.2d 1292, 1296 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1980).
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special needs." 112 Naturally, the meaning of "maximum possible
development" required interpretation in the courts. The judges
who were confronted with this language took it seriously, but
never literally. The resulting body of case law, state and federal,
grew increasingly nuanced from the 1970's through the turn of
the Century.
B. Developing the Mandate: Cases from 1980 - 1992
113
1. John Isgur and the School Committee of Newton

Although John went through his first and second grades before
Chapter 766 became effective, his teachers recognized that he
had perceptual problems; and accordingly, his school provided
him with special help in reading and math. Soon after Chapter
766 became effective, John's parents requested a full "core
114
evaluation" under regulations promulgated by the state DOE.
The school instead made an intermediate "core evaluation" which
was less extensive. 115 Thereafter, the IEP team,1 16without the
parents' agreement, recommended an IEP by which John would
continue in a regular classroom with special assistance in
reading and math. John's parents rejected the proposed IEP and
demanded a due process hearing before an officer of the Bureau
of Special Education Appeals (BSEA). Pending a final decision,
they placed John in a private school and sought reimbursement
for tuition.
The BSEA's hearing officer decided that the IEP as proposed
was overly vague and general, but that these deficiencies had
been partially rectified by explanations to John's parents, and

112 MA. GEN. LAWS. ch. 71B, § 2 originally required "maximum possible
development." It was modified to follow the federal standard in 2000 by ch. 159, § 154.
This is addressed in Part III.E of this article.
113 See Isgur, 400 N.E.2d at 1293 (holding that intermediate core evaluation was
adequate in determining the classroom needs of the disabled plaintiff).
114 See id. at 1294 n.4 (explaining the requirements for a full core evaluation as per
regulations).
115 The intermediate core evaluation as done was fairly extensive inasmuch as it
involved John's parents, the school psychologist, the principal, and three of his teachers.
Id. at 1294 n.5.
116 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2003) (setting forth required team composition). See Part
II.B. supra.

2004]

MANDATE FOR EDUCATING DISABLED CHTLDREN

713

that the IEP would be satisfactory with modifications. 117 The
State Advisory Commission on Special Education (Commission)
affirmed whereupon John's parents filed an action in the state
Superior Court. The court entered a judgment sustaining the
Commission's decision. John's parents appealed to the
Massachusetts Appeals Court which took up the main issue:
Whether failure to do a full core evaluation rendered the BSEA
hearing officer's decision about the IEP invalid. The court
decided that, "a failure to comply with the regulation requiring a
full core evaluation upon the parent's request goes to the essence
of rights protected by ch. 766."118 The court went on to decide,

however, that no prejudice had resulted from the intermediate
core evaluation, that the plan that would have emerged from a
full core evaluation would have resembled the plan actually
proposed, and that the IEP requiring a placement in the Newton
public school was consistent with the law." 9
The case would be mildly interesting as an early application of
Chapter 766; however, it would not merit full consideration in
this article, except for the following dictum:
Of course, it is possible that he might have made greater
progress in the presumably smaller classes at the private
school, just as we assume that many non-special needs
children would make greater progress in smaller classes if
there were resources to provide them, but this is not the test
for determining prejudice to John and his parents.
[T]he language "maximum extent feasible" as used in the
statute must be interpreted in light of the clear preference
under the statutory and regulatory scheme for keeping the
child wherever possible in a regular education program or
the least restrictive alternative placement ....

117 Isgur, 400 N.E. 2d at 1295 (recounting the details of the BSEA hearing,
specifically that the hearing officer assumed the power to order the modifications
necessary to make the IEP acceptable).
118 Id. at 1296 (reviewing the evaluation requirements of Chapter 766 and comparing
to the tests actually done; noting that a deviation from the statutory test set is only a
violation if the child's rights are prejudiced).
119 Isgur, 400 N.E. 2d at 1298 (holding that since the board apparently acted in good
faith and the parents failed to present evidence contradicting the board's conclusions
regarding the child's strengths, the board's decision would stand).
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Applying these principles to the facts found by the hearing
officer, we conclude that the plaintiffs did not sustain their
burden of establishing that the Newton program as modified
could not benefit John to the "maximum extent feasible"
while retaining him in the least
restrictive alternative to the
120
regular education program.
It followed that John's parents were not entitled to
reimbursement for tuition paid to the private day school. 12' More
importantly, the maximum possible development mandate - two
years prior to Rowley - was already being judicially rendered as a
maximum-extent-feasible mandate.
A common dictionary
definition of "feasible" opens the door to flexibility, suitability,
and practicality. 122

The linguistic shift was sufficient to blunt the sharp edge of the
utopian words maximum possible development before those words
took on much meaning. Maybe the court was on solid ground
since the word "feasible" did appear in another section of the
statutory scheme pertaining to the evaluation of special
education programs. 123 On the other hand, one can argue
cogently that the different word choices in different sections of
the state act indicated a legislative intent to make a distinction
in the requirements embedded in those separate sections.
Nonetheless, the formulation "maximum feasible" soon replaced
"maximum possible" in judicial opinions. In 1984, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted the phrase "maximum
feasible benefit" in the case of Stock v. Massachusetts Hospital
School. 124 The federal courts picked it up. 125 Thus, within a
120 Id.

121 Id. (denying reimbursement largely based on lack of reversible error on the part of
the school). Cf Amherst-Pelham Regional Sch. Comm. v. Dep't. of Educ., 381 N.E.2d 922,
933 (Mass. 1978) (authorizing the Bureau of Child Advocacy to refer a child to an
alternative program despite any judgment by committee and granting reimbursement to
parents for the costs of a necessary and appropriate private school).
122 1. Capable of being done, executed, or effected: possible of realization....
2. Capable of being managed, utilized or dealt with successfully: suitable...
3. Reasonable, likely (gave an explanation that seemed [feasible enough].
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 831 (3d ed. 2002).

123 MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 71B, § 3, 16 (2003) (pertaining to assessments of children
and programs requiring reassignment of a child if an evaluation of the child's program
demonstrated that the program was not benefiting the child "to the maximum extent
feasible"; amended in 1989 to add a qualifier about least restrictive environment).
124 Stock v. Mass. Hosp. Sch., 467 N.E.2d 448 (Mass. 1984) (relaxing "possible" to
"feasible").
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decade of its enactment, the Massachusetts mandate was
routinely articulated by a combination of words less utopian than
the statutory language of ch. 71B, § 2 where the mandate was
codified. 126 In meetings bearing upon special education, parents
and school personnel usually spoke of maximum feasible benefit
or MFB as the operative mandate. But, the words maximum
possible development did not disappear from judicial opinions

entirely. 127
In addition to the linguistic softening of the mandate, on close
parsing, the case of John Isgur discloses three limitations on
private placements: the least restrictive alternative requirement,
the allocation of the burden of proof to John's parents in the
judicial action (with an implicit presumption in favor of the
BSEA's decision), and an explicit recognition that scarcity of
resources may play a role in deciding whether an IEP meets the
state mandate. 128 These limitations recur in later cases;
consequently, I will not develop them further at this time.

125 See David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 423 (1st Cir. 1985)
(showing the willingness of the First Circuit to use this phrasing of the standard).
126 This was recognized in a DOE study of the Special Education Standard for
Services wherein the department rendered its own conclusions about the evolution of the
operative formula in Massachusetts:
The term "maximum feasible benefit" does not appear as such in G.L. c. 71B. The
term came into use after decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
(Stock v. Massachusetts Hospital School, 392 Mass. 205 (1984) and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit (David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee, 775 F.2d 411
(1st Cir. 1985)) referred to language in G.L. c. 71B mandating that the Individual
Educational Plan developed for a student with disabilities must "benefit the child to
the maximum extent feasible." That phrase still appears in c. 71B, § 3, paragraph 16,
but it was amended in 1989 to state that the program must "benefit the child to the
maximum extent feasible in the least restrictive environment." The Stock and David
D. decisions also referred to the phrase in G.L. 71B, § 2 that called for the "maximum
possible development" of a child with special needs. That provision, too, was amended
in 1989 so that it now reads, "maximum possible development in the least restrictive
environment."
Massachusetts Department of Education, Preliminary Study of the Special Education
Standard for Services, (2000) available at http://www.doe.mass.edulsped/2000/sfs/
intro.html.
127 See David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 615 F. Supp. 639, 645 (D.C. Mass.1984)
(framing the issue as whether the school "addresses plaintiffs special educational needs
so as to assure his maximum possible development in the least restrictive environment").
128 Both special needs children and non-special needs children might make greater
progress in smaller classes if there were resources to provide them. However, the
Supreme Judicial Court later explicitly rebuffed a claim by the School Committee of
Brookline that it could not fund a private placement because of Proposition 2 1/2, a state
statute that limits increases in property taxes. Sch. Comm. of Brookline v. Bureau of
Special Educ. Appeals, 452 N.E. 2d 476, 481 (Mass. 1983).
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129
2. Margaret Lang and the Braintree School Committee

Margaret was diagnosed as mentally retarded, mentally ill,
epileptic, and seizure prone.
During her pre-school and
elementary school years, her parents lived in Boston, and the
Boston School Department provided funding that enabled
Margaret to attend a private school, St. Coletta Day School. Her
years at St. Coletta's were not trouble-free as she suffered many
seizures, 130and only gradually learned to relate to teachers and
other children. When Margaret was in her teens, her parents
moved to Braintree and requested that the Braintree School
Committee assume the financial obligations for Margaret's
continuing placement at St. Coletta's. The school committee
declined and instead offered a public school placement with
special services.
Margaret's parents rejected the plan, and mediation failed, so a
due process hearing before a BSEA officer was held. The hearing
officer issued a decision declaring that the school had offered an
appropriate educational plan. 131 This decision was affirmed by
the Commission. 132 Margaret's parents challenged the BSEA
decision in federal district court as was their right under 20
U.S.C. §1414(e). 133 The parents argued two main points: that the
public school would be unsafe on account of Margaret's physical
problems, 134and that the shock of transition would be positively
harmful. The parents were able to muster some expert opinions

129 Lang v. Braintree Sch. Comm. 545 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Mass. 1982).
130 Id. at 1225 (noting that the child's seizures were controlled with medications
adjusted over time enabling her to perform such tasks as using stairs safely but not
sufficiently to allow her to participate in a regular public education program).
131 Id. at 1224 (noting also that the school committee's plan was less restrictive than
placement at St. Coletta's Day School).
132 Id. at 1223 n.2 (discussing the details of the IEP created for the child by the
Braintree School Committee, and approved by the BSEA and Commission).
133 See generally id. at 1221 (listing the Massachusetts Commissioner of Education
and the Braintree School Committee as defendants; for the purposes of this article only
'the school committee' or 'the school' will be referred to as the Langs' adversary, since the
naming of the commissioner as a defendant made no difference in the issues raised in the
case).
134 Id. at 1228 (rejecting this part of the plaintiffs argument, since the child would
have to face stairs not only at the public school, but also at the St. Coletta school and even
the plaintiffs own home: "It is clear to the court that the safety hazards intrinsic in the
Braintree program are no greater than those existing in the St. Coletta program or, in
fact, in the Langs' home").
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in support of their arguments, especially the later one. 135 The
school committee contended with expert opinions that its
proffered placement was equally strong and less restrictive;
hence, it ought to be acceptable. In view of the Act's preference
for maintaining the status quo,136the judge placed the burden of
establishing the sufficiency of the IEP upon the school
committee, but easily determined that the burden had been met
stating, "Braintree is clearly offering Margaret an educational
program designed to benefit her, and numerous professionals
testified that this program embodies sound educational
thinking."' 37 In a more complete justification of this decision, the
judge wrote:
[T]here is every reason to believe, that Margaret's placement
in a public school setting, with the proper special education
and support services, would be of greater benefit to her than
remaining in a private school setting. The court gives
particular credence to the testimony of Braintree's school
nurse, the only witness who is personally familiar with both
programs, and to Dr. Rosenberger, who treated Margaret for
several years and is acquainted with the Langs. Their
testimony strongly suggests that at least at this point in her
life, Margaret will benefit more from the program Braintree
offers through its IEP than from the St. Coletta's program.
While the change from St. Coletta's to Braintree might be a
difficult one, the court does not view it as devastating, as
plaintiffs suggest. Inasmuch as the Braintree IEP relies on
legitimate educational philosophy akin to the mainstreaming
approach preferred by the Act, and will provide to Margaret
what this court views as an education that benefits her
within the meaning of the Act, the IEP must be deemed
138
satisfactory under the Act.
The least-restrictive-environment (LRE) requirement tilted the
judge toward sustaining the BSEA decision even though the
135 Id. at 1228 (conceding, in light of plaintiffs expert testimony, that the transition
to a public school might be traumatic for the child but ultimately holding from the
evidence that the child would be better suited "at this point in her life" in a public school
catering to her needs).
136 Id. (explaining 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) contains preference for maintaining the
status quo in situations where child is currently receiving "an appropriate education").
137 Id.
138 Id.
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school had violated procedural requirements of the Act. 139 On this
point, the case is consistent with the case of John Isgur1 40 But,
on close scrutiny, Margaret's case reveals something more: the
absence of any argument based upon the higher mandate of
Massachusetts state law even though John Isgur's case was in
the reports. This serves as a reminder of the importance of
advocacy in the early stages of any contested placement.' 4 1 I
doubt, however, that a strong argument based upon the state
mandate would have made any difference once the judge was
convinced that a placement less restrictive than St. Coletta's was
best for Margaret.142
3. David D. and the Dartmouth School Committee 14 3
David D. was born with Down Syndrome. Through his
elementary, middle school, and early high school years, David
attended the Dartmouth public schools where he received special
educational services. Unfortunately, David developed abnormal
sexually aggressive behaviors as a teenager. His parents felt
strongly that he needed a residential program to educate him in
appropriate self-control; therefore, they rejected a proposed IEP
139 For a discussion of the appropriateness of the IEP established by the school
system which implemented the goal of mainstreaming children when there was legitimate
basis, see Id. at 1228. For an explication of the least-restrictive-environment requirement
under federal law, see Part II of this article. On the application of the least-restrictiveenvironment requirement, compare Isgur v. Sch. Comm. of Newton, 400 N.E.2d 1292,1297
(Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (ruling hearing officer was correct in finding the public system was
least restrictive option and appropriate to meet the child's needs).
140 See id. at 1297 (ruling hearing officer was correct in finding the public system was
least restrictive option and appropriate to meet the child's needs).
141 The absence of any argument rooted in the state mandate might have been an
oversight on the part of Lang's lawyer, or it might have been due to a belief that
compliance with the state mandate could not be litigated in federal court. The question of
whether or not the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution barred suits
in federal court to enforce students' rights created by state law was a live question in the
First Circuit until the decision in David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F2d. 411, 42021 (1st Cir. 1985), the next case discussed in the text.
142 The opinion also discloses a deference to the educational philosophy espoused by
the school committee, a deference which we will see again. I also note that the judge was
very humane in not allowing the school's reimbursement claim. The judge justified this by
reference to the procedural errors made by the school establishment: "Given the
significant procedural defects in the development of the IEP, and the fact that Margaret
remained in a setting which Braintree concedes offered her a beneficial educational and
social experience, the Langs should not be required to reimburse Braintree for the
amounts expended to keep Margaret at St. Coletta's." 545 F. Supp. at 1228.
143 David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 615 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1984), affd, 775
F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985).
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that would have kept him in a public high school. After a due
process hearing, the BSEA hearing officer decided in favor of the
school committee's proposed IEP, finding that David's breaches of
socially acceptable behavioral conventions outside of school were
isolated, that the primary goal for David's IEP must be to
maximize his ability for independence, and that supportive
counseling for David and his family members - as offered by the
school committee in a proposed IEP modification - rendered the
IEP adequate and appropriate. David's parents filed an action
challenging the BSEA decision in federal district court.
The arguments, as set out in an opinion by the district judge,
disclose a very sophisticated contest between opposing lawyers
each parsing the statutes and case law trying to gain an
appropriate advantage: the school committee's lawyer laid the
stress on the mainstreaming requirement by contending that if a
student is benefiting from a program, that student cannot
lawfully be placed in a more restrictive program; and the parents'
lawyer laid the stress upon language in the Burlington IP44
opinion which said that the LRE requirement could not be
employed to cure an otherwise defective placement. The parents'
lawyer strongly argued for the application of the state mandate
that presumably hoisted the demands of state law above the
federal FAPE requirements.
Counsel could rightly point to
recent dicta from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
describing state special education law as law mandating that the
department shall administer special education programs so as to
"assure the maximum possible development of a child with
145
special needs."
144 For a discussion of the least restrictive environment as a federal right, see Town
ofBurlington v. Dep't. of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 789 n.19 (1st Cir. 1984), affd, 471 U.S. 359
(1985),. This case eventually went to the Supreme Court which decided that the EAHCA
(later IDEA) granted courts the equitable power to order reimbursements to parents who
unilaterally made acceptable placements when a school district or committee proposed an
IEP that was found inadequate. 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985). Burlington I and II could have
been presented fully in the text, and do constitute a big piece of the Massachusetts'
contribution to the law of special education, but I have avoided doing so because there is
an abundance of simpler case that well illustrate the trends I want to describe.
145 David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 615 F. Supp. 639, 645 (D. Mass. 1984)
(quoting Stock v. Mass. Hosp. Sch., 467 N.E.2d 448, 53 (Mass. 1984). The Supreme
Judicial Court was interpreting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71B, § 2 as amended by St. 1978,
ch. 552, § 19. The court in Stock decided that the school had wrongly graduated a student
thereby cutting him off from special education services, and accordingly ordered the
diploma rescinded. However, in Stock the court also employed the "maximum feasible
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In this case, the higher state standard almost certainly made a
difference to the federal district judge since he ruled for the
parents stating:
The state standard mandates that an IEP assure plaintiffs
maximum possible development. I find persuasive the
unanimous opinion of plaintiffs experts that plaintiff
requires a residential training program in order to achieve
the maximum progress in the development in his ability to
function as independently as possible and that a residential
setting is the least restrictive environment in which
plaintiffs educational needs could currently be met.
Therefore, I conclude that plaintiff has met the burden of
proving that the Dartmouth IEP for 1982-83 (as amended) is
inadequate; and I find that placement in a residential
school.. .is
the educational placement appropriate for
146
plaintiff.
So, the federal judge ordered that the Dartmouth School
A
Committee must place David into a residential school.
predictably unhappy school committee appealed. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit had "no difficulty affirming [the
district court's decision] in its entirety." 14 7 This court fixed its
approval of the district judge's reasoning upon the Massachusetts
mandate, stating in pertinent part:
.. the district court stated the issue as "whether
Dartmouth's IEP addresses plaintiffs special education
needs so as to assure his maximum potential development in
the least restrictive environment consistent with that goal."
We think 14the
court both phrased and answered the question
8
correctly.
The case of David D. is one case - perhaps the main appellate
case - where the Massachusetts mandate appears to have tipped
the balance against the school committee resulting in the
overturning of a BSEA decision. 149 This case was litigated long
benefit" language which takes the hard edge off of maximum possible development. Mass.
Hosp. Sch., 467 N.E.2d at 453-54.
146 Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 615 F. Supp. at 647-48 (citation omitted).
147 David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 423 (1st Cir. 1985).
148 Id.

149 Obviously, it is not possible to state for certain whether the district judge or the
First Circuit would have ruled differently without the heightened state mandate. But, at
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before the scandals in Boston involving sexual improprieties of
priests came to light, but I have wondered whether a sub-text in
David D's case was other children's safety. The district court and
appellate decisions requiring a residential placement might well
have been based in part upon a genuine judicial concern to avoid
possible sexual exploitation if it could be avoided by more intense
training for David D. In my view the disposition in this case was
150
eminently sensible.
5
4. Matthew M. and the Concord School Committee' '

Matthew suffered from deficiencies in fine and gross motor
coordination, visual motor coordination, and had trouble relating
to his peers. He was easily distracted. He may have suffered
from Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD). 152 In any event, Matthew
was a child who needed special education. He went through his
elementary school years in the Concord public schools, my
hometown, under yearly IEPs. The dispute between Matthew's
parents and the school district broke out when he was entering
middle school.
The school offered an IEP for the 1986-1987 academic year,
placing Matthew in a public school classroom with supports. His
parents rejected the proposed IEP, demanded a due process
hearing, and unilaterally placed Matthew at the Landmark
School, a private school for especially challenged children. The
BSEA hearing officer's decision (issued in June 1987 after the
academic year had ended) went in favor of the school district
with a proviso, namely, that an after-school socialization
this stage of the evolution of the federal mandate, I think the outcome probably would
have been different in the absence of a strong state mandate. The First Circuit opinion is
also important because the majority decided that the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution does not bar suits in federal court to enforce rights created by state
law. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d at 423. For a discussion of the Eleventh
Amendment implications, see Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
20-30 (1981).
150 The First Circuit opinion is also important because a child's right to an IEP
empowers him or her to attain the maximum possible development under a state
mandate. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d at 423. The federal Act is deemed to
incorporate the state mandate making it federal law. There was a strong dissent. Id. at
420.

151 Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990).
152 Matthew's parents hired a neurologist who was prepared to testify before a
federal judge that Matthew suffered from ADD, but judge excluded the testimony. See id.
at 988 n.1. The exclusion was not deemed to be error. Id.

722

ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:3

component must be added. 153 Since the Landmark placement had
been made by the parents in good faith, the hearing officer
ordered reimbursement for one semester's costs. Matthew's
154
parents filed for review in federal court.
Meanwhile, the school's representatives worked up an IEP for
the 1987-1988 school year, apparently without help from
Matthew's parents. This proposed IEP was similar to the 19861987 proposal and Matthew's parents rejected it. The federal
court stayed the action for review of the 1986-1987 IEP to allow
time for a due process hearing on the proposed 1987-1988 IEP. A
second hearing officer approved this IEP, partly on the grounds
that the Landmark placement was not the least restrictive
environment for Matthew as required by federal and state law.
The federal judge allowed leave to amend so that Matthew's
parents could challenge both BSEA decisions in one judicial
action.
The judge accepted the administrative records as
evidence, took no new evidence1 55and decided that both proposed
156
IEPs as offered were appropriate.
The First Circuit opinion which followed is one of the most
closely reasoned and enlightening opinions issued on the
meaning of the Massachusetts mandate. The court commenced
by asserting that the parents (complaining parties) had the
153 See id. at 989 n.2 (noting that school district had engrafted this component onto
its proposed IEP in January, 1987, which was prior to the beginning of the due process
hearing).
154 The child's parents wanted a declaration that the hearing officer had erred in
approving Concord's placement and wanted all costs for the Landmark placement. Id. at
989. The district cross-claimed against the Department of Education claiming that the
BSEA had exceeded it authority in the circumstances by ordering any reimbursement. Id.
155 The judge's refusal to take new evidence was something vigorously complained
about on appeal. The refusal is understandable in light of what happened in the second
due process hearing. Plaintiffs' lawyer admitted that he had three expert witnesses
favorable to Matthew's case "squirreled away," as the First Circuit noted, for the
anticipated court trial. Id. at 996. The hearing office implored counsel to produce these
witnesses for the hearing to avoid undermining the administrative process. Apparently
not trusting the administrative process, counsel refused to produce the witnesses. When
the second BSEA decision went against his clients, counsel brought out the experts and
proffered their testimony to the federal judge in the case where review of both BSEA
cases was now consolidated. The judge refused to hear any of the expert testimony. The
First Circuit panel approved stating, "We refuse to reduce the proceedings before the
state agency to a mere dress rehearsal by allowing appellants to transform the Act's
judicial review mechanism into an unrestricted trial de novo. Where parties could have,
but purposely chose not to, call certain witnesses at the administrative hearing, the
district court has discretion to exclude testimony on judicial review." Id. at 997.
156 See id. (reversing the BSEA order that Concord was required to pay for Matthew's
first semester at Landmark because his parents had made the placement in good faith).
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burden of proving that the BSEA's decisions were wrong. 157 The
court acknowledged that the case argued for Matthew's parents
turned mainly on the meaning of the Massachusetts mandate.
Describing the parents' case, the court stated:
In storming these ramparts, appellants [parents] rely
heavily on the particulars of Massachusetts' requirement
that its special education programs "assure the maximum
possible development" of handicapped students. This
substantive standard is admittedly higher than the federal
"educational benefit" floor, and makes the formulation and
evaluation of IEPs a more complicated task in the
Commonwealth than elsewhere. Be that as it may, the
parents' claim that their son's academic progress at
Landmark necessarily demonstrated the inadequacy of
Concord's IEPs will not wash: even under the Massachusetts
standard a program which maximizes a student's academic
potential does not by that fact alone comprise the requisite
"adequate and appropriate" education. In a nutshell,
appellants' per se approach is far too simplistic.158
Thus, Matthew's academic achievement in the private
placement was relevant, but not dispositive; rather, it was one
factor to be considered in judging an IEP. Other aspects of a
child's development are also important, hence, "purely academic progress-maximizing academic potential - is not the only indicia
of educational benefit implicated either by the Act or by state
law." 159 Moreover, an IEP should not be judged exclusively in
hindsight. Judicial review should take into account what was
objectively reasonable when the IEP was promulgated. A court
should not impose its own judgment in the place of any
educational agency's judgment, at least where "the IEP proposed
by the school district is based upon an accepted, proven
methodology."' 160 An IEP must be in accord with the LRE

157 Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 991 (1st Cir. 1990) (detailing
who has the burden and the extent of the burden before confronting the appellants'
particularized challenges).
158 Id. (citations omitted).
159 Id. at 992.
160 Id. (citing Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290, 297 (7th Cir.
1988)).
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requirements of both federal and state law. 16 1 Finally, a district
court should give "due weight" to the administrative hearing
162
officers' judgments.
Within these carefully stated guidelines, the First Circuit
opinion concluded:
[T]he court obviously agreed with the BSEA hearing officers
that Matthew required not only academic help but also
socialization training and motor skills assistance. Having
canvassed the evidence presented by Matthew's teacher, his
parents, and the treating professionals, we cannot say that
such a conclusion constituted clear error. As a matter of
maximizing Matthew's educational benefit, those special
needs were properly considered by the IEP team,
notwithstanding the parents' rather single- minded focus on
academic results ....The IEP ensured socialization therapy
with a psychologist and occupational therapy to improve
Matthew's social skills. Landmark's regimen provided no
motor skills training and no specific program of socialization
therapy. It follows that Concord should lawfully implement
an educational plan which it reasonably considered more
appropriate and well-rounded than the Landmark program,
especially when its IEP explicitly provided for more, and
better diversified, 163"related services" keyed to Matthew's
specific handicaps.
The LRE requirement was a major factor in sustaining the
appropriateness of Concord's proposed IEPs. 164 The court created
an image of balancing interests on a fulcrum: on one side is
maximum benefit and on the other is least- restrictiveenvironment, and in this case, taking into account the totality of
Matthew's needs, the school district "struck an adequate and
appropriate balance." 165 Clearly, the Massachusetts mandate was
161 See id. (stating the pedagogical format must be such that a handicapped student

is educated, as much as possible, with children sans handicaps).
162 See id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)) (stating in fact the
district court was bound to this duty).
163 Id. at 993.

164 The court's opinion detailed Concord's proposed IEP for 1986-1987 as well as the
later proposed IEP for 1987-1988 which involved a combination of regular and segregated
classroom experiences during the course of Matthew's school day. Id. "In contrast, as a
residential school catering to a learning-disabled clientele, Landmark posed a much more
restrictive environment and afforded decreased prospects for mainstreaming." Id.
165 See id. (sustaining district court's affirmative conclusion).
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neither self-defining nor simple; rather, the court saw it as a
supple concept the meaning of which must shift from case to
case, always qualified by the federal Act's requirements. No
doubt due to its precision and balance, the case of Matthew M.
has wielded an enormous influence.
It set the tone and
established an analytical style for much subsequent litigation,
such as the case that follows.
At this point, however, I want to avoid creating a false
impression of unqualified enthusiasm for the choices of the
Concord school personnel and the judicial decisions which
sustained those choices. The school personnel, the BSEA hearing
officer, and the judges seem to have made their decisions with
such care and attention to detail, that it is easy to be mesmerized
by process and professionalism, and to forget the impact of the
disposition. Matthew was doing well at Landmark, and his
parents really did want to make his academic progress the
priority. Given the intense competition for schools of higher
education, parents cannot reasonably be faulted for attempting to
give a child every reasonable advantage in that competition, even
if the child has reduced chances of gaining social skills or being
exposed to "normal" students. While the LRE requirement is
generally laudable, it should be recognized that it can operate as
a weapon that can preclude conscientious parents and guardians
from selecting the programs that seem best on balance for their
children in the race toward college or other post-high school
environments. The question that lingers in my mind after
reflection on Matthew's case is this: was the law interpreted with
such stress upon inclusion that parental judgment about
Matthew's unique needs was obliterated? I suspect the same
question could be raised in thousands of cases where the LRE
requirement has been determinative.
166
5. Steven P. and the Norton School Committee

Steven's mother recognized his developmental problems when
he was one, and he was evaluated at Children's Hospital in
Boston. At age three, upon his mother's request, the Norton
public schools began providing speech therapy and did a core
166 Norton Sch. Comm. v. Steven P., 768 F. Supp. 900 (D. Mass 1991).
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evaluation. School personnel determined that Steven was a child
with special educational needs, so he received special services
from grades one through five. 167 His mother became very
concerned when Steven did poorly on standardized tests at the
end of fifth grade, and these concerns increased when his
academic performance and attitude toward school plummeted
during sixth grade. This was the situation when the team met to
plan an IEP for his seventh grade year.
At the meeting, his guidance counselor recommended an
evaluation at Kennedy Memorial Hospital (KMH), an evaluation
that eventually resulted in a recommendation for more intense
Meanwhile, however, the Norton public schools
services.
168
IEP that actually reduced special services.
an
developed
Steven's parents rejected it, but his placement remained the
Steven, parents, and the school personnel muddled
same.
through the year with the help of mediation. After seventh
grade, the school presented an IEP for eighth grade that was
substantially similar to the seventh grade IEP, offering slightly
more than five hours of special education services per week. His
parents promptly rejected it, and acting on the advice of an
educational consultant, placed Steven at the Landmark school
where his achievements and attitudes turned upward. 169 Steven's
parents and their lawyer thereafter met with school personnel in
an effort to work out an agreement about Steven's education, but
no consensus was reached.
170
When Steven was beginning his ninth grade at Landmark,
without giving notice to Steven or his parents, the school
developed and proposed a ninth grade IEP (quite similar to the
IEP which had been rejected for his eighth grade year) and
proposed it to Steven's parents. It was rejected. In the due
process hearing that followed, the hearing officer sided with
167 See id. at 904 (receiving services under "502.2" prototype, meaning he did not
spend more than 24% of his school week outside of his regular classroom).
168 See id. at 905-06 (creating an IEP under a 502.3 prototype, which meant regular
classroom placement with academic support three periods per week, along with language
therapy twice per week).
169 See id. at 906 (enrolling Steven in Landmark was the immediately precipitating
event of this litigation).
170 See id. (rejecting this proposal, Steven P was subsequently enrolled in
Landmark's equivalent of a middle school).
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Steven's parents for the two years under review 171finding that
the district's proposed IEPs were inappropriate, that Landmark
was an appropriate placement, and that the school district was
obligated to reimburse Steven's parents. Norton public schools
contested the decision in federal court.
The district court granted summary judgment against the
school district for the 1988-1989 school year, but decided that the
record was not sufficient for summary consideration of the IEP
for the 1989-1990 year. With several citations to the case of
Matthew M. & the Concord School Committee, 172 the court
sustained the hearing officer's conclusion that "Norton never
came close." 17 3 Although Steven was demonstrating deficiencies
in reading and language skills up to five years below grade level,
the school proposed to keep him in a regular education placement
with minimal supplementary services. Thus, on this record, a
decision opposite to Matthew M's case was warranted.
The court explained:
To be sure, the academically superior school is not
automatically the appropriate placement under the EHA,
given the act's emphasis on mainstreaming. Likewise, as the
BSEA found, the 502.6 residential placement at Landmark
was more restrictive than would optimally be necessary for
Steven as it did not provide the mainstreaming required
under the EHA. The First Circuit has held, however, that
"the least restrictive environment guarantee... cannot be
applied to cure an otherwise inappropriate placement. .. "
Moreover, as discussed above, it is not necessary for a
parent, when faced with a pressured decision of where to
place her child to seek out the perfect alternative
placement .... Norton had ample opportunity at the BSEA
hearing to demonstrate that there were more appropriate,
less restrictive, placements available for Steven, yet came up
with none. Thus, having reviewed the extensive record, and
giving "due weight" to the state agency, it is apparent that

171 See id. (reviewing the school years of 1988-1989 and 1999-1990).
172 See e.g. id. at 907 (citing Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 1000
(1st Cir. 1990)) (detailing that "parents are not automatically barred from receiving
reimbursement simply by virtue of their unilateral decision to change their child's school
during the pendency of the placement review).
173 See id. at 909 (holding Norton's IEPs fell far short of Steven's needs).
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the BSEA was correct in its determination that Landmark
North was an appropriate placement.174
The school's failure to follow the procedural aspects of state
and federal law certainly did not help its case. The is no reported
opinion thereafter, indicating that the Norton public schools
probably took a fresh look at Steven P's case, and probably
altered their approach to IEP preparation. 175 The image that
comes to my mind is the fulcrum from Matthew M's case. In
Steven P's case, the Massachusetts mandate helped to tip the
scale against the weight of the LRE requirement because the
school never developed a realistic IEP in light of Steven's unique
needs.
Whether the balance would have tipped differently
without the Massachusetts mandate, I cannot say for certain, but
I doubt that the Massachusetts mandate was a necessary
underpinning for the ruling.
176
6. Christopher Amann and the Stow School System

Christopher Amann was diagnosed in kindergarten as having a
learning disability. The Stow school personnel developed an IEP
which Christopher's parents accepted, as they did three
subsequent revisions. By the time Christopher was entering the
fourth grade, his parents, upset with his lack of progress, placed
him in the Carroll School, a private school designed especially for
children with learning disabilities. Apparently assuming this
was a private placement at the parents' expense, the Stow
schools ceased preparing any IEPs.
The school's operating
assumption was in error, for in the middle of Christopher's fifth
grade, his parents wrote to the Stow schools requesting an IEP
for the following year; they also requested reimbursement for
Christopher's tuition at the Carroll School.
174 Id. at 910 (citations omitted).
175 I do not mean to judge the Norton School District or any person associated with
the district in a negative way. The laws are intricate and the judgments difficult and it is
not possible to be sure that a careful reading of the opinions enables anybody to grasp
fully the dynamics in the team meetings that preceded the due process demands.
However, it does seem from the reported opinion that the school's lack of any meaningful
investment in trying to help Steven P. when he was obviously falling far behind his
classmates weighed heavily with the court. It seems to me that good faith efforts or the
lack thereof often make a difference in court.
176 Amann v. Stow Sch. Sys., 982 F.2d 644 (1st Cir. 1992).
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Thus the quarrel began. Ultimately, Christopher's parents
rejected an IEP prepared for his seventh grade year which would
have mainstreamed him in the Stow public schools for social
studies, science, music, art, physical education and industrial
arts.1 77 Christopher would have received language arts and
mathematics instruction from a special education teacher in a
daily academic support class. The school seems to have made a
reasonably designed plan to meet Christopher's particular needs.
Nonetheless, his parents initiated a due process hearing seeking
reimbursement for their son's continuing enrollment at Carroll
School.
The hearing officer decided for the school, ordering slight IEP
modifications for Christopher's safety. 178 Mr. Amann took his
son's case to federal court where the district judge sustained the
hearing officer's decision, albeit with the application of the
179
federal FAPE standard rather than Massachusetts mandate.
On appeal, the First Circuit panel stated that although the
district judge had articulated an erroneous standard, the BSEA
officer had applied the correct standard; hence, the district
court's decision sustaining the hearing officer's decision should be
affirmed.18 0 The Stow school system was right, even under the
Massachusetts mandate.
The First Circuit opinion stated:
The Amanns have, in essence, repeated an argument made
and rejected in Roland M v. Concord School Committee.
[Matthew M's case] There, we noted that "purely academic
progress -maximizing academic potential - is not the only
indicia of educational benefit implicated either by the Act or
by state law." Rather, under the IDEA, "[a]n IEP must
prescribe a pedagogical format in which 'to the maximum
extent appropriate,' a handicapped student is educated 'with
177 Id. at 648 (describing reaction of Christopher's parents upon proposal of new IEP
for their son).
178 A few unusual procedural twists followed, e.g. a motion to reconsider because the
IEP did not require a mainstream facilitator, a compliance hearing to challenge Stow's
implementation of the IEP, and a motion to re-open the administrative proceedings so
that Chris's parents could assert a claim that his school had lead contamination. Id.
179 Id. at 649 (noting court's insistency on applying relaxed federal standards instead
of stringent state standards).
180 Id. (rationalizing why district court reached proper outcome despite improper
application of federal standards).
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children who are not handicapped."' Massachusetts law
states the same requirement in different terms; it calls for
"maximum possible development in the least restrictive
environment." Federal and state law, therefore, both dictate
a policy of "mainstreaming." "[T]heir common objective is the
provision of needed services promptly to learning
handicapped children through the free, local public school
system except where the resources of those schools cannot
appropriately meet the children's needs."
On this record, and taking the relevant legal principles into
account, we find ample reason to affirm. There was
substantial proof from which the BSEA could have rationally
concluded that the IEP was adequate and appropriate. First
there is no question that Stow's plan envisioned a less
restrictive environment for Christopher's education. Its
program would have enabled Christopher to spend much of
his school day learning alongside non-handicapped children.
This opportunity was not available at Carroll School.
Second, even giving full credit to the Amanns' allegation that
Christopher enjoyed better academic progress at Carroll
School than he would have had he returned to Stow, "there
was considerable room for the BSEA, and the district court,
to find that the advantages inherent in the IEP did not
severely compromise educational benefits."'"

Once again the Massachusetts mandate was qualified by the
LRE requirement. Also discernible is the maneuvering room
allowed for the BSEA and, ultimately, for the school systems, in
developing appropriate IEPs when the court discerns good faith
efforts. The school districts which have fared poorly in litigation
have generally failed to show good faith and serious commitment
toward building meaningful and workable IEPs.
As for
Christopher Amann, his parents tried to challenge the next IEP
presented by Stow, but their case was dismissed for failure to
meet the applicable statute of limitations.18 2
181 Id. at 649-50 (citations omitted) (offering several reasons why application of state
standard would reach same outcome as applied federal standards in light of plaintiffs'
arguments).
182 Amman v. Stow Sch. Sys., 991 F.2d 929, 931 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding that the
district court properly dismissed claim since Ammans sued seven months after the statute
of limitations expired).
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C. Refining the Mandate: Cases 1998 - 2002
From Christopher's case against the Stow School District
decided in 1992 to 1998, there was a dearth of interesting case
law bearing on the meaning of the Massachusetts mandate.
Starting with three federal cases reported in 1998, the reports
become interesting and informative for my purposes in this
article.
83
1. Matthew J. and the School Committee of Granville

Matthew's principal diagnosis was schizotypical personality
disorder.
He attended Granville public schools from
kindergarten through eighth grade, with the exception of fourth
grade when his parents enrolled him at the Master's School in
Simsbury, Connecticut. From fifth grade through eighth grade,
he received special education services. The relationship between
Matthew's parents and the school system began to deteriorate
during Matthew's eighth grade year. After a brief trial period,
his parents rejected a behavior-based program. 8 4 Through
mediation, his parents and the school developed an agreement
for an in-district placement, but, according to the case report, the
school failed to implement what was agreed upon. The Granville
schools proposed no JEP for Matthew's freshman year; instead,
personnel provided a list of special education schools, presumably
approved for placement.
Matthew's parents did not pick from the list. Rather, they
85
enrolled him again in the Master's School in Connecticut,
where he stayed on for his high school years and did reasonably
well. From his tenth grade onward, the Granville District paid
for some special educational services, and at one point appeared
to acquiesce in the placement by listing the school on Matthew's
IEP. 18 6 When the parents eventually sought reimbursement for
183 Matthew J. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 989 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1998). According
to the court, "For Matthew this illness manifested itself as excessive social anxiety,
magical thinking, poor internal controls and inappropriate effect." Id. at 391. As a
consequence of his illness, Matthew had continuing learning difficulties. Id.
184 Maybe a little too brief since he left after one day. Id. at 384.
185 This was a private, sectarian school. Id. at 383.
186 School officials may have been ambivalent on account of the sectarian nature of
the school, a matter earlier litigated in Massachusetts. See id. at 386.
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tuition, the school resisted, claiming that the placement was not
in accord with federal or state mandates and that reimbursement
for the costs of sending Matthew to a sectarian school was barred

by law. 187
A BSEA officer ordered reimbursement for certain special
education costs, but denied tuition reimbursement, generally on
grounds urged by the school. 188 A federal magistrate judge
allowed reimbursement for Matthew's freshman year only on
equitable grounds, since the school had presented no IEP for that
year, but otherwise denied reimbursement. 8 9 A federal district
judge overturned the BSEA officer's decision, declaring that the
private placement was appropriate in the circumstances even
though the private school had not provided anything designated
as "special education."'190 Neither the First Amendment nor state
constitutional law barred reimbursement. 191 Nor did the record
sustain the school's contention that Matthew's parents had
sabotaged the school's efforts to create or locate an appropriate
program. 192
Consequently,
the
court
ordered
tuition
reimbursement for all four years, no doubt a hard blow to the
school budget. Yet, it is doubtful that the disposition would have
187 The Granville District relied upon the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and the Anti-aid provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. at 390.
188 Id. at 382 (outlining decision of BSEA officer with regards to two types of costs
incurred by plaintiffs).
189 Id. (distinguishing federal court's conclusion upon appeal from decision of BSEA
officer regarding tuition reimbursement for child's first year of secondary education).
190 The fact that the Master's School did not have anything amounting to a special
education program was not troublesome. The judge wrote:
Neither the statutes, nor the decisions construing them hold, or even suggest, that a
school must have a program formally designated a "special education" program in
order to constitute a proper placement for a student with special needs. Although
Master's does not explicitly offer "special education" services, this fact alone is not
dispositive. Instead, the court must look to whether the services Master's did provide
were appropriately responsive to Matthew's educational needs (footnote omitted).
Putting aside for the moment the First Amendment issue, the court finds that the
Master's school was an appropriate placement for Matthew... The services Master's
provided responded to Matthew's special needs in that he maintained adequate
grades and successfully graduated from high school in four years (citation omitted).
Id. at 390-91.
191 See id. at 391-93 (discussing how tuition reimbursement under present
circumstances violates neither federal constitutional law nor Massachusetts statutory
law).
192 Id. at 393 (noting that plaintiffs parents, while not entirely blameless, took no
action that constitutes deliberate intent to disrupt appropriate program placement for
plaintiff).
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been different if the federal mandate had applied. The district
might well have avoided the result with aggressive planning and
sustained meaningful communications when Matthew's parents
began to search for an appropriate high school placement.
2. Daniel H. and the Mansfield Public Schools

193

Daniel suffered from a language-based learning disorder and
was the recipient of special education services during his
elementary school years.
He did well and moved toward
increased mainstreaming as the years passed. 194 For Daniel's
sixth grade IEP, the school proposed a regular classroom with
one-half hour per week of speech and language monitoring, as
well as an information exchange by notebook between home and
school. Daniel's parents deferred a decision on the IEP pending
an evaluation of Daniel by the New England Medical Center
(NEMC). Daniel remained in his public school classroom. The
NEMC diagnosed Daniel's difficulties in processing auditory
information and word retrieval and, accordingly, made
195
recommendations that went a little beyond the proposed IEP.
In this time-frame, Daniel began to experience significant
difficulties, including exhausting struggles to get his homework
completed and disciplinary infractions at school.
Daniel's
parents requested that the Mansfield school system incorporate
NEMC's recommendations into his IEP. The school declined, but
as a practical matter, offered to provide virtually every
recommended service soon after receiving NEMC's report.
Daniel's parents did not respond to the offer.
193 Kathleen H. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 154 F.3d 8 (lst Cir. 1998). Kathleen and
Larry H. were the parents of Daniel H. Id. at 8. An exceptionally succinct and clear
statement of the requirements of IDEA and state special education law appear in
Kathleen H. Id. at 10-11.
194 According to the factual narrative in the First Circuit's opinion:
From kindergarten through the sixth grade, Daniel attended Mansfield public
schools. In the first, second and third grades, Daniel received special education
services in accordance with his IEP with a 502.4 prototype. In the fourth grade,
Daniel's TEAM modified his IEP to a 502.3 prototype, and he was mainstreamed for
mathematics. In the fifth grade, Daniel was mainstreamed in all content areas after
he successfully completed the Stevenson Reading and Literature Program, a special
education curriculum, in accordance with his 1992-1993 IEP.
Id. at 11.
195 Specifically, "NEMC recommended small group speech therapy as well as weekly
consultations between a speech pathologist and Daniel's classroom teacher." Id. at 12.
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For Daniel's seventh grade IEP, the school again proposed a
regular classroom (mainstreaming) and special sessions for
speech and language, along with consultation and instruction for
Daniel's classroom teachers by speech and language providers.
The Mansfield schools also agreed to implement NEMC's
recommendations "where appropriate" and appended the
recommendations to the proposed IEP. 196 Daniel's parents
rejected the proposed IEP, enrolled him in the Learning Prep
School, and requested a due process hearing wherein they sought
reimbursement.
The BSEA officer approved the school's
proposed IEPs for the sixth and seventh grades, with some
modifications for the future and decided that, in any event, the
private school in which Daniel was enrolled was overly
restrictive.
Therefore, the parents had no just claim for
97
reimbursement. 1
Daniel's parents went to federal court where a judge upheld
the BSEA decision. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed with
citations to Roland M. v. Concord School Committee1 98 [Matthew
M's case] and Amann v. Stow School System [Christopher's
case]. 199 The court stated that, "even if the IEP was initially
deficient, our focus in assessing its adequacy is on the IEP as it
emerges from the administrative review process." 20 0 Moreover,
the procedural mistakes had neither hampered the parents'
opportunity to participate in formulating an IEP "nor caused a
deprivation of educational benefits." 20 1 Thus, the parents had no
claim; they had mistakenly gambled that the court would
approve the propriety of a unilateral private placement. Using
196 Id. (noting school's willingness to adhere to NEMC regulations, despite prior
constant refusal).
197 The BSEA officer acknowledged that the school district had made some
procedural mistakes, but found that the errors were "not grave enough to assume that
[Mansfield] lacks the capacity to develop or implement a special education program for
Daniel." Id.
198 Id. at 13 (quoting Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990))
(requiring a clearly erroneous holding on the part of the District Court in determining if
the IEP is adequate).
199 Kathleen H. v. Mass Dep't Educ., 154 F.3d 8, 13 (quoting Amann v. Stow School
System, 982 F.2d 644 (1st Cir. 1992)) (holding local school district followed proper
procedures in IEP, and parents were provided due process in administrative challenge).
200 Id.

201 Id. at 14 (stating further that parents ability to participate in formation process
must be seriously hampered, resulting from inadequate procedures in addition to
compromising the pupils education).
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the same authorities cited in Matthew J's case [the preceding
case against the Granville District], the court had no trouble
sustaining a mainstream placement with reasonable and
common sense adjustments to meet Daniel's particular needs.
Perhaps Daniel's success in his elementary years tended to
justify the school's approach. As distinguished from Matthew J's
school, Daniel's school appears in the case report as pro-active,
outside
to
and
receptive
issues,
to
address
ready
recommendations. It does appear that the judges will more
readily defer to local choices when the record creates confidence
in the good faith of a school system. This view is buttressed in
the next case involving Frank S.
20 2
3. Frank S. and the School Committee of Dennis-Yarmouth

Frank S. was a young man of at least average intelligence,
driven to achieve. He was diagnosed as suffering from Pervasive
As a practical matter, his
Developmental Disorder (PDD).
challenges in school derived from a cluster of language relatedHe was generally mainstreamed, and received
disabilities.
special educational services in elementary school, in middle
school, and through his first three years of high school. By his
junior year, Frank's record was enviable: he was mainstreamed
for all classes; he took honors courses in algebra, chemistry,
statistics, and trigonometry. He earned A and B grades. Against
his school counselor's recommendations, he took and succeeded in
Honors English. Frank ended up taking the Scholastic Aptitude
20 3
Test (SAT) and getting a 700 in math and a 550 in verbal.
Frank participated in a concert band, jazz band, the chess club, a
writer's forum, and the drama club. He played saxophone in the
All Cape and Islands Music Festival. 20 4 His high school career
would be the envy of many.
The downside was that he had trouble organizing his time,
agonized over the details of his homework, and developed a
tendency toward depression and slightly deviant behavior. He
202 Frank S. v. Sch. Comm. of the Dennis-Yarmouth Reg'l Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d
219 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding IEP prepared by district satisfied Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, relieving school districts financial responsibility).
203 Id. at 222-23 (noting test was taken untimed).
204 Id. at 223 (stating during this time Frank ranked 28 out of 208 students).
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was deemed eligible for special educational services. He took the
anti-depressant (Zoloft) to assist him in day- to- day functioning.
The disagreement with the school district came about when the
team
worked up an IEP for Frank's senior year.
Understandably, Frank's parents aimed beyond high school.
They wanted a transition plan whereby Frank would participate
in the 1996 graduation exercises with his classmates, yet remain
205
at the high school for another year.
The school would not allow this. Frank could not go through
with a graduation ceremony and also have transitional services.
There may have been an underlying cost-savings motive behind
the school policy, but lawfully, once a student graduates from
high school, he or she is no longer eligible for special educational
services. 20 6 Frank's parents rejected the IEP proposed for Frank's
senior year, enrolled him at the Pine Ridge School, a residential
school in Vermont, 20 7 and requested a due process hearing
20 8
seeking reimbursement. The BSEA officer denied their claim.
Frank's parents filed suit in the federal court. By agreement,
their case was heard by a Magistrate Judge who decided that the
school's proposed IEP met Frank's needs "as guaranteed by state
and federal law." 20 9 Plaintiffs appealed to a federal judge, as then
allowed. 2 10 The judge noted that the Magistrate Judge had
applied an erroneous standard:
205 Frank might have been ambivalent. The District Judge's opinion noted that there
was evidence suggesting that Frank did not want to stay at the high school after his
friends left, but rather wanted his transition to involve classes at Cape Cod Community
College. Id. at 224 n.6.
206 A point not lost of the federal court, which specifically noted the end of special
services with formal graduation. Id. at 224 n.9. However, the court also notes that Frank's
parents decided that he should not enroll in an American history course which was a
prerequisite for graduation, so graduation with his class of 1996 became a moot point. Id.
207 The school is located in Williston, Vermont. Id. at 224. Frank's parents were
concerned when earlier considering the school that it might not meet his academic needs.
Id. at 224 n.10.
208 Id. at 224-25 (stating because of progress Frank made previously through district
programs, there was no reason to believe similar progress would not be made if he
stayed).
209 Id. at 225 (quoting Magistrate Judge who held Frank's developing to his full
potential was not responsibility of Commonwealth).
210 In discussing standard of review, the court specifically notes:
The parties elected to proceed before the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c)(1). Section 636(c) (4) at the time of the parties' election permitted an appeal of
the Magistrate Judge's decision to a district judge. Is this circumstance, a district
judge is to review the Magistrate Judge's decision for clear error.
Id. (citing Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 990 (1st Cir. 1990)).
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It is apparent that the Magistrate Judge failed to
differentiate the more strict Massachusetts IDEA standard
from the less stringent federal mandate. Under IDEA, a
state is permitted to adopt a more exacting standard than
the one mandated by federal law. Massachusetts has done
so. Under Massachusetts law, an IEP must provide for the
development, not merely for an
child's maximum possible
"adequate" education. 211
Rather than remand, however, the judge conducted his own
review as urged by the parties. With very careful attention to
the details of the record, especially the testimony of Frank's
mother at the BSEA hearing, the judge concluded that Frank's
parents failed to carry their burden in proving that the proposed
IEP was inadequate. A slight frustration is discernible in the
judge's summing up:
The responsibilities that Frank's parents sought to place on
the district exceeded even the very stringent demands
imposed by Massachusetts law. The District had given Frank
an exemplary education in a supportive environment
sensitive to his special needs. The parties agree that Frank
succeeded academically in this environment. Frank's
parents' expectation that the District would be able to mold
Frank into "a responsible and independent individual
capable of interacting with the material and social world
around him"... while understandable, was unreasonable,
given Frank's innate disabilities. The District's responsibility
was to exert it best efforts to maximize Frank's possible
212
developmental potential. I see no evidence that it did less.
Obviously, Frank's parents gained no reimbursement. Most
interesting to me in the language quoted is an implied limitation
on the Massachusetts mandate: reasonableness, including a
recognition of inherent student limitations. Frank's parents
211 Id. at 225-26 (citation omitted). A footnote to the courts opinion noted the
Magistrate Judge relied on the interpretation of "adequate and appropriate" given by the
First Circuit, which stated the state must only confer "some" benefit on the child. Id. at
225 n.13.
212 Id. at 231 (emphasis in original). The judge explained his reasoning before
summing up by describing several instances where the parents requests were honored, or
attempted to be honored as best as possible, despite their numerous complaints. Id. For
example, the district funded Frank's tutoring at a Sylvan Learning Center so that after
school activities were not interfered with, the district assessed Frank's levels of
functioning, and attempted to supply him with summer employment. Id. at 231.
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were perceived as overreaching and unreasonable.
A
reasonableness limitation will turn up in Michigan case law and
elsewhere. Less evident, and perhaps a little questionable, is the
judge's assumption that the personal development sought by the
parents was really not possible for Frank, and that their
aspirations (and Frank's) were consequently unreasonable.
Taking the judge's language seriously, it appears that a
diagnosis could serve to limit what a school should be expected to
do. While that may seem innocuous and logical, it could be
dangerous by planting firm limits against achievement on the
basis of a diagnosis. But, overall, the opinion radiates common
sense in a situation where parental concerns outstripped the
reasonable limits of a decent public school system, something
good parents may do from time to time. 213 Reason tugged the
other way in the case that follows.

213 This seems to have been true in the case of Douglas W. v. Greenfield Public
Schools, 164 F. Supp. 2d 157 (D. Mass. 2001). Douglas was described by his parents as a
boy of average intelligence with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and
mixed receptive-expressive language disorder. Id. at 161. During his first grade, Douglas
was on an IEP and did receive special services. Id. Before his second grade year
commenced, his parents had him evaluated at Tufts New England Medical Center which
recommended a substantially separate classroom with speech and language therapy. Id.
at 162. While Greenfield's school personnel sought to assure Douglas's parents that the
team could develop an appropriate IEP with appropriate related services, they also
informed his parents that a substantially separate classroom was not an option. Id.
Before an IEP could be developed, Douglas's parents placed him at Eagle Mountain, a
small private school in Greenfield. Id. The team [without the benefit of parental
assistance] developed an IEP and proposed it. Id. at 163. Douglas's parents rejected it,
and demanded a due process hearing seeking reimbursement. Id. The BSEA officer held
for the school district. Id. at 164. This decision was sustained by a federal magistrate
judge who stated:
[The hearing officer found, given the totality of evidence, that Greenfield's IEP did
indeed provide Douglas with a FAPE in the least restrictive setting ... [t]he parents
have not demonstrated that the hearing officer committed any legal error in reaching
that decision. At bottom, the court finds, based upon the preponderance of the
evidence, that the IEP proposed by Greenfield, as polished over the course of the
administrative hearing, was adequate and appropriate for Douglas.
Id. at 171. The language employed is obviously from the federal mandate. We can only
infer that on these facts the Massachusetts mandate required no more than did the
federal mandate. See also Frank S. v. Sch. Comm. of the Dennis-Yarmouth Reg'l Sch.
Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 219, 225 (D. Mass. 1998).
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2 14

Shaun D. had a rough start, and his story is more heartrending that most in this collection of cases. At age eight, the
Department of Social Services (DSS) removed him from his
biological mother on account of abuse and neglect. DSS placed
him with Linda D. and her husband in Shelburne Falls,
The records showed multiple diagnoses
Massachusetts.
including, post-traumatic stress disorder, head trauma, mild
obsessive-compulsive
disorder, static
mental retardation,
encepalopathy as well as pedophilia and paraphilia. 215 Pursuant
a neuropsychological
to recommendations
accompanying
evaluation, the Mohawk District developed an IEP that placed
Shaun in a substantially separate classroom, a placement with
which Linda D. agreed. Shaun seemed to adjust reasonably well.
School troubles started in May 1994 when the TEP team began to
plan an IEP for the 1994-1995 school year, 2 16and it was reported
that Shaun inappropriately touched a student confined to a
wheelchair. Shaun was put into a counseling program. The new
IEP, and amendments thereto, which Linda D. approved,
required close adult supervision at all times. Thereafter, Shaun's
behavior in school was appropriate.
When it came time for developing the 1995-1996 IEP, the
school proposed basically the same plan. This time Linda D.
withheld approval, pending an evaluation from the Franklin
Medical Center. The evaluation which followed acknowledged
significant academic progress and good adaptation to living with
Linda D. and her husband on their farm, but also recognized a
"significant sexual disorder" and recommended a residential
placement "until Shaun's pedophilia was brought under
control." 217 The team was also provided with an alarming risk
assessment from a social worker who opined that Shaun "had
difficulty controlling his sexual impulses, was at risk for sexually
214 Mohawk Trail Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. Shaun D., 35 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Mass. 1999)
(holding district financially responsible for residential placement of child which was
necessary due to child's combination of emotional, social, and behavioral conditions).
215 Id. at 37 (noting Shaun's condition and history are not in dispute).
216 Since Shaun was not moving grade to grade in the ordinary manner, calendar
years and not grades are used to designate the IEPs in dispute. See id.
217 Id. at 38-39 (discussing Shaun's problems in part as staring at young children,
and difficulty restraining his sexual behavior).
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acting out behavior and should not be left unsupervised with
218
children."
Nonetheless, the school proposed an IEP that called for
placement in a substantially separated classroom and provided
that Shaun would be under the visual supervision of a
responsible adult at all times. Linda D. rejected it, but not before
Shaun had taken a turn for the worse. In September 1995 Shaun
was hospitalized at the Franklin Medical Center.
Upon
discharge and return to his home, his discharge papers showed
that he was anuretic, had sexually assaulted at least six children,
2 19
and had stopped eating.
Shaun was referred to a treatment center which described him
as a "sexually deviant youth" who "needed treatment in an
intensive residential setting."220 Nonetheless, he continued in the
Mohawk public school placement (apparently without an agreedupon IEP) where he demonstrated academic progress and some
growth in peer relations. However, his out-of-school behavior
deteriorated badly. Understandably overwhelmed, Linda D. and
her husband petitioned DSS to take custody of Shaun. DSS took
custody and immediately placed Shaun in a residential
treatment center for three months. Thereafter, in April, 1996,
DSS placed him at the Whitney Academy, a school designed to
help students who display sexually offending behaviors.
Representatives of the Mohawk school system had neither
knowledge of nor participation in the residential placement.
While Shaun remained in this residential placement, Mohawk
once again developed an IEP proposing to keep him in the public
system with special services. In a due process hearing initiated
by the Mohawk system, the question of paying for the residential
placement was adjudicated. The hearing officer determined that
Mohawk should pay for Shaun's residential placement at
Whitney Academy, 22 1 relying in part on David D. v. Dartmouth
222
School Committee.
218 Id. at 39.

219 See id. (detailing Shaun's psychiatric discharge summary).
220 Id. at 39.

221 See id. at 40 (holding Mohawk responsible for placing Shaun at Whitney).
222 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding the educational plan insufficient and
requiring plaintiff to be schooled in a residential private school).
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The school district took the case to federal court where its
lawyer argued primarily that the services for which payment was
sought were not truly educational, and that the school was being
asked to assume the cost of medical services, including
psychiatric care, which was beyond the scope of the federal and
state mandates for schools. 223 The argument in federal court
turned on the meaning of "special education." The judge did not
accept the school's argument.
The district court's opinion states in pertinent part:
In the court's opinion, the law does not support the
delineation which Mohawk seeks to draw, particularly in the
case of a severely impaired student like Shaun. "The concept
of education is necessarily broad with respect to some
severely or profoundly retarded children." Similarly here,
Shaun had educational goals and objectives that were not
simply academic in nature. As the First Circuit
acknowledged, such educational goals can relate to
behavioral controls and other non-academic tasks. Given
Shaun's unique combination of needs, special education
services may reasonably include counseling and therapy, the
very services offered by Whitney, but not by Mohawk....
Interestingly enough, Mohawk itself historically defined
Shaun's educational needs as including the very goals and
objectives which it now claims are excluded under its more
limited definition of educational services....
However, as described, Shaun not only presents a unique
situation but, in accord with the IEPs which Mohawk itself
previously formulated, had educational goals which went beyond
simply preventing the reoccurrence of sexually offensive
behavior. Those goals included his understanding appropriate
22 4
social conduct and forming appropriate peer relationships.

223 The school's lawyer might have overshot a little:
Mohawk goes so far as to argue that, if the court were to embrace the regulatory
scheme as interpreted by Defendants, "all angry and aggressive behavior outside of
school, including murder, rape, gang violence, drug related activity, assault and
battery, robbery, kidnapping, and sexually inappropriate behavior, which did not
affect the child's educational performance, would become the responsibility of local
school districts."
Mohawk Trail Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. Shaun D., 35 F. Supp 2d. 34, 41 (D. Mass. 1999) (quoting
P1. Reply Mem. at 5 (No. 97-30099-KPN)).
224 Id. at 42-43 (citations omitted).
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Thus, the case of Frank S. [a brilliant high school student in
Mansfield] was easily distinguishable, and the case of David D. [a
young man prone to sexual aggressiveness] was analogous. As in
the case of David D., it was the non-academic piece or the
behavioral component that made the residential placement the
least restrictive environment. In Shaun's case, as with David D.,
the court faced a question of how to educate a sexually
aggressive, sometimes out-of-control male in his teens. For both
David D. and Shaun D., the courts ordered residential
placements at school expense contrary to strong protests from the
schools and in spite of their apparent willingness to work in good
faith with difficult young men. I sense a public policy concern
about the safety of children woven into the judicial concerns that
led to an order of a residential placement. Sensibly applied, the
federal mandate should have required no less, even if there had
been no heightened mandate in Massachusetts.
D.

Conclusions

The foregoing is a little shy of an exhaustive survey of the
cases arising from Massachusetts during the years of the
maximum-possible-development mandate, 225 but it is more than a
fair sampling. 226 This case law can teach us something if we can
hear it, namely, that the Massachusetts mandate never required
in any literal sense the maximum possible development of any
real child. It is doubtful that the mandate's most hostile accusers
really read the cases. Reading the cases shows the limitations
that the courts placed upon the state mandate.
On the basis of the reported case law, I conclude:
1. The most powerful and frequently recurring limitation on
the Massachusetts mandate is the requirement that every child
must be placed in the least restrictive environment available,
providing that child's special needs can be addressed in that

225 Also commonly referred to as the MFB or maximum-feasible-benefit mandate. See
supra Part III. A.
226 1 have not included any discussion of cases where the mandate is mentioned, but
nothing respecting the mandate seems in issue. I am confident that the cases selected
reasonably and accurately cover the development of the pertinent law for the years from
1982 through 2001.
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environment. 2 27 This limitation pertains to movement from one
kind of classroom to another, but has had more particular
application when parents have sought private out-of-district
placements in private schools or on occasion have sought private
residential placements. More often than not, if a school district
acts reasonably, follows the procedural requirements of state and
federal law, and then presses its case, the courts will approve an
in-district placement under the Massachusetts mandate even if
the child demonstrably can learn particularized skills better, or
is happier, in a private placement.
2. Judicial deference to pedagogical expertise of public school
personnel has been another limitation on the Massachusetts
mandate. When educational methodology has been in issue, the
courts have avoided entering the fray and have deferred to the
judgment of school personnel. Some of that deference is allowed
to the decisions of the administrative hearing officers also, and
rightly so, because Rowley requires that due weight be given to
228
administrative decisions.
3. A third limitation is a little harder to define, but it does
spring up, namely: a reasonableness limitation that takes into
account the nature of a disability, the progress a child (or older
student) has made, and the requests which led to conflict with
the school. Nothing in the text of the Massachusetts mandate
ever stated that parents were supposed to be reasonable or that
the costs of programs should be reasonable in relation to a child's
unique needs. But, the courts have been wary of parental
demands when they have seemed manifestly unreasonable.
Perhaps the early judicial adoption of the term "maximum
feasible benefit," which in many minds became a shorthand
description of the Massachusetts mandate, stands as linguistic
evidence of a reasonableness limitation assumed by the courts,

227 If the state requirement for the least restrictive environment were repealed, the
federal requirement would remain (unless Congress acted) thereby leaving results in the
cases the same. See Peter T. Kachris, Editorial, Maximizing a Student's Potential Will
Help Lawyers, Not Students, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 4, 2002, at B7 (arguing that
the change from the Massachusetts standard to federal standard made little difference in
the quality of services provided to special education services).
228 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982) (noting requirement of
reviewing court to receive administrative hearing records implies that weight be given to
those records).
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both state and federal. The mandate has never been judicially
applied to require utopian or ideal placements or programs.
4. An aspect of reasonableness has been a sense of balancing
academic achievement with other requirements for a child's
development. In the case of Matthew M., one could say the First
Circuit required a holistic approach. 229 Nothing in the state
mandate required such an approach, but it is consistent with the
LRE requirement and is implied in the federal emphasis on
related services. Parental stress upon academic progress has
been squelched often-times by judicial resort to the LRE
requirement.
5. In my opinion, judicial construction of the Massachusetts
mandate by state and federal judges was generally sensible and
faithful to the text in context, and made the mandate workable.
In a few cases, the mandate might have resulted in placements
more expensive than might have occurred under the federal
mandate, notably the cases of David D. and Shaun D., where the
school districts were liable for residential placements. While
reasonable people might differ about the necessity of residential
placements, these decisions can hardly be characterized as wildeyed demands for unreasonable placements. Issues of public
safety and parental sanity may have played an unarticulated role
in the decision-making. If so, we should laud the courts for
taking account of these concerns.
6. In my own family, I can state unequivocally, that neither of
my daughters with disabilities was ever provided with a program
that provided in any high philosophical sense for her maximum
possible development. For Josephine and Ingrid, in their worst
days, that standard literally applied would have required a team
of medical specialists to keep them primed for education and
multiple educational specialists to meet their physical,
emotional, and behavioral challenges, as well as their physical,
intellectual, musical, and vocational potentials. On a most basic
level, both Josephine and Ingrid swim well and could benefit
greatly from substantial time in the water each day. No program,
public or private, has ever included that component. We never
229 The term "holistic" was never employed. Yet, it seems appropriate since the First
Circuit chastised the parents for their "single-minded focus on academic results." Roland
M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 993 (1st Cir 1990).
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sought a utopian approach nor did anybody ever suggest any
such thing. As presumably sane parents, 23 0 we assumed that a
cluster of reasonableness limitations hovered over the
Massachusetts mandate, and acting on that assumption, we were
well served generally. Most parents portrayed in the reported
cases were reasonable too, though a few overshot and were
checked judicially.
7. The state and federal courts both played significant roles in
developing the meaning of the Massachusetts mandate. While
the federal courts worked out the implications in greater detail
than the state courts, given greater opportunity in the fact
patterns, I can discern nothing disjointed or adverse, comparing
federal and state court opinions.
Judges in both systems
recognized limitations on the state mandate.
E. Legislative Reaction
In light of the case law applying the Massachusetts mandate,
there was no just reason to tamper with it. But, case law aside;
there was a reaction against it, resulting ultimately in its
modification to make it co-equal to the federal FAPE mandate. I
recognize that case law is merely the tip of an iceberg. The
school culture, and consequently educational costs, may have
been influenced by the Massachusetts mandate more than the
cases illustrate. Whatever the underlying reality, dissatisfaction
was manifested from several quarters, not surprisingly from
some school administrators.
Leaders in the Massachusetts
231
legislature, in response, commissioned McKinsey & Company,
private consultants, to do a study of special education in
Massachusetts. The study addressed three main questions, one
of which was the following: "What would be the impact of moving
from maximum feasible benefit (MFB) to free and appropriate
230 An assumption for which I offer no documentation. As any parent of a seriously
disabled child will no doubt admit, there are days when the thought of relief parenting for
a substantial period of time might seem to be in the child's best interest.
231 The study was commissioned by Thomas F. Birmingham, President of the Senate;
Thomas M. Finneran, Speaker of the House of Representatives; Robert A. Antonioni,
Senate Chairperson of the Joint Committee on Education, Arts, and Humanities; and
Lida E. Harkins, House Chairperson of the Joint Committee on Education, Arts, and
Humanities. See generally Ed Hayward, Report on Special Education Gets Flunked By
BU Professor, BOSTON HEARLD, Apr. 4, 2000, at 022 (reporting that the report was
commissioned by Massachusetts state legislative leaders).
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public education (FAPE)?"23 2 Notice that McKinsey & Company's
study assumed the applicability of the maximum feasible benefit
[MFB] standard instead of the statutory maximum possible
development [MPD] standard. The answer provided was the
following:
According to an analysis of prototype data, moving the
special education standard from MFB to FAPE could, at full
implementation, shift between 2,200 and 35,000 students
into different educational environments (prototypes) and
could make between $36 million and $8 million of the special
education budget available for reallocation. The specific
results are dependent on the impact of FAPE on inclusion
and whether eligibility changes are implemented. The range
is provided because there is no definitive evidence about
whether MFB plays a role
in keeping children in the least
233
restrictive environment.
McKinsey & Company specifically noted, "Data does not exist
that would enable the comparison between Massachusetts and
FAPE states for specific services and for special education
costs." 234 In the absence of such data, inferences could be made
based only on probable shifts in placements. As noted above, the
consultants thought shifts could number between 2,200 and
35,000, an amazingly wide range. McKinsey & Company should
be commended for honesty in reporting: the report forthrightly
acknowledged that changes in placements following a mandate
change would be speculative, as would projected savings from a

232 The other two questions were: "What would be the impact of moving to different
eligibility evaluation rules and criteria (e.g., those that are consistent with other
states/Federal approach)?" and "How can Massachusetts manage large swings in local
special education budgets?" MCKINSEY & Co., REPORT ON SPECIAL EDUC. IN MASS. 2
(2000) [hereinafter REPORT].
233 Id. at 26.

234 There were other key findings which were:
Massachusetts currently places a higher percentage of special education children in
both the least and the most restrictive educational environments relative to peer
group states who have FAPE.
Experts are in general agreement that the steady state standard of FAPE is close to
that of MFB; however, there is broad disagreement about what would happen during
a transition from MFB to FAPE.
If the standard is changed, steps would be needed to manage the transition (e.g.,
training oversight).
Id. at 26.
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change in state mandate. 235 The truth was that nobody really
knew what would happen if the Massachusetts mandate were
changed or repealed.
It is very difficult to see how the study made a compelling case
for legislative change of the mandate. A study done within the
state DOE during the same time-frame came to similar
conclusions. Not deterred, the legislative leaders acted swiftly
and a proposal for a legislative change from "maximum potential
development" or "maximum feasible benefit" (whichever one
chooses) 236 to FAPE was soon in the works. 23 7 In fairness to
legislators, a driving force and the main thrust of the proposed
changes had to do with limiting eligibility for special education
rather than changing the mandate. The over-arching goal was,
of course, to save money. The change in the mandate was swept
into a larger legislative package.
Parents and advocacy groups reacted strongly and predictably
in a negative way. A release from the State House News Service
on March 15, 2000 included the following:
Despite a personal appeal from Natick native and Buffalo
Bills quarterback Doug Flutie today, lawmakers say they
expect to reduce special education eligibility or benefits in an
effort to reduce the program's $1.7 billion price tag.
More than 600 people - including Flutie, whose 8-year-old
son is autistic - flooded Beacon Hill and Gardner Auditorium
to protest a pair of bills reducing the number of students who
receive special help.
South Boston mother Kathleen Barry said she hopes
legislators have the courage to resist making changes, which

235 In fairness, changes in eligibility requirements and increasing consistency in the
eligibility requirements were projected to make for greater savings, which seem to have
been reasonably projected. Id. at 14.
236 Still statutorily "maximum possible benefit" until the change in 2001. See Doreen
Iudica Vigue, State Proposes Tightening Rules on Special Ed, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27,
1999, at B3 (observing that state legislators would have to choose between current state
law standard of "maximum possible benefit" and federal standard of "free and appropriate
public education").
237 See Ed Hayward, Officials Calm Fears of Special Ed Change, BOSTON HERALD,
July 19, 2000, at 3 (discussing plan proposed in the Massachusetts House of
Representatives to switch to the federal standard).
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she said would hurt kids like her 8-year old son, who has
trouble seeing and is dyslexic.
"He totally lost his first year of school because they didn't
know how to deal with it," Barry said. Experts said her son's
vision problems masked his dyslexia during 1st grade; Barry
said she only discovered the problem because she demanded
the "maximum feasible help" for him. "Changing the
standard 238
would have held me back from getting that second
opinion."
In the 2000 edition of The Summer Advocate, a publication of
the Arc of Massachusetts, the following "Special Education Alert"
appeared:
The budget released by the House Ways and Means
Committee and later adopted by the full House could
drastically alter the landscape for Massachusetts special
education programs. Most legislators, citing data contained
within the recently released McKinsey & Co. study (although
the study commissioned by the legislature did not
recommend any change to "maximum feasible benefit") voted
to accept language that would among other things: Change
state law from requiring schools to provide the standard of
"Maximum Feasible Benefit" to the federal standard of "Free
and Appropriate" education. 239
The apprehension among many parents and advocates was
palpable.
Resistance notwithstanding, the Massachusetts
legislature changed the state mandate to FAPE in July 2000 by
amending § 2 of 71B of the Massachusetts General Laws to
substitute "a free and appropriate public education" for
"maximum possible development." 240 The change was effective
January 1, 2002.241 The Advocate, in its Fall 2000 issue, mourned
the change as a "significant disappointment" 242 and published the
238 She may have been making reference to the legislative proposal that eliminated a
right to a second independent evaluation of a child.
239 THE ADVOCATE (The ARC of Mass., Waltham, Mass.), Summer 2000, at 9.
240 MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71B, § 2 (2001) (noting that from and after January 1,
2002, the first paragraph of section 2 was amended to change the words "assure
maximum possible development" to "assure a free and appropriate public education").
241

Id.

242 Legislative Session Ends on Bittersweet Note, THE ADVOCATE (The ARC of Mass.,
Waltham, Mass.), Fall 2000, at 3.
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vote of every state representative on the issue. 243 The heightened
244
mandate had been the law for about twenty-five years,
probably a good run for a noble legislative experiment. My wife
and I wondered, as did many others, whether or not the change
would impact our children's IEPs and, if so, what the impact
245
would be.
IV. MICHIGAN: THE "MAXIMUM POTENTIAL" MANDATE

In 1976 the Michigan legislature enacted Public Act No. 451
which was subsequently codified as § 380.1701 of the Michigan
Compiled Laws. 246 In relevant part, § 1701 mandates that the
state board of education shall:
(A) Develop, establish, and continually evaluate and modify
in cooperation with intermediate school boards, a state plan
for special education which shall provide for the delivery of
special education programs and services designed to247develop
the maximum potential of every handicappedperson.
It reads like a ripple from the old Massachusetts mandate.
Perhaps popular support for special education in combination
with altruistic legislators played a role in enacting this lofty
mandate in Michigan. It is probable, on the other hand, that a
separate driving force was a lawsuit in federal court in which a
federal judge was about to give the state a firm directive on the
basis of an equal protection challenge. 248 Whatever the genesis,
243 Maximum Feasible Benefit Falls Victim to Legislative Process, THE ADVOCATE
(The ARC of Mass., Waltham, Mass.), Fall 2000, at 4.
244 Richard J. Robison, Maximum FeasibleBenefit: What's All the Fuss? (Jan. 1998),
available at http://www.fcsn.org/execdir/ed2.htm (describing the comprehensive special
education law passed by Massachusetts in 1976, which set high standards by requiring
schools to educate students with disabilities so they could achieve their "maximum
possible development.").
245 A major BSEA decision following the change to FAPE will be the subject of Part
VIII, Section C of this article. Largely because of positive developments in federal case
law, the change of the Massachusetts statutory mandate has not made much difference,
to date at least.
246 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1701 (2003) (noting in the "History" section that §
380.1701 arose from Public Act 451, which passed in 1976 and became effective on Jan.
13, 1977).
247 Id.

248 See Harrison v. State of Mich., 350 F. Supp. 846, 846 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (showing
that a viable equal protection claim on behalf of children with alleged mental, behavioral,
physical, and emotional handicaps who had been denied access to public schools was
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the legislature appears to have outrun federal constitutional
requirements with its "maximum potential" mandate. On its
face, the italicized language certainly implies a higher obligation
than the Supreme Court subsequently required in Rowley. 249 As
in Massachusetts, the case law tended to constrict the mandate.
A. Explaining and Limiting the Michigan Mandate
250
1. Debra Nelson and the Southfield Public Schools

Although earlier decisions made reference to M.C.L. §
380.1701,251 the first case of consequence, decided in 1986,
involved Debra Nelson. Debra suffered a stroke at age ten. Her
school developed an IEP placing her in a classroom for educable,
mentally impaired children.
Dissatisfied, Debra's parents
rejected this IEP and requested a due process hearing. After a
hearing officer found the school's placement appropriate, Debra's
parents sought an administrative review at the state level. The
reviewing official reversed, finding that Debra needed a more
pending when the Michigan legislature acted to address the needs of handicapped
children).
249 Bd. of Educ.v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982) (holding that a state required to
provide a handicapped child with a "free appropriate public education" satisfies the
requirement by providing personalized instruction with support services sufficient to
permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction and that such instruction
and services must be provided at public expense, meet state educational standards,
approximate grade levels used in the state's regular education program, comport with the
IEP formulated in accordance with requirements of the act and, if the child is being
educated in regular classrooms, be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve
passing marks and advance from grade to grade).
250 Nelson v. Southfield Pub. Sch., 384 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Ct. App. Mich. 1986)
(holding that a Michigan special education state review official abused his discretion in
not allowing the appellant school district to file briefs or present oral arguments in an
appeal of a decision to modify the educational program it had developed for a mentally
impaired ten-year-old student).
251 The Flint court held that the defendant school district did not violate a hearingimpaired student's civil rights by refusing to provide in-class cued speech services. Flint
Bd. of Educ. v. Williams, 276 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Ct. App. Mich. 1979). Furthermore, the
Woolcott court held that a school board may petition the probate court to take jurisdiction
over a handicapped student under M.C.L § 712A.2(a)(4) only after administrative
proceedings under the school code's special education provisions have terminated and a
final decision has been made that no program within the school system can adequately
address the child's special needs and satisfactorily develop the child's maximum potential.
Woolcott v. Mich. Bd. of Educ., 351 N.W.2d 601, 607 (Ct. App. Mich. 1984). Neither
appellate court discussed the heightened standard under Michigan law; but each noted in
the context of related issues that the Michigan statute required school districts to provide
education plans to develop the maximum potential of handicapped students.
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specialized program. A state circuit court affirmed, so the school
district appealed.
The Court of Appeals of Michigan vacated the circuit court's
decision on account of a procedural error, reversed the state
reviewing official, and remanded for further proceedings. 252 This
was no victory for Debra's parents. But, the importance of the
case for posterity was in the court's comments on the Michigan
In explaining the rationale for its decision, the
mandate.
Michigan Court of Appeals commented upon § 1701 as follows:
M.C.L. § 380.1701 ... does not define the phrase "maximum
potential". We believe that there is some limitation on what
kind of a program is required. When two competing
educational programs which meet the child's requirements
are evaluated, the needs of the handicapped child should be
balanced with the needs of the state to allocate scarce
resources among as many handicapped children as possible.
Age v. Bulitt County Public Schools, 673 F.2d 141, 145 (6th
Cir. 1982). However, assuming in this case, that funds are
available for two proposed educational programs, each
suitable to enable the child to reach her maximum potential,
to adopt the program requiring
it would appear reasonable
253
lesser expenditure.
The court did not say that something less than a program
designed to develop a student's maximum potential was
acceptable, but it did inject cost as a legitimate consideration
very early in the development of the mandate. For years to come,
252 Nelson, 384 N.W.2d. at 426 (finding that the state review official had not allowed
the defendant district to file a brief or to present oral argument on appeal while it had
allowed argument by the parent appellees and requiring that on remand both plaintiff
and defendants be allowed oral argument).
253 Id. at 425. The citation to Age v. Bullitt County Pub. Sch., 673 F.2d 141, 145 (6th
Cir. 1982) is curious. The case arose in Kentucky, which did not have a heightened
mandate. The case was decided favorably to the school district at the administrative
hearing level, on administrative review, at the federal district court, and by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, all acting under the FAPE standard. Id. at 145. Michael
Age, the child on behalf of whom suit was brought, suffered from a profound hearing loss.
Id. at 142. Expert opinion supported the viability of the school's proposed placement. Id.
at 143. In a dictum, near the end of the Sixth Circuit's opinion, the court made the
following statement: "we cannot say that the State has failed to reconcile satisfactorily
Michael Age's need for a free, appropriate public education with the need for the State to
allocate scarce funds among as many handicapped children as possible." Id. at 145. In this
judicial recognition of fiscal realities in Kentucky, the Michigan court found some
justification for injecting fiscal concerns into decisions in Michigan even though Michigan
had the heightened mandate and Kentucky did not. Nelson, 384 N.W.2d.at 425.
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Nelson provided judges with a basis upon which the maximum
potential mandate could be qualified and constricted.
2. Jennifer Kulmacz and the Northview Public Schools 25 4
Jennifer was severely hearing impaired. Her mother enrolled
her in the Northview public schools where she participated in a
Total Communication Program (TCP) through the fifth grade.
Jennifer's mother then placed her at the Michigan School for the
deaf for one year after which she returned to Northview district
where she again participated in the TCP255 program. 256 Believing
that her daughter could achieve more in a segregated setting,
Jennifer's mother next enrolled her in the Model Secondary
School for the Deaf (MSSD), a federally funded school in
Washington, D.C. While MSSD offered free tuition and residence
the dormitory facilities were closed several times during the year,
so the students needed to go elsewhere. For these breaks,
Jennifer's mother brought her home, and requested that her
school district pay for transportation to and from Washington,
D.C. The district refused.
The request for reimbursement for transportation expenses
forced the issue of whether or not the school's proposed IEP,
which would have continued Jennifer's placement in the public
schools, met the federal and state mandates. A local hearing
officer held for the district. A state reviewing officer agreed that
the district's proposed IEP met federal and state requirements.
Jennifer's mother went to federal court challenging this denial of
her request for transportation costs. 257 On the question of
whether or not the district's proposed IEP met state and federal
254 See Barwacz v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., 674 F. Supp. 1296, 1308 (W.D. Mich. 1987)
(dismissing the plaintiff parent's claim under Michigan Mandatory Special Education Act
for failure to state a claim); see also Barwacz v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., 681 F. Supp. 427,
437 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff parent had failed to prove that the
individualized education program developed for her severely handicapped daughter failed
to meet the standard set forth in the Michigan Mandatory Special Education Act).
255 The TCP involved simultaneous use of speech, finger spelling, and sign language.
256 See Barwacz, 674 F. Supp 1296 at 1299 (showing the point at which defendant
Kent Intermediate School District, which assumed responsibility for special education
cases originating in the Northview district where Jennifer and her mother resided,
became involved in the case).
257 Id. at 1299 (showing that, among other claims, the plaintiff parent sought
reimbursement of approximately $2,500 in annual expenses she expected to incur in
transporting her daughter from Washington, D.C. to Michigan).
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standards, the district judge denied summary judgment believing
258
there were facts in dispute.
It is clear to the Court upon reviewing the provisions of the
Michigan statutes and rules in conjunction with the EAHCA,
that the applicable standard for schools in Michigan is that
schools shall, to the maximum extent appropriate, provide
special education programs and services that are designed to
develop the maximum potential of each handicapped person
within the least restrictive environment. Further, it is also
clear that special classes, separate schooling, or other
removal of handicapped children from the regular education
environment should occur only when the nature or severity
of the handicap is such that education in regular classes with
the use of supplementary
aids and services cannot be
259
achieved satisfactorily.
Plaintiff maintains that her arguments do not turn on a
philosophical
disagreement
with
the
concept
of
"mainstreaming." However, the Court believes that no
matter in what terms plaintiffs argument is couched, it
ultimately is grounded in and turns upon a discussion of the
merits of mainstreaming versus placement in some sort of
segregated setting. The testimony of plaintiffs expert
supports that conclusion. Indeed, plaintiffs argument that
MSSD is more appropriate because of the presence of
hearing-impaired teachers and teachers that sign at MSSD
ultimately turns on the notion that mainstreaming
is
260
inappropriate or to some extent ineffective.
It may well be that if the Court were to substitute its
judgment for that of the school board, it would choose to send
Jennifer to the MSSD. Jennifer has certainly demonstrated
to this Court, to use a contemporary metaphor that she is in
no sense "a child of a lesser god." Moreover, it is evident that
her self-proclaimed "pride in her deafness" will help her to
attain whatever goals she has set for herself. However,
under the limited type of review which the Supreme Court
258 Id. at 1302 (showing that the Barwacz Court found that there were material facts
in dispute with respect to the issue of whether the administrative record established that
Jennifer's program met the substantive requirements of the Michigan Education of the
Handicapped Act).
259 See Barwacz, 681 F. Supp. at 433-34.
260 See id. at 435.
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has indicated is appropriate here, I conclude that the
plaintiff has not met her burden of proving that the IEP
designed and approved by the defendants fails to meet the
requirements of the EACHA - even allowing that the State
standard which requires the board of education.. .to "provide
special education programs and services designed to develop
the maximum potential of each
handicapped person" is
26 1
incorporated into the EACHA.
Federal and state LRE requirements trumped all competing
arguments. As the judge acknowledged, the LRE requirement to
an extent constitutes a legislative choice of educational
philosophy. Because of that legislative choice, neither Jennifer's
well-stated desires, nor her mother's strong preference, nor
expert testimony, nor the judge's apparent affinity for the MSSD
program, would override the requirement that Jennifer's
education be in the least restrictive environment in which her
education could reasonably be carried out. Assigning the burden
of persuasion to Jennifer's mother also made a difference also.
As in Massachusetts cases, the assignment of burdens in court
and the least-restrictive-environment requirement chipped away
at the heights of the state mandate.
B. QuarrelsAbout EducatingAutistic Children
While the causes of the nationwide increase in diagnosed cases
of autism are hotly disputed, there is no doubt that this disorder
has become the focus of much media attention and is of profound
concern to parents and guardians of several hundred thousand
children diagnosed as autistic. When our Ingrid was diagnosed
as autistic in 1989, this neurological disorder, especially amongst
females, was quite rare.
Over the past fifteen years, the
situation has changed profoundly. 2 2 Figuring out a meaningful
261 See id. at 437.
262 Autism Levels are 'Ten Times Higher', BBC NEWS (London) (Feb. 27, 2001)
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/health/1193046.stm (quoting Mr. Shattock, the
vice-president of the World Autism Organization, who stated that "[o]ur early data does
suggest that there is a big increase and tenfold over 10 years is the figure we have at the
moment"); Ed Edelson, Study Confirms Marked Rise in Autism, HEALTH SCOUT NEWS, 2
(Jan. 2, 2002) availableat http://abcnews.go.com/sections/living/Healthology/HS-511049.h
tml. (citing the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that stated that "the
overall rate is 10 times higher than rates from three other U.S. studies that used similar,
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program for an autistic child, especially when a parent can sense
the intelligence within awaiting some connection to the outside
world, can be a nerve-wracking and tedious business. There is
mystery about autism, but no mystery as to the reason for
disputes regarding the appropriate programs and placements for
autistic children. Michigan has quite a few of its own.
1. Martin (Marty) Renner and the Public Schools of Ann
263
Arbor
Marty was diagnosed as autistic at age two. His parents
placed him in an early intervention program, and in due course
worked with school personnel to develop an IEP. The parents
also began consultations with Dr. Patricia Meinhold, a behavioral
psychologist, who was a devoted follower of Dr. Ivan Lovaas. The
Lovaas method is an intensive and comprehensive behavioral
program with heavy stress upon discrete trial training (DTT). A
DTT program requires repetitive stimuli or requests followed by
immediate positive, negative, or re-directive responses designed
to modify the autistic child's behavior. Marty's parents initiated
a home-based DTT program when he was three, and the school
district agreed to pay for it. Marty developed rapidly. They
increased the DTT program from ten to twenty-five hours per
week. Dr. Meinhold concluded that Marty was making progress
and therefore recommended an increase to thirty-five hours per
week.
In this time-frame, with the Renners' agreement, the school
implemented an IEP that involved substantial classroom time
apart from one-to-one training, and because some DTT was
incorporated into part of each school day, the paid-for DTT hours
at home were reduced. This reduction of home DTT hours
eventually resulted in a conflict between Marty's parents and
school personnel and subsequently ended in the parents' rejection
of the IEP. The administrative hearings and litigation that
followed led to an exceptionally powerful Sixth Circuit opinion
specific criteria to identify children with autism and pervasive developmental disorders in
the 1980's and early 1990's").

263 See Renner v. Bd. of Educ. of the Pub. Sch. of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635, 637 (6th
Cir. 1999) (bringing suit on behalf of their autistic son, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to defendant public

school district).
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bearing upon the requirements of the federal law and the
26 4
Michigan special education law.
The heart of the conflict can be grasped by comparing Dr.
Meinhold's view that Marty's program should consist of an
uncompromising use of DTT 265 and school personnel's view that
the Lovaas method should be combined with less rigidly managed
time in school. For the due process hearing, the school hired an
expert, Dr. Gary Mesibov, who expressed concerns about total
reliance on the Lovaas method. The hearing officer put the
burden on the school to prove that its IEP met state and federal
standards. The officer took evidence and concluded that the
school failed to carry its burden, and consequently decided in
favor of Renners. He ordered one-to-one DTT sessions over an
extended school year, relying heavily upon Dr. Meinhold's
recommendations.
On appeal, the state hearing review officer ("SHRO") put the
burden on the Renners to establish that the proposed IEP was
inappropriate,and promptly reversed, since they failed to carry
their burden. 266 The Renners sued in federal district court
claiming violations of state and federal law. When each side
moved for summary judgment, the file was referred to a
magistrate judge who recommended summary judgment in favor
of the defendant (school). The federal district judge adopted the
report and recommendation and thus sustained the state hearing
review officer's decision.
Due to this particular procedural
history, the Renners' appeal to the Sixth Circuit required a
review of the magistrate judge's report. In that report, the Sixth
Circuit judges found ample basis to sustain the school's position.
264 See id. at 645 (affirming the district court's decision, the court of appeals held that
the defendants did provide a "free, appropriate, public education for Marty within the
meaning of the statute").
265 Dr. Meinhold proposed:
(1) forty hours of DTT a week, divided between the home and school environments;
(2) an extended school year; (3) weekly team meetings between the school, the
parents, and the tutors; (4) staff training and supervision by a consultant with

experience in implementing DTT with young, autistic children; (5) recorded trial-bytrial data on Marty's responses to DTT; and (6) appropriate interactions with nonhandicapped peers.
Id. at 640.
266 See id. at 643 (concluding, after examination of the record and the qualifications
of those involved in the IEP, that "there [was] abundant nontestimonial and extrinsic
evidence in the record to justify a contrary decision" from that reached by the LHO [Local
Hearing Officer]".
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First, the court adopted the view that "the parents had the
burden of proving by a preponderance that the proposed IEP was
inadequate." 267 Second, the court did not accept the thesis that
Marty's success under the Lovaas method proved that the
school's IEP was inappropriate; rather, the court found that the
Lovaas method was a one-size-fits-all approach to autism.
Therefore, it was, incompatible with the state and federal
mandates. In the court's language: "[w]ith respect to 'special
needs,' it appeared to the magistrate judge that Dr. Meinhold's
recommendations of 40 hours of one-to-one DTT per week was
her usual and customary program for all young autistic children
with general needs commensurate with this problem, and not
geared to Marty specifically."2 68 The magistrate judge was
persuaded that the IEP did provide for an appropriate
educational opportunity taking into account Marty's unique and
269
particular needs.
Whether the judges were being a little cynical about the
Lovaas method or were sincere is not clear to me, but since
Section 1400(c) of the IDEA requires a free and appropriate
270 it
education designed to meet the unique needs of each child,
follows that the standard 40 hour per week one-to-one Lovaas
treatment could fall short of the state and federal mandates.
Obviously, the court was hesitant to take sides in a debate about
the most acceptable pedagogical method for teaching autistic
children, agreeing with the magistrate judge's opinion "that there
is simply no consensus within the educational or medical
communities on the most effective way to treat autism in
preprimary age children."27 1 With regard to the heightened
mandate of Michigan state law, the court had this to say:
Michigan has chosen to enhance IDEA's requirements.., by
requiring that an IEP be 'designed to develop the maximum
267 See id. at 642 (citing Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1990)).
268 See id. at 643.
269 See id. (noting that nothing in the record indicates anything "unique about
Marty's autism," and "we find no error in his conclusion that his particular needs were
addressed in the IEP").
270 See id. at 644 (stating that "Section 1400(c) of the IDEA was intended to ensure
that a child with a disability has 'a free appropriate public education.., designed to meet
[the] unique needs' of that child").
271 See id. at 646.

758

ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:3

potential' of the handicapped child. The term 'maximum
potential' has not been well defined in Michigan law.
Further, the standard may be more precatory than
mandatory; it does not necessarily require the best education
possible. Michigan standards, moreover, do not require 'a
most sophisticated
adopting the
model
education,
or geographic
fiscal
methods
without
pedagogical
constraints....' We have already concluded that the
procedural requirements of both federal and state acts were
a
met.... Plaintiffs are not entitled to prescribe or require
27 2
specific desired methodology under these circumstances.
This language is hard on advocates who try to fight for a
particular pedagogical method through judicial actions. This
language made it clear that under the Michigan mandate, the
273
school districts still have a choice of pedagogical methods.
Moreover, the "maximum potential" mandate simply does not
require a model education but an education tailored for the
unique needs of the child. Especially intriguing is the court's use
of the word "precatory." It appears that the judges of the Sixth
Circuit thought that the Michigan mandate, relied upon by
Marty's advocates, may have stated a legislative aspiration, not a
standard literally binding on school districts. According to the
court, state law assuredly required something above a de
minimis effort, but not the Lovaas method or any other method
sought by the parents, the qualifications of their expert
notwithstanding.

272 Id. at 645 (citations omitted). The court went on to conclude that:
Under the higher Michigan standards, then, defendant [school district] proposed an
adequate and sufficient plan to provide Marty a free and appropriate public education
offering to meet and develop the "maximum potential" of this child in light of his
abilities and needs. There was attention given to "mainstreaming" and to developing
communication and relational skills with regard to other children. Finally, we
conclude that defendant met Michigan standards.
Id. at 646.
273 See id. at 645. The court noted, quoting Barwacz v. Mich. Dept. of Educ., 674 F.
Supp. 1296 (W.D. Mich. 1987) that 'Michigan standards, moreover, do not require 'a
model education, adopting the most sophisticated pedagogical methods without fiscal or
geographic constraints .... Id. at 1302. However, it may be noted that a student of
special education law can easily conjure up an extreme case where this would not be true,
e.g. severe corporal punishment or extended deprivation of life's necessities as behavioral
modifiers.

2004]

MANDATE FOR EDUCATING DISABLED CHILDREN

759

2. The case of Lisa Dong & the Rochester Community
274
Schools
Lisa Dong entered an early intervention program at age three.
At four, upon parental request, the school placed her in a
program for autistic children. Lisa's parents began consultations
with Dr. Meinhold (from Renner), who strongly recommended the
Lovaas method. The parents began DTT implementation at home
starting with ten hours per week. Eventually a quarrel broke
out. When Lisa was five, the school proposed a twenty-seven and
a half hour per week TEACCH2 Program, 275 and Lisa's parents
demanded forty hours of the Lovaas program. When negotiations
proved unsuccessful, Lisa's parents removed her from school and
began a forty hour per week Lovaas program in their home and
sought reimbursement. In the due process hearing that followed,
the local hearing officer ruled that the school's proposed IEP was
appropriate, and a state hearing review officer agreed.
Lisa's parents filed an action in federal court, where the
federal district judge decided for the school district and other
defendants.2 7 6 The Sixth Circuit panel affirmed, citing Renner.
Recognizing that this was another fight about pedagogical
methods, the court stated:
The SHRO's ["state hearing review officer's"] decision, which
is entitled to due weight, found that both the Lovaas-style
DTT program of 40 hours per week and the District's
TEACCH influenced language based autistic impaired
program of 27.5 hours per week would provide Lisa with a
FAPE designed to maximize her potential. Comparing these
two appropriate teaching methodologies, the SHRO further
found that the IEP was designed to maximize her potential
in the least restrictive environment. The district court went
a step further to conclude that, taking into account the
IDEA's goal of providing services in the least restrictive
274 See Dong v. Bd. of Educ. of the Rochester Cmty. Sch., 197 F.3d 793, 796 (6th Cir.
1999) (acting on behalf of their daughter Lisa, plaintiffs-parents challenged the IEP
developed for Lisa, arguing that it failed to provide a free, appropriate public education).
275 See id. at 798 (describing the program, the court noted that TEACH programs
present a competing method for educating autistic children, stressing classroom work as
opposed to home-based work, and a cognitive as opposed to behavioral approach).
276 See id. at 799 (noting that the "district court conducted an independent
examination of the record and properly decided the case at that juncture under the
appropriate 'modified de novo' review applicable to IDEA claims").
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environment, the District's program was better designed to

develop Lisa's potential than the more restrictive DTT
program.277

Along with the restraints on the maximum potential mandate
so clearly articulated in Renner, the court decided that the LRE
requirement, well explored in Barwacz (the case of Jennifer
Kulmacz), had rightly tipped the lower court and hearing officers
away from an exclusive adherence to the Lovaas method.
C. The Renner/Dong Legacy

Perhaps because of rich and colorful judicial language and
interesting fact patterns, Renner and Dong became guiding stars
in the Sixth Circuit. Renner was cited as controlling in an
unpublished Sixth Circuit opinion, Soraruf v. Pinckney
Community Schools, 278 where the court came close to obliterating

any difference between the federal FAPE mandate and Michigan
law. Renner reappeared as authoritative in Burilovich v. Board of

Education279 wherein the parents sought Lovaas treatment for
their autistic son ("B.J.") and the school district resisted, arguing
that mainstreaming in a kindergarten class with special
assistance was appropriate. 28 0 The Sixth Circuit in pertinent part

stated:
277 Id. at 803.
278 No. 98-2052, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3216, at *10 (6th Cir. Feb. 23, 2000) (per
curiam). Matthew Soraruf was described as autistically impaired and when his case made
it to the Sixth Circuit, the court stated:
Under Sixth Circuit precedent, an appropriate public education 'does not mean the
absolutely best or 'potential-maximizing' education for the individual child.'
Furthermore, interpretation of Michigan's standard 'is left in the reasonable
discretion of the state officials.'
Soraruf, at *10 (citations omitted). The court then concluded that "[aiccordingly, we will
require only that Pinckney Schools' placement provided Matthew with a free appropriate
education that was reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefits." Id.
The last sentence comes very close to the phrasing of Justice Rehnquist in Rowley, which
would tend to obliterate any distinction between FAPE and the Michigan maximum
potential standard. See supra notes 89 & 94 and accompanying text.
279 208 F.3d 560, 562-63 (6th Cir. 2000).
280 See id. at 560. The court noted that the special education director tried to avoid a
due process hearing, but reconciliation proved impossible. Id. In the due process hearing
the familiar characters played their appointed roles. Id. Dr. Patricia Meinhold testified for
B.J. and his parents, while Dr. Mesibov testified in favor of the school's proposed
mainstreaming placement. Id. The local hearing officer decided for B.J.'s parents, and the
state hearing officer reversed. Id. The district court sustained the state reviewing officer's
judgment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id.

2004]

MANDATE FOR EDUCATING DISABLED CHILDREN

761

Given the differing opinions on both sides as to the best
program for B.J. and the reasonable bases in the record for
the opinions, we emphasize that courts should not
"substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for
those of the school authorities which they review." Rowley,
458 U.S. at 206, 102 S. Ct. 3034. Giving due weight to the
SHO's [State Hearing Officer's] decision, we conclude that
the IEP was designed to allow B.J. to achieve his maximum
potential. Cf. Renner, 185 F.3d at 644-46 (finding
IEP
28
substantively valid under similar circumstances). 1
The decision was one more victory for the LRE requirement
since the Lovaas method would have been incompatible with a
kindergarten placement where B.J. would spend significant time
with his classmates. It was, of course, another endorsement of
school choice of pedagogical methods and another defeat for
uncompromising Lovaas partisans.
D. Does the "Least Restrictive Environment"Mean the
Neighborhood School?
The case of McLaughlin v. Bd. of Educ. of Holt Public
Schools 2 2 illustrates a foiled parental attempt to employ the LRE
requirement as a means of gaining their daughter's placement at
a neighborhood elementary school.
In comparison with the
foregoing cases, the case of Emma McLaughlin represents a role
reversal of sorts, as it has usually been school personnel who
have sought support in the LRE requirement. Emma was a child
with Down syndrome. During her kindergarten IEP, her parents
and the school agreed that she should be mainstreamed for half
of her school day. The narrow question relating to the second
half of her school day was: "whether Emma should receive special
education services in a categorical classroom or in a resource
room in order to achieve the goals in her IEP, goals that had been
agreed upon by school officials and Emma's parents." 28 3 Her
parents pressed to have her placed in her neighborhood school,
which only allowed access to a resource room. The school district
281 Id. at 572.
282 133 F. Supp.2d 994 (W.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd. on appeal, McLaughlin v. Holt Pub.
Sch. Bd. of Educ., 320 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2003).
283 McLaughlin, 320 F.3d at 670.
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insisted upon placing Emma in a distant in-district elementary
school, where she could receive services in a categorical, i.e.
segregated, classroom. 28 4 Emma's parents fought the battle as an
access issue, demanding access to the closest regular elementary
school. 28 5 When school officials disagreed, they went to a due
process hearing. The local hearing officer ruled that the school's
proposal was appropriate. A state reviewing officer agreed.
Emma's parents went to federal court, where the judge held in
their favor, basing his decision on the LRE requirement. The
judge relied heavily upon Roncker v. Walter,28 6 an earlier Sixth
Circuit decision that stressed mainstreaming as the basis for
vacating a judgment made in the Southern District of Ohio.
Applying the Roncker holding to Emma McLughlin's case, the
district court judge declared that there was only one rightful
conclusion: services necessary for Emma to achieve her TEP goals
"can feasibly be provided at Dimondale [her neighborhood
elementary school]. '"287 The fact that those special services could
be provided "more effectively and successfully" in a categorical
284 See id. at 668. The court explained that "categorical classrooms" are segregated
classrooms designed for children with special needs. Id. According to the reported opinion,
Emma's parents were actually dealing with two school districts, namely, the Holt Public
Schools and the East Lansing Public Schools, both having proposed a similar IEP that did
not keep Emma in a regular classroom of her neighborhood school. Id. By focusing upon
the proposed Holt IEP, nothing is lost in the explanation. It is not apparent from the
opinion why one case or the other was not rendered moot.
285 See id.; see also supra Part I.A. (discussing the fight for access to public schools
and historical instances where access was denied).
286 700 F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir. 1983). The procedural history of Roncker included:
Neill Roncker was severely mentally retarded. Id. The Cincinnati School District proposed
to place Neill in a county school run exclusively for the mentally handicapped. Id. His
parents fought for placement in a special education class in a local elementary school. Id.
at 1063. After a due process hearing, the hearing officer held for the parents. Id. A
reviewing officer for the Ohio state Board of Education reversed, providing "some
provision was made for him [Neill] to receive contact with non-handicapped children." Id.
Neill's mother sued in federal court, where the judge held for the school district, finding
that the record supported the district's claim that Neill could made no meaningful
progress in a regular school setting. Id. The Sixth Circuit reversed with a strong
statement of the Congressional intent behind the LRE requirement. The court stated:
The Act does not require mainstreaming in every case but its requirement that
mainstreaming be provided to the maximum extent appropriate indicates a very
strong Congressional preference .... In a case where the segregated facility is
considered superior, the court should determine whether the services which make
that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If
they can, the placement in the segregated school would be inappropriate under the
Act.
Id.
287 McLaughlin, 133 F. Supp.2d at 1005.
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classroom in a different elementary school did not trump what
the judge perceived to be the mainstreaming requirement.2 8 8 He
plainly acknowledged that this view of the LRE requirement
seriously impacted the discretion of local and state officials, and
in Emma's case, it arguably collided with Michigan's "maximum
28 9
potential" requirement.
The school district appealed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and
strongly emphasized a school's discretion in determining the
correct location for a placement, once the child's needs and a
classroom were matched. The court was convinced that the trial
judge had simply phrased the issue incorrectly, thereby creating
290
an LRE issue where none needed to be addressed.
In the court's own language:
In this case, numerous school officials testified that the
categorical classroom placement was necessary based upon
Emma's goals and needs and based on a comparison of the
teaching methodologies. We need not detail that evidence
here, because there is no dispute about the facts that support
288 See id. at 1005 (arguing that categorical classroom benefits do not far outweigh
benefits of mainstream schooling).
289 See id.
The Court is not oblivious to the fact that this conclusion is at odds with the decisions
of the IEP Team, the local hearing officer, and the state hearing review officer, all of
whom enjoy greater expertise than this Court in matters of special education. Yet,
while the Court is obliged to defer to their judgment on matters requiring educational
expertise, the present conflict is driven by the law.
This Court does not take issue with the conclusion that special education services
might in fact be more successfully and effectively provided to Emma in a categorical
classroom. This appears to have been the decisive rationale for the IEP's proposed
placement at Sycamore Elementary School and for the hearing officers' affirmances.
It is a rationale derived from Michigan law's "maximum potential" requirement. Yet,
as laudatory as this requirement may seem to be in the abstract, in practice, it eludes
precise definition. Moreover, its particular definition in any given case cannot be
made without proper respect for Congress' strong preference for placement in the
least restrictive environment.
Id
290 The Sixth Circuit opinion seems a little uncharitable toward the district judge's
reading of Roncker v. Walters illustrated by the following language:
The district court may have gotten off track early, by beginning its analysis based on
the incorrect premise that at the administrative hearings "both sides agreed, in the
abstract, that Dimondale Elementary represented the least restrictive environment."
In fact ... the local hearing officer determined that the issue of least restrictive
environment was not relevant because the parties had agreed about the extent to
which Emma would be in a general education classroom. The least restrictive
environment analysis is relevant when there is a question of mainstreaming;
generally - it does not address the question of mainstreaming at a particular school.
McLaughlin, 320 F.3d at 671.
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the experts' testimony. It is sufficient to note that, giving the
appropriate deference to the findings of the administrative
hearing officers, the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of
proving that the 1999 IEP plan was inappropriate for
Emma....

From the outset, the parties had agreed that

Emma would be fully included in the half-day mainstream
kindergarten class, and they also agreed that Emma needed
a full-day program. The disagreement centered on what type
of special education classroom was appropriate for the
second part of Emma's day. Because the Holt school system
has certain types of special education classrooms at certain
elementary schools, the decision about the type of classroom
would necessarily determine which elementary school Emma
would attend. The McLaughlins wanted Emma to attend
Diamondale and have gone to great effort to contend that the
resource room at Diamondale could be adapted to serve
Emma's goals and needs. However, the hearing officers
decided, and an independent review of the record reveals,
that a categorical classroom is best designed to serve the
needs of students like Emma. In the end, the plaintiffs have
failed to meet their burden of demonstrating
that a
291
categorical classroom is an appropriate placement.
Thus, the parents lost the war for placement at their
neighborhood school.
The Michigan mandate played no
discernible role in the Sixth Circuit's decision. Rather, the court
set a clear boundary on the use of the LRE requirement: it
pertains to the child's classroom, not the location of the facility in
which the classroom is situated. The school had no obligation to
bring the appropriate classroom or a variation thereof into
Emma's neighborhood school.
E.

Conclusions

The Michigan legislature nobly entered the special education
field with a maximum potential mandate for each child's
placement. In approximately three decades since the passage of
Public Act No. 501, the statutory language has repeatedly
encountered the sharp edges of restricting realities, both legal
and non-legal. While my examination of case law has not been
exhaustive, it presents a reasonably full and fair portrayal of the
291 Id. at 673.
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implementation of the Michigan mandate in the state and federal
courts. In light of case law, several conclusions can be drawn,
some parallel to conclusions drawn from implementation of the
Massachusetts mandate, others not.
My conclusions are as follows:
1. The federal LRE requirement has had a powerful mitigating
effect on the maximum potential mandate. Especially in cases
involving autistic children, it has been the primary conceptual
tool used by the courts to keep children in regular classrooms and
away from home-based forty hour per week DTT programs. In
cases involving the autistic children, the LRE concept has
seriously limited parental choices.
2. The LRE requirement does not require school modifications
to bring an appropriate program to the physical plant nearest a
child. In Emma's case, the parents were unable to employ the
LRE rule to their advantage to obtain their daughter's entry into
a neighborhood school against the resistance of the school
officials. The LRE requirement has not proved to be empowering
for parents.
3. So long as the LRE requirement has not been offended, the
courts have bowed to educators' choices on conflicts in
pedagogical methods. Hard-core Lovaas advocates suffered a
series of defeats in the Sixth Circuit because they were unable to
convince the courts that their methodology was the one and only
methodology for seriously treating autism and therefore
imperative under the Michigan mandate. The Sixth Circuit
turned to the federal requirement that an IEP must be tailored to
the unique needs of each child and rejected the Lovaas
methodology for its apparent standardization. Here the federal
requirement for a tailored education limited parental preference.
The courts, starting with Nelson, recognized a
4.
reasonableness limitation, noting that relative cost may be a
factor in choosing programs. Thereafter, the courts repeatedly
stated that the maximum potential mandate does not mean
model programs or the best possible programs that can be
imagined. The maximum potential mandate has been tempered
to require realistic on-the-ground choices.
5.
The Sixth Circuit creatively played with Michigan's
statutory language considering that it might be precatory which
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certainly takes the sharp edge off of mandatory. This is
reminiscent of the Massachusetts' courts' use of the term
maximum feasible benefit as a substitution for the statutory term
maximum possible development. 92 The term precatory signaled a
Sixth Circuit belief that the legislative purpose behind
Michigan's mandate was something less than the language
literally would have required. I have found no case in which any
Michigan state court took issue with the Sixth Circuit's
characterization of the Michigan mandate.
6. As noted in investigating the Massachusetts mandate, the
assignment of a burden of proof or persuasion to parents in the
administrative process
and the due weight given to
administrative decisions (as required by Rowley), often combine
to sustain a school's plan. Parents simply cannot muster the
evidence to carry their assigned burdens. In this context, I again
stress that advocacy is often a major factor in the resolution of
these cases.
7. As a distant observer, it is not possible to know what effect
the Michigan mandate has had on the educationalculture within
the state of Michigan. But judging by the results reported and
the language employed in case reports, it appears that the
limitations noted above have probably leveled the maximum
potential mandate so that it is not readily distinguishable from
the federal FAPE mandate as developed by those judges who
have been reasonably progressive in interpreting and
implementing the Act. 293 Generally speaking, the Sixth Circuit's
constructions of the federal mandate seem quite progressive. If
this is due even in part to a sort of fertilizing effect from judging
cases under Michigan's heightened state mandate, the mandate
might be serving a positive purpose not expressly stated in the
case reports.
In my view, the Michigan mandate has been applied with such
caution that there is no just cause for its modification or repeal.
In a rare case, it might be employed to assist parents or
292 See supra Part III. A. 1 (discussing Massachusetts legislature actions to meet the
educational needs of children with disabilities in comprehensive ways).
293 See infra Part VIII (exploring case law development of FAPE mandates).
294 See generally Peck v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 148 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 1998)
(extending school district funded physical and occupational therapy sessions for disabled
students to both private homes as well as private parochial schools).
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guardians in gaining an appropriate program where the FAPE
mandate might not be so employed, if a court were inclined to
take a de minimis view of the federal mandate. As a parent of
two children with disabilities, I do not want to advocate for any
reduction in any mandates, state or federal. I would rather use
my own skills to demonstrate that the mandates do not require
things, which critics will on occasion charge, e.g., utopian
placements, at unlimited costs to the public. The case reports are
clear enough: the federal LRE requirement coupled with burdens
of proof and the good sense of judges, state and federal, have
made the Michigan mandate workable.
V. MISSOURI: THE MANDATE TO "MAXIMIZE THE
CAPABILITIES OF THE HANDICAPPED"
A. The Mandate and Early Cases
Missouri's legislature enacted a special education statute in
1973, well before Congress entered the field. 295 In its statement of
policy, the legislature declared:
.. it is hereby declared the policy of the state of Missouri to
provide or to require public schools to provide to all
handicapped and severely handicapped children within the
ages prescribed herein, as an integral part of Missouri's
system of gratuitous education, special education services
of
sufficient to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities
296
handicappedand severely handicapped children.
The potential within the italicized language lay dormant for
more than twenty-five years. In 1981's Mallory v. Drake,297 when
a court noticed the statutory language, its implications were not
explored. In fairness, the state Court of Appeals cited the statute
only in the course of explaining Missouri's eligibility for federal
funds. 298 Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court of Missouri
295 See 11 MO. REV. STAT. § 162.67 (2003) (requiring public schools to provide all
handicapped children free appropriate education consistent with provisions set forth in
and federal regulations).
state
296
Id. (emphasis added).

297 616 S.W.2d 124 (Mo. App. 1981).
298 The Court of Appeals explained
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cited the mandate in Fort Zumwalt School District v. State,299 a
case wherein taxpayers and a school district charged that the
state had failed to fund special education in accordance with
state statutory law and precedent. 3 00 Establishing the statutory
context for its decision, the court noted:
Mindful of the federal carrot, Section 162.670, RS Mo 1994,
announces the policy of the state 'to provide or to require
public schools to provide to all handicapped and severely
handicapped children within the ages prescribed herein...
special education services sufficient to meet the needs and
maximize the capabilities
of handicapped and severely
30
handicapped children.' '
As in Mallory v. Drake, the meaning of the state mandate was
not developed, no doubt because it was unnecessary to develop it
to decide the case. When the federal courts had an opportunity
to explicate the meaning of the statute, the results were
unhelpful to the children with disabilities, probably because
nobody raised the argument for a higher state mandate, as the
next case illustrates.

The case arises under the federal statute, Assistance for Education of All
Handicapped Children, Pub. L. 94-142, 20 U.S.C. sec. 1411, et. seq., and the
implementing Missouri statute Section 162.670 et. seq. The federal statute grants
funds to the states for assistance in educating the handicapped. 20 U.S.C. § 1411. To
be eligible for those grants, the state must meet certain eligibility requirements set
forth in 20 U.S.C. Section 1412. The first of those arguments is that the state must
have in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a "free
appropriate public education." This educational requirement has been met in
Missouri by Section 172.670, which declares it to be the policy of this state to provide
to all handicapped children "special education services sufficient to meet the needs
and maximize the capabilities of handicapped and severely handicapped children."
Id. at 125.
299 896 S.W.2d 918 (Mo. 1995).
300 Id. at 918 (noting that plaintiffs prevailed except on claims for money damages
and noting possible distinctions between FAPE and state requirements for special
education had nothing to do with this case).
301 Id. at 920.
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B. Federal Courts and the Missouri Mandate
30 2
1. Nicholas Clynes and the Fort Zumwalt School District

When he was in kindergarten, Nicholas was diagnosed as
having a learning disability in reading and math. Thereafter,
teams developed IEPs for each school year, keeping Nicholas
with non-disabled peers while offering him individualized
instruction in reading and math. When a team met to develop an
IEP for Nicholas's fourth grade, his parents put off any
agreement and placed him in a private summer program at
Churchill School. This summer placement worked out to their
satisfaction, so they left him at Churchill School for his fourth
and fifth grades, and in due course, sought reimbursement that
their school district resisted.
Nicholas's parents went to a due process hearing before a
three-person panel. 303 The panel denied any reimbursement on
the grounds that Nicholas had been making progress in the
public school, that the private placement was unduly restrictive,
and that the district continued to offer a FAPE for Nicholas.3 0 4 A
state level review officer reversed, describing the IEPs as "hit
and miss" attempts which had not met the FAPE
requirements. 30 5 A federal district judge agreed, and accordingly
ordered reimbursement for the fourth and fifth grade costs as
well as summer school at Churchill.
The school district took an appeal to the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. After a careful review of the district judge's
findings, the court reversed, concluding that the district judge

302 Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 1997); Fort Zumwalt Sch.
Dist. v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., 923 F. Supp. 1216 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
303 See 11 Mo. REV. STAT. § 162.961 (2003) (providing that within 45 days of receipt
of a request of a due process hearing the hearing panel will reach a decision on the matter
in question and forward that decision to the parents or guardian of the child and the
president of the appropriate local board of education and/or responsible educational
agency and to the department of elementary and secondary education).
304 See Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 119 F.3d at 610-11 (showing that the panel in this
case consisted of two educators and someone else described simply as a "lay person,"
contrary to Missouri law).
305 See id. at 611 (describing the prior IEP's as "not having produced a demonstrable
plan of progress").
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had required too much.3 0 6 The court fell back upon the Rowley
requirements and declared that the methods used by the public
school "were reasonably likely to confer an educational
benefit." 30 7 Furthermore, the school personnel had indicated a
willingness to make adjustments based upon insights gained
from the private school. The court stated:
After studying the underlying factual findings of the district
court in light of the record and legal standards under IDEA,
we conclude that the school district did offer Nicholas a free
appropriate public education as required by Congress.
Although Nicholas may well have benefited more from his
education at Churchill [private school] than at Hawthorne
[public school] , and he did not read as well as his nondisabled peers or as his parents hoped, IDEA does not
require the best possible education or superior results. The
statutory goal is to make sure that every affected student
receives 8a publicly funded education that benefits the
30
student.
The court noted elsewhere that "[u]nder IDEA a school district
is not required to maximize a student's potential."30 9 This
language arguably ran contrary to the Missouri statute but
according to the case report, nobody tried to argue the Missouri
mandate. There was a lengthy and, in my opinion, compelling
dissent by Judge Floyd R. Gibson who did not believe that a
FAPE was being offered nor that due deference was being given
to the state level review officer. 310 Yet, Judge Gibson did not
argue that the Missouri mandate required reversal. Therefore,
twenty-four years after its enactment, the state mandate had
impacted neither state nor federal cases in a manner helpful to
children with special needs.
306 See id. at 613 (stating "the court erred by requiring a program to maximize
Nicholas' ability, by comparing his progress to non-disabled students, and by failing to
examine the IEP's from the perspective of the time when they were written").
307 Id. (relaxing the standards required by the District Court).
308 Id. (indicating that the educational opportunities to be offered to Nicholas did not
meet Congressional requirements).
309 Id. at 612 n. 2 (showing the "best that can be expected from him" standard is not
the proper standard under IDEA).
310 See id. at 613-18 (relaying his belief that the "district court properly decided that
the 1991-1992 IEP was deficient ....[and that] the Churchill School was without a doubt
an appropriate placement for Nicholas").
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2. Danny D. and the Special School District of St. Louis
311
County
In Danny D.'s case, the advocates squarely presented a federal
district judge with an issue that required a decision on the
meaning of the Missouri mandate. As early as kindergarten,
Danny had trouble paying attention in school. When he was in
second grade, his mother requested an evaluation by the Special
School District, a district charged with the responsibility of
providing special education and related services to eligible
students within St. Louis County where Danny's family
resided. 312 Danny was diagnosed as suffering from Tourette's
Syndrome, attention deficit disorder, obsessive-compulsive
313
disorder, learning disabilities and depression.
For his fifth grade year, Danny entered a public school
classroom pursuant to an IEP under which he received resource
room services every day. He grew increasingly unhappy. 3 14 Test
results in the spring of Danny's fifth grade year were
unimpressive, and consequently, his parents privately hired a
tutor for after-school instruction and arranged for counseling
sessions with a psychologist. With these supplements, Danny
successfully finished the fifth grade. The crunch came about
when Danny entered the middle school, described as innovative.
His sixth grade IEP provided for mainstreaming with team
teaching, resource room services, shortened math and language
assignments, extended time to complete assignments, and
accommodations for testing. 315 It did not work as well as
everyone had hoped. During his resource room time, Danny was
3 16
often off-task, easily distracted, and "into his own thing."
311 Carl D. v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, Mo., 21 F. Supp.2d 1042,1053-54
(E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that Carl D. and Gail. D. were not entitled to reimbursement
from the Special School District for the cost of unilaterally enrolling Danny in a
Metropolitan private school).
312 See id. at 1048 n.6 (indicating that after an evaluation the Special School District
determined that Danny was learning disabled in math and language skills, and therefore
certified that he was eligible for special education services).
313 See id. at 1047 (confirming that Danny suffers from Tourette's Syndrome,
Attention Deficit Disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder).
314 See id. at 1048 (detailing that Danny was experiencing depression, feelings of
worthlessness and sadness, and difficulties with school and social interaction).
315 See id. at 1049 (clarifying that testing accommodations included alternative
environments for testing and the ability to dictate answers to essay questions).
316 See id. (observing that Danny was independent yet not disruptive during class).
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Though his grades were passing, his mother and his tutor
became suspicious about whether the grades really reflected
progress.
Moreover, Danny frequently refused to do his
homework, told his mother that he hated school, said he wanted
to drop out, and engaged in destructive behavior at home.
Finally, he wrote a letter - which his mother discovered - on

methods for committing suicide. His parents understandably
sought an alternative placement.
Approximately two and one-half months into his sixth grade
year, Danny's parents unilaterally enrolled him at the
Metropolitan School, a private school, where he was placed with
multi-modal learners who each received significant individual
attention. He attended mainstream classes in history, sciences,
and social studies. On the whole, the placement was successful,
at least in channeling Danny's energies, because he adjusted
socially, made friends, quit complaining about school, and his
destructive behaviors at home subsided. To a parent, this would
seem like a great success. Meantime, however, the public school
personnel developed a new IEP (approximately two months after
his departure) in which the school proposed increased resource
room time, an after-school math tutorial, and counseling
sessions.
Danny's parents rejected this proposed IEP and
insisted on his continuation at Metropolitan School. The school
disagreed and proposed a similar IEP for Danny's seventh grade
year, which would have kept him in the public middle school.
Danny's parents rejected this proposed IEP also. The public
school versus parental private placement dispute was ripe for
consideration.
After a due process hearing, the three member panel decided
that the Special School District had offered a FAPE on both IEPs,
i.e. for the sixth and seventh grades. A state administrative
review officer affirmed in all respects. 317 Danny's parents filed
suit in federal court where their lawyer argued that the Missouri
mandate required more than the federal mandate.3 1 8 Recognizing
317 See id. at 1053 (affirming the lower court's decision which included a finding that
the decision to place Danny at Metropolitan was "more a matter of choice than
educational necessity").
318 See 11 Mo. REV. STAT. § 162.670 (2003) (distinguishing between the standard
imposed by federal law and that which is required by Missouri state law).
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that some state mandates had been construed to require more
than the federal mandate, the district court with reference to
Missouri law stated:
The Eighth Circuit has yet to decide this issue, and the
Court found no Missouri state court case which articulates
the standard of special education required by Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 162.670. In the absence of any binding or persuasive
authority, this court is reluctant to impose upon Missouri
public agencies substantive requirements in excess of those
specifically mandated by IDEA. Accordingly,
federal
3 19
substantive standards govern plaintiffs' claim.
Thus, when the issue was first squarely presented in a federal
court, the judge discerned no heightened mandate under
Missouri law and held a rather low vision of the federal mandate;
accordingly
Danny's
parents
lost
their
claim
for
reimbursement. 320 On the one hand, the judge's deference to state
decision-makers seems to respect federalism. On the other hand,
given the Missouri mandate's similarity to the Michigan
mandate, the ruling seems awfully timid. The state mandate did
nothing for Danny or his parents who, hopefully, could afford to
keep him at Metropolitan School.
321
3. Matthew Gill and Columbia 93 School District

Matthew's parents moved from Montana to Missouri when he
was two. Matthew, born prematurely, suffered from multiple
322
developmental impairments and received services early in life.
When Matthew was three, specialists suggested that his
impairments were consistent with autism, and at four, he was
formally diagnosed as autistic. 323 As was evident in several
Michigan cases, Matthew's parents discovered the Lovaas
method and came to believe that it was right for their son.
Therefore, they privately began Lovaas therapy at home,
319 Carl D., 21 F. Supp.2d at 1054.
320 See id. at 1059 (ruling the plaintiffs were not entitled to reimbursement for
sending Danny to the private Metropolitan school).
321 Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2000) (deciding to deny
rehearing and rehearing En Banc).
322 See id. at 1031. A team developed an IEP before his third birthday. Id.
323 See id. at 1031-32 (summarizing circumstances leading to diagnosis of Matthew's
with autism).
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increased it to thirty five hours per week, and reduced Matthew's
time in school accordingly. Matthew's verbal skills increased, but
his social skills declined. Nonetheless, his parents soon sought
forty hours per week of Lovaas home therapy for which they
wanted reimbursement.
The special education director thought a school-based program
with some one-to-one DTT training would be appropriate, and
that the home-based program isolated Matthew inappropriately.
The school's legal counsel may have been reading Sixth Circuit
opinions. 324 After nearly a year of discussions, the parents and
school district reached an impasse, so the parents demanded a
due process hearing. 325 A panel 326 decided that the IEP offered by
the school was appropriate although it ordered that the IEP be
327
modified to incorporate additional one-to-one therapy.
Matthew's parents sought review in federal court. 328 The federal
judge granted summary judgment for the school. Matthew's
parents appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing, inter alia, that
329
the state mandate should have been applied.
To this argument, the Eighth Circuit panel responded:
Our court has previously applied the federal standard when
evaluating a special education program in Missouri. The
Gills argue that Clynes should not control because it did not
discuss all the points of state law they cite. The application
324 See supra Part IV.
325 See Gill, 217 F.3d at 1033 (reviewing events leading up to demand of due process
hearing).
326 See id. at 1033. With a panel consisting of two educators and one lawyer, the court
explained:
Under Missouri law, an administrative panel reviewing the results of an IEP meeting
must be made up of three individuals with expertise or training in special education.
The Missouri scheme permits the parents to select one member of the panel, the
school district to select another, and the state education department to appoint an
attorney to serve as the chairperson.
Id. at 1035 (citation omitted).
327 See id. at 1033. The opinion states that, "Two of the three panel members voted
for funding ten hours of weekly one-to-one training at home." Id. Whether that vote
required any action by the district is unclear from the opinion.
328 See id. at 1037. It is unclear why the parents were not required to make an appeal
first to a state level review officer. The court discusses exhaustion of administrative
remedies, but only to explain why the district court could properly consider Gill's
arguments against two IEPs. Id. at 1038 n.6. Nowhere does the opinion explain why the
Gills were allowed to go straight to federal court from the three member panel decision.
329 See id. at 1035-36 (setting out clearly argument for state mandate); see also Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 162.670; MO. REV. STAT. 162.675(2); Mo. REV. STAT. 162.675(4) (defining

terms for argument of state mandate).
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of the federal standard in Clynes was part of the court's
holding rather than dicta, however, and in
our circuit only
330
the court en banc can overrule a precedent.
I am suspicious of strict adherence to the Lovaas method for
many children.
But, I can appreciate the frustration of
Matthew's parents and their lawyer. Indeed, in Clynes, an
Eighth Circuit panel held that the federal mandate was satisfied
by the IEPs prepared for Nicholas, but so far as the opinion
discloses, the application of the higher state mandate was not
considered by the court. So, Matthew and his parents were stuck
with the federal mandate, and as to whether or not the district
had offered Matthew a FAPE, the court stated:
Federal courts must defer to the judgment of education
experts who craft and review a child's IEP so long as the
child receives some educational benefit and is educated
alongside his non-disabledclassmates to the maximum extent

possible. Here, Matthew's program was modified in response
to the Gills' requests to provide more one-to-one therapy, but
the district believed that the proposed private program
would deprive him of social interaction necessary for his
intellectual development. Parents who believe that their
child would benefit from a particular type of therapy are
entitled to present their views at meetings of their child's
IEP team, to bring along experts in support, and to seek
administrative review. The statute set up this interactive
process for the child's benefit, but it does not empower
parents to make unilateral decisions ....

Since Matthew

received a free appropriate public education, the Gills have
not made out
a claim against the District or the
31
Department.3
Hence, in the year 2000, twenty-seven years after enactment,
the Missouri mandate had empowered neither parents nor
guardians in advocating for any disabled children. But, the
world of special education in Missouri was about to change
abruptly with an opinion in the case of Dennis Lagares, Jr.
published by the Missouri Court of Appeals in December 2001.
330 Gill, 217 F.3d at 1036 (citation omitted) (explaining rationale for holding was res
judicata).
331 Id. at 1038 (emphasis added) (explaining reasoning behind application of federal
mandate).
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C. DiscoveringPower and Promise in the Mandate
332
The case of Lagares v. Cambenton R-III School District
brought forth a persuasive and powerful appellate opinion.
Dennis started out well in kindergarten, but by first grade was
having trouble with reading, spelling and math. In second grade,
the school placed him in a special reading program, with which
he continued in third grade, and the school passed him into
fourth grade. Before commencement of his fourth grade year,
however, Dennis's mother became concerned because he had
done poorly on standard statewide achievement tests, so she
arranged for a psychologist to assess his educational problems.
After receiving the psychologist's report, Dennis's mother asked
the school to do its own evaluation. On doing so, the school
determined that Dennis suffered from learning disabilities in
reading and written expression. Therefore, the school district
proposed an IEP under which Dennis would be mainstreamed
with supplementary services, including some one-to-one every
day with a special education teacher. 333 His parents apparently
agreed since the reported opinion makes references to repeated
meetings to review the IEP during the spring of Dennis's fourth
grade. The clash occurred when Dennis's parents requested
tuition for a private summer school, 334 and the district offered its
own public placement instead. Dennis's parents sent him to the
private school for the summer. He came back into the public
school for the fall for fifth grade. As he began fifth grade, the
school modified his IEP to incorporate recommendations from his
private summer school, and he began the year doing satisfactory
work. 33 5 Nonetheless, his parents soon pulled him out, began
home schooling, 336 and sought reimbursement for summer school,
which they deemed a success.

332 68 S.W.3d 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
333 See id. at 521 (examining circumstances leading to diagnosis of learning disability
and proposal of IEP for Dennis).
334 See id. The parents put Dennis into the Churchill School, the same school
attended by Nicholas Clynes in Fort Zumult Sch. Dist., 119 F.3d at 610.
335 See Lagares, 68 S.W.3d at 521-22 (reviewing methods used and places where
Dennis was educated).
336 What his parents did for Dennis's sixth grade year is not clear in the opinion. This
seems a little strange because the due process hearing panel did not take evidence until
after his sixth grade year had passed.

2004]

MANDATE FOR EDUCATING DISABLED CHILDREN

777

A due process panel denied relief finding that the school had
offered a FAPE. The panel refused to consider whether or not
the Missouri mandate required more because the issue was
raised for the first time in a post-hearing brief. The parents filed
a petition for review in the state circuit court where their lawyer
pressed the argument that the Missouri mandate should be
considered. 337 After briefs and oral arguments, the circuit judge
ruled that the federal standard governed and had been correctly
applied. On this appeal, the Lagareses' lawyer again pressed for
application of the Missouri mandate, and this time found
receptive judicial minds. The resulting opinion is notable for its
integrity and simplicity.
The court first quoted the pertinent statutory language setting
forth the state's declared policy "to meet the needs and maximize
the capabilities of handicapped and severely handicapped
children." 338 The court next turned to the question of legislative
intent stating, "to determine the intent of the legislature from
statutory language, this court considers 'the words used in their
plain and ordinary meaning'." 3 39 And, further, "the plain and
ordinary meaning is generally derived from the dictionary."' 340 A
dictionary definition of "maximize" is "to increase to the highest
34
degree." 1
Consequently, the Missouri mandate came to life as the
following quotation illustrates:

337 See id. The court stated:
In their petition, the Lagareses asked the circuit court to set aside the panel's order
and find that the District denied Dennis a free appropriate public education and,
thus, violated the IDEA. Specifically, the Lagareses alleged, inter alia, that the
panel's decision was unauthorized by law because the panel applied the wrong
standard to Dennis. The Lagareses claimed that the panel should have applied the
standard set forth in § 162.670, which states that it is the policy of the State of
Missouri to require public schools to provide "special educational services sufficient to
meet the needs and maximize the capabilities of the handicapped and severely
handicapped children."
Id. at 523.
338 See id. at 525 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 162.670 (2000)) (reciting policy of
Missouri legislature in providing aid for handicapped children).
339 See Lagares, 68 S.W.3d at 525 (quoting Butler v. Mitchell-Hugeback, Inc., 895
S.W.2d 15, 19 (Mo. 1995)) (referring to maxims of statutory interpretation).
340 See Lagares, 68 S.W.3d at 525 (finding that dictionaries are used in determining
plain meaning of words used in statutes)
341

See id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1396 (1971))

(providing definitions for words "benefit" and "maximize").
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Applying the dictionary definitions of these terms to the
articulated standards, Missouri's policy is to provide special
educational services sufficient to meet the needs and
increase to the highest degree the capabilities of
handicapped children. In contrast, the standard set by the
IDEA is that the special educational services be useful to, or
aid, advance, or improve handicapped children. Considering
the plain meaning of the terms "maximize" and "benefit,"
Missouri's maximizing standard for determining the
sufficiency of special educational services for disabled or
handicapped children is higher342 than the educationally
benefit standard set by the IDEA.
The court went on to consider sections following §162.670,
which were to be read in pari materia, and discerned that the
relevant statutory provisions were replete with language about
maximizing the capabilities of the handicapped. The school
district's lawyer made two arguments against the statutory
meaning sought by Dennis's parents including: (1) an argument
that the power to define the meaning of the mandate had been
delegated to the state board of education, and (2) that the
meaning of the state mandate had already been defined by the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. As to the first argument,
the court declared, that the state board of education had no
authority "to promulgate regulations and standards that conflict
with or modify the maximizing standard set forth in §162.670
and §162.675." 343 As to the second argument, the court rightly
observed that while federal cases interpreting state law may be
persuasive, they are not binding on the state courts. 344 Therefore,
the circuit court's decision was reversed and the case was
remanded for consideration in light of the Missouri mandate for
maximization.

342 Id. at 525 (citations omitted) (comparing Federal and Missouri policies in
providing aid for handicapped people).
343 Id. at 527 (indicating that any regulation generated by an administrator is limited
to the authority conferred to the agency by statute).
344 See id. at 527-28. It seems fair to say that the court was also skeptical of the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Gill where the court inferred that since the enactment of the
state mandate preceded the enactment of the federal mandate, the state legislature could
not have been attempting to raise a standard higher than the federal mandate. The resort
to plain meaning rendered such inferences unnecessary.
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D. Legislative Reaction to the JudicialPerception of a
Heightened Mandate
Dennis's parents, and their lawyer, must have been jubilant
inasmuch as they had pumped life into a dormant statute. But,
the victory for plain meaning and children with disabilities was
short-lived. Less than two months after the appellate court
decision in the case of Dennis Lagares, the Missouri legislature
acted by revising §162.670 to read in pertinent part as follows:
it is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Missouri
to provide or to require public schools to provide to all
handicapped and severely handicapped children within the
ages prescribed herein, as an integral part of Missouri's
system of gratuitous education, a free appropriate education
consistent with the provisions set forth in state and federal
regulations implementing the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 20345U.S.C. Section 1400 et. seq. and
any amendments thereto.
So Missouri followed the same path as Massachusetts albeit it
at an accelerated pace. The change was immediately
implemented. In Reese v. Board of Education of Bismarck R-V
School District,346 decided in September 2000, the federal
mandate was applied as the controlling law. The district court,
in recognition of recent history with reference to §162.670,
stated:
This statute now comports with similar statutes in the
majority of other states in that Missouri public schools must
provide a FAPE which meets state and federal regulations
implementing the IDEA. In light of the Missouri legislature's
clear intent not to override the federal standard, this court
will adhere to the holdings of Gill and Clynes as to the
applicable standard when347evaluating educational services
provided to Spencer Reese.

345 11 Mo. REV. STAT. § 162.670 (2003) (as amended by A.L. 2002 H.B. No. 2023).
346 225 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
347 Id. at 1155 n.12. Note 12 in summary fashion traces the most pertinent points in
the interpretation of Mo. REV. STAT. § 162.670 prior to its revision. Id.
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Conclusions

As was the case with Massachusetts and Michigan, it is
possible to derive some conclusions out of the Missouri
experience. On the basis of the case law and the legislative
reaction, I offer the following:
1. It is possible that the legislators in 1973 did not intend
what the statute literally stated. Perhaps the lofty statutory
words about state policy were, as the Sixth Circuit said about
Michigan law, "precatory" rather than "mandatory".
2. There was no strong support from the state educational
establishment for a heightened mandate. The state board of
education interpreted the mandate in a very restrictive manner;
otherwise, its regulations would have been more expansive and
would have provided a basis for parental arguments. The federal
courts, looking for guidance from the state, found nothing in
state regulations that gave life to the maximizing language of
§162.670.
3. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did not develop
the federal mandate in a very creative way. The judges in the
main appear to have a accepted a minimalist reading of Rowley.
In any event, the results of the reported cases show nothing
beyond a minimalist requirement under federal law.
4. It took a good advocate to press the matter in a state
appellate court before the state legislative policy linguistically
embedded in the statute was truly crystallized. This once more
underscores the extreme importance of strong advocacy and also
bolsters the argument that the courts must play a central role in
making the mandates, state or federal, meaningful.
5. As in Massachusetts, legislators made no effort creatively
to cut a new path short of maximization but well above de
minimis. The federate mandate served in both states as a refuge
for lawmakers bent on economizing. To me it seems especially
disappointing that in Missouri there was no attempt to chart a
mid-way course by application of the state mandate given the
Eight Circuit's minimalist interpretation of the federal Act.
6. Once the legislature discovered what it had done in 1973 or what a state appellate court deemed it to have done - the
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legislators swiftly reversed course without any popular uprising
in favor of the heightened mandate.
7. As a parent and a lawyer, I would not recommend reintroducing any bill for a heightened mandate in either Missouri
or Massachusetts in the current climate of severe economic
stress. The predictable result would be two-fold: the bill would
fail, and the wrath of special education opponents would be
aroused to unprecedented heights. If this is a correct reading of
the signs of the times, battles for children with disabilities should
be joined on other fronts, a matter to be explored in Part IX of
this article.
VI. NEW JERSEY: THE "BEST-ABLE-To-ACHIEVE SUCCESS"
MANDATE

A. Statutory and Regulatory Basis
The state of New Jersey entered into the field of special
education with the passage of L. 1954, c. 79 more than twenty
years before Congress acted in any significant way.3 48 In relevant
part the statute stated:
It shall be the duty of each board of education to provide
suitable facilities and programs of education for all the
children who are classified as handicapped under this
chapter. The absence or unavailability of a special class
facility in any district shall not be construed as relieving a
board of education of the responsibility for providing
education for any child who qualifies under this chapter. 349
For more than twenty five years, the statute generated no
litigation elucidating the meaning of the word suitable in
connection with special education. Judicial interpretation of the
statutory term suitable came about only after the enactment of
the federal mandate to which New Jersey subscribed by
348 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:46-1, 46-9, 46-13 (West 2003); Patricia A. Russo,
Education of Handicapped Children, 116 N.J.L.J. 473 (1985) (citing historical and
statutory notes).
349 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-13 (West 2003) (emphasis added). There have been
amendments to this section but so far as I can ascertain, the language quoted was part of
the original statute enacted in 1954.
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submitting a plan and receiving federal funds for special
education. 350 The first case of consequence focusing upon the
interpretation of N.J.S.A. 18A: 46-13 arose in light of a
regulation adopted by the state DOE which in relevant part
required that districts," must provide each handicapped pupil a
special educational program and services according to how the
pupil can best achieve educational success." 351 As will be evident
in the cases following, this language proved to be the source of a
heightened mandate when interpreted by the judges of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals. This heightened mandate judicially
gleaned from the regulations was deemed consistent with the
legislative language quoted above wherein the operative words
were "suitable facilities and programs."
B. JudicialDevelopment of the Mandate
352
1. S.G. and the Board of Education of Parsippany-Troy Hills

S.G.'s parents were Robert and Loretta Geis, hence, the
opinions involving S.G. are cited as Geis v. Board of Education or
simply Geis in many later reported cases. S.G. suffered from
multiple handicaps including, "neurological dysfunction, mental
retardation, communication disorders, and chronic illness with
emotional overtones." 353 At age five, he went into an out-of-state
residential placement at Woods School in Pennsylvania under an
IEP agreed upon by his parents and school district. 354 Thereafter,
his parents moved to a second school district in New Jersey355
that continued his placement at Woods School. When S.G.
reached the age where children are usually entering junior high
school, his district proposed bringing him back into the public
350 See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 46-19.1 (2003) (addressing the New Jersey
legislature's significant additions to special education law made by the enactment).
351 6 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6:28-2.1 (1978) (incorporating the regulation into the state
administrative code).
352 Geis v. Board of Education, 774 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1985); Geis v. Board of
Education, 589 F. Supp.269 (D.N.J. 1984).
353 Geis, 774 F.2d at 578 (enumerating the handicaps suffered by the appellee).
354 See id. (discussing the appellee's attendance at the Woods School in Langhorne,
Pennsylvania).
355 See Geis, 589 F.Supp. at 270 (detailing the circumstances of the families move to
Parsippany-Troy Hills, Morris County).
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school system. His parents resisted and eventually demanded a
due process hearing.
The classification officer (hearing officer) decided in favor of
the district, 356 a decision that S.G.'s parents challenged in federal
court. 357 The district judge concluded that the proposed public
school placement met the federal standard enunciated in Rowley;
however, under the New Jersey regulatory standard,the school's
plan failed. According to the district judge:
... New Jersey's own program goes beyond the minimum
established by Congress. It creates considerably higher
standards. Under N.J.A.C. 6:28-2.1 and 2.2 a local public
school district must provide each handicapped pupil a special
education program and services according to how the pupil
can best achieve educational success. A handicapped pupil
must be placed in the program option which is determined to
be the least restrictive environment in view of the pupil's
educational handicap and every effort must be made to place
the pupil in an educational setting as close to his or her
home as possible...
It was the Board of Education's position based on the
opinions of some of its experts that S.G. should be brought
back into a home and school setting, because there is a
danger that S.G. will develop a dependence on an institution
and will never be able to move out of it. It is plaintiffs'
position, supported by their professional witnesses, that
S.G.'s continued progress depends upon the concentrated
form of education provided by a residential school such as
the Wood School, and that he would be unable to cope with
the substantial amounts of unstructured time.
Thus, the experts, all of whom are sincere and competent,
disagree. I have evaluated the experts' opinions, the reasons
356 See id. at 271. The Hearing Officer was referred to in the opinion as a
classification officer. See also Geis, 774 F.2d at 578. New Jersey's initial three-tiered
review process was struck down in East Brunswick Board. of Education v. N.J. State
Board of Education, No. 81-3600 (D.N.J. 1982), because it ran afoul of 20 U.S.C. §
1415(b)(2) which requires that due process hearing officers be independent of the state
educational agency. New regulations giving the responsibility for due process hearings to
the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law went into effect in March 1983.
357 See Geis, 774 F.2d at 589 (indicating the that parties agreed to treat this decision
as final for purposes of appeal since the avenue for an administrative appeal was deemed
unlawful and an acceptable administrative structure was not yet in place).
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given for them and the other evidence in the case and
conclude that plaintiffs have established by a preponderance
of the evidence that continued attendance at the Wood School
will enable S.G. to achieve success in learning and that
placing S.G. in his home and in local schools would have an
adverse effect on his ability to learn and develop to the
35 8
maximum possible extent.
The school district appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, which affirmed.3 5 9 In its opinion, the court noted
that shortly after the district court's decision, the special
education chapter of the New Jersey Administrative Code upon
which the district judge had relied, was extensively revised.3 60 In
that revision, the best-able-to-achieve success standard was
deleted because the state officials thought that the trial judge in
S.G.'s case had gone beyond the meaning of the state regulation.
Apparently assuming that the regulatory change would not be
retroactive, the school board's lawyer argued that while the
district court had ruled in accordance with the regulation, the
regulation was invalid because it went beyond the scope of the
statute. 3 1 The lawyer drew the court's attention to N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 18A:46-13 which in relevant part stated, "[i]t shall be the
duty of each board of education to provide suitable facilities and
programs of education for all the children who are classified as
handicapped" 362 and argued that suitable under state statutory
law was functionally equivalent to appropriateunder federal law.
It followed that the district judge had erred by following an
invalid state regulation.
The court replied to the school board's argument with the
following:
But even if the New Jersey statute had used the word
"appropriate", we would not be persuaded that it prevents
the State Board of Education from imposing a standard
higher than the "some benefit" standard of Rowley. Both
358 Geis, 589 F.Supp. at 272-73 (emphasis added).
359 See Geis, 774 F.2d at 577 (affirming the judgment of the district court).
360 See id. at 582 n.3 (discussing the implications of 16 N.J. Admin. Reg. 1970(a)
(1984)).
361 See id. at 582 (indicating the school board's application of the regulatory change).
362 Id. The statute has not been amended in any relevant way as of April 2003. As to
facilities and programs, the duty is still to provide something suitable.
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"appropriate" and "suitable" are vague terms that must be
given content by administrative and judicial interpretation.
We do not see any statutory impediment to the State Board
of Education concluding that an "appropriate" or "suitable"
educational program363is one that best helps a pupil to achieve
success in learning.
The court found additional statutory language that arguably
3 64
undergirded or at least was consistent with the regulation.
Refusing to invalidate the regulation as it existed when the suit
was filed, the appellate court affirmed the district court's
requirement that the residential placement be made.
Consequently, in S.G.'s case, New Jersey's special education
regulation with its best-able-to- achieve-success mandate made a
difference, but with the regulatory change in place, the future
development of the state mandate was uncertain.
2. Andrew Diamond and the East Windsor Regional School
3 65
District
physical
Andrew was born with several congenital
abnormalities and a neurological impairment that inhibited his
ability to communicate or walk.3 66 Early on, his school district
placed him at Midland School, a private day school. When he
was nine, Midland School officials advised his parents that his
learning skills were declining, that his behaviors were
deteriorating, and consequently, the placement was no longer
Nevertheless, Andrew remained at Midland,
appropriate.
probably because nobody could immediately come up with an
acceptable alternative. Eventually, Andrew's parents placed him
in a residential school of their own choosing and began footing
363 Id. at 582 (stating legislative test to require that all school-age children be
assured the fullest possible opportunity to develop their intellectual capacities by
requiring that state and local communities identify and provide remedial services for
handicapped children in both public and nonpublic schools).
364 See N.J.S.A. § 18A:46-19.1 (stating that initial child evaluation and classification
is conducted by multi-disciplinary child study teams, which then develop individualized
education programs in consultation with parents and teachers).
365 Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming award of expenses
for one full year residential program for defendant parents' son because both federal and
state statutes required plaintiff board of education to provide some plans calculated to
produce educational progress, not trivial educational advancement).
366 See id. at 988 (showing extent of child's disability).
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the bill; 367 however, they demanded a due process hearing in
which they sought tuition reimbursement.3 68 At the private
school, Andrew began to make progress described as remarkable.
The hearing officer
decided that Andrew required
reclassification 369 which would require a residential placement "if
no suitable day placement could be found." 370
The board
proposed a day school which Andrew's parents deemed
unsuitable, so they kept him in the residential program until
they ran out of money at which point they brought Andrew home.
Still wanting reimbursement and a continuing residential
placement, they requested another due process hearing. While
Andrew was at home, the school paid for 1 to 1 /2 hours of home
instruction per day, but he regressed. After a hearing, the officer
ordered a continuation of Andrew's prior residential placement
and reimbursement of previous residential costs to his parents.3 7 1
Resisting reimbursement and seeking to reverse the placement
directive, the school district went to federal court. At the district
court, there was a replay of S.G.'s case insofar as the court
determined that the residential placement was appropriate, that
the school district's proposed day program was not, and that
reimbursement owed.
The school board appealed to the Third Circuit. The school
district's lawyer argued that according to Rowley, so long as the
school provided some benefit to Andrew, its legal duty was
accomplished.3 72 The court rebuffed the argument in the
following language:

367 See id. at 988-89 (stating that Andrew's parents felt state-selected school
inadequate, and placed him in Rhode Island's Behavior Research Institute in June, 1981).
368 See id. at 989 (noting that it appears that Andrew's parents demanded their due
process hearing before they made their son's placement, but prior private placement
decision necessarily channeled inquiries in their due process hearing).
369 See id. (explaining, without reference to prior classification, how aforementioned
New Jersey Department of Education hearing officer determined that Andrew Diamond
should be reclassified as neurologically impaired and trainably mentally retarded).
370 See id. (describing result of Andrew's reclassification as neurologically impaired
and trainably mentally retarded).
371 See id. (specifying consequence of school board's failure to pay for Andrew's
placement at said Behavior Research Institute).
372 See id. at 991 (showing how each state is required to provide handicapped
children with free appropriate public education, and that requirement is satisfied by
providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit children to
benefit educationally).
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But Rowley makes it perfectly clear that the Act requires a
plan of instruction under which educational progress is
likely. The School District's "of benefit" test is offered in
defense of an educational plan under which educational
regression actually occurred. Literally, the School Board's
plan might be conceived as conferring some benefit to
Andrew in that less regression might occur under it than if
Andrew Diamond had simply been left to vegetate. The Act,
progress, not
however, requires a plan likely to produce 373
regression or trivial educational advancement.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's finding that
a residential placement was required under the federal FAPE
standard as articulated by the Supreme Court in Rowley, thus
signaling a development of the meaning of FAPE which I will
explore in greater detail in Part VIII of this article.3 74 As a second
ground for affirming, the court turned to New Jersey special
education law and put forth the following analysis:
Moreover, Andrew Diamond, as a resident of New Jersey,
was entitled to a standard of service exceeding that set by
the Education of the Handicapped Act itself. In Geis v. Board
of Education of Parsippany-Troy Hills....

we held that

federal law incorporated the standard of service set forth in
former N.J.A.C. 6:28-2.1, which exceeds that of the federal
act. The regulation provided local school boards to provide
educational services according to how the student can be
achieve success in learning. This regulation was operative at
the time Andrew Diamond was placed in a residential
program and at the date of the decision by the New Jersey
Department of Education. It was amended effective June 29,
1984; however, the agency's statement in the New Jersey
Register indicates no intention to lower expectations for
educating disabled children. Besides the regulation, we
noted in Geis that a program which assures children the
fullest opportunity to develop their intellectual capacities is
consistent with the New Jersey Legislature's findings...
Thus, even if the district court had not correctly applied the
Education of the Handicapped Act standard for free
373 Id. (citations omitted) (discussing how New Jersey requires states to provide an
appropriate free education to every child, and thus requires plans of instruction in which
educational progress is likely, as opposed to regression or trivial advancement).
374 See id. (holding that residential placement is sometimes the only appropriate
placement for those with severe disabilities).
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appropriate education, the higher standard adopted by New
Jersey in implementing the Act would in any event require
375
an affirmance.
It takes a moment's reflection to understand fully what the
court said about state law. First, the mandate as explicated in
S.G.'s case pertained to Andrew because the regulation was still
in effect when Andrew went into his residential program.
Second, language in the state's special education statute, codified
at N.J.S.A. § 18A:46-19.1, required "that all school-age children
be assured the fullest possible opportunity to develop their
intellectual capacities." 3 76 Therefore, even if the state's regulatory
standard no longer required more than Rowley, the cited state
statute did, and consequently the disposition of the case could not
be correctly made without reference to state law. One can fairly
state on the basis of the foregoing quotation that in 1986 the
Third Circuit panel determined that the New Jersey mandate
required more than the federal mandate even though the federal
mandate required the residential placement in Andrew's case.
The federal appellate judges could scarcely have missed the
intent of the state DOE's regulatory change; rather, they were
willing to rest upon their own views about the meaning of New
Jersey's special education statutes. The district also made an
argument that the federal LRE requirement made the day
program preferable to the residential placement, an argument
the board characterized as "specious". It is unnecessary to
consider other case law of the 1980s because the picture is
reasonably clear from the Geis and Diamond cases discussed
above.3

77

375 Id. at 992 (citations omitted) (discussing various standards for educating disabled
children).
376 N.J.S.A. § 18A:46-19.1 (West. Supp. 1985) (discussing least restrictive
environments, depending upon the particular disability in question).
377 See also B.C. by F.G. v. Cranford Bd. of Educ., 702 F. Supp. 1140, 1148-49 (D.N.J.
1988) (showing clear statement of New Jersey's heightened mandate of "free appropriate
public education").
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C. A Victory for the State Department of Education:Lowering its
Mandate
1. John Lascari and the Ramapo Indian Hills Regional High
378
School District
John Lascari attended his local public school from
kindergarten through eighth grade. In the seventh and eighth
379
grades he was placed in a class for the "perceptually impaired."
A Child Study Team (CST) evaluated John as he was about to
enter high school and provided a diagnosis that included the
terms, "neurologic dysfunction in the form of a marked
38 0
dyslexia.. .associated difficulties in auditory perceptual skills."
As anyone familiar with such a diagnosis can testify, dyslexia can
be brutal for a child's school experience, and it was for John
Lascari. With an I.Q. of 126, as he was about to start high
Not
school, John was reading at a second grade level.
38 1
low.
was
self-esteem
his
surprisingly,
John started high school under an IEP that placed him in a
class for persons perceptually impaired. When it came time to
plan an IEP for John's sophomore year, tests showed that his
progress during his first year of high school had been
insignificant; consequently, his parents requested that vocational
training be dropped and that more stress be placed upon his
However, on a change of mind before
academic skills.
commencement of his sophomore year in high school, John's
parents announced an intention to place him at the Landmark
School in Massachusetts 3 2 and requested a due process hearing
seeking full reimbursement.
378 Lascari v. Bd, of Educ., 560 A.2d 1180 (S.Ct. N.J. 1989) (holding that appellant
parents were entitled to reimbursement from respondent school district for cost of private
school tuition but not room and board).
379 Id. at 1184 (stating that John graduated from grade school in June 1980).
380 Id. (discussing John's evaluation by a child-study team, consisting of learningdisability specialists, social workers, and psychologists, in anticipation of his enrollment
at Ramapo).
381 Id. (noting that although tests revealed his I.Q. was 126, John read at secondgrade level and felt segregated from other students because of his placement in his
school's perceptually-impaired program).
382 See id. at 1184-85 (discussing John's placement; however, records were unclear
whether his parents made their unilateral placement and then simply announced it, or
whether they presented their plan and their school rejected it).
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Thus began the hearings and appeals that ultimately took the
case to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Omitting the
considerable procedural complexity of this case, 38 3 I want to focus
only on what the state Supreme Court did and said as it applied
and discussed the New Jersey mandate. With a citation to Geis
v. Board of Education [S.G.'s case] the now familiar standard was
reiterated:
[W]hen the due process hearing began in January 1982, the
board was obligated to provide John with an education that
would allow him to best achieve success in learning.
The classification officer, the trial court, and the Appellate
Division applied the "best achieve success-in-learning" test,
and the Board did not cross-petition from the Appellate
Division's recourse to that standard. At oral argument,
moreover, the board conceded that the higher standard
was
38 4
in effect when the Lascaris leveled their challenge.
Applying this standard, without any separate consideration of
the Rowley standard, the court sustained the trial court's award
of reimbursement for tuition costs at the Landmark School and
the trial court's denial of the costs of room and board.: So far, the
case merely restated the principles evident in Geis and Diamond
and applied them to a gifted young man suffering from dyslexia.
But, the court did much more where, in dicta, the court expressly
negated the heightened mandate discerned by the Third Circuit
and for New Jersey adopted the Rowley standard on account of
the regulatory clarification made by the state department of
education.
The court in relevant part stated:
For the future, we note that the Department of Education
has adopted new regulations, which took effect after oral
383 See id. at 1181-82, 1184-87 (stating the procedural history from the first due
process hearing through the grant of certification by the New Jersey Supreme Court).
384 Id. at 1189.

385 See id. at 1190-93. The trial court had engaged in some weighing of the equities,
wherein the trial judge was comfortable with the Landmark School's academic program
but was not convinced that the out-of-state private placement, or for that matter, any
residential placement was necessary for John to have an appropriate IEP, and the
Supreme Court agreed. Id. A little more clarity in communications between parents and
school district, and a clear demonstration by John's parents of continuing attempts to
clarify and to cooperate might have helped the parents' reimbursement cause.
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argument on May 15, 1989. One of those regulations,
N.J.A.C. 6:28-1.1, adopts the federal standard, which Rowley
defines as an education from which the child could benefit.
Previously, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit had interpreted the New Jersey statutory and
regulatory scheme as providing a higher standard of
education. As the comments to the 1989 regulations make
clear, the Department of Education disagrees with that
interpretation. The relevant comment states that "it is
necessary to clarify that the standard in N.J.A.C. 6:28 has
been the same as the Federal standard. 38 6
Here the state's highest court declared that the federal district
judges and the Third Circuit judges had misunderstood the New
Jersey mandate, which correctly understood, had been in accord
with the Rowley standard all along. The regulation effective May
15, 1989, did not change the law but clearly stated the true
meaning of the law. This regulatory clarificationof the law has
remained, notwithstanding amendments to the administrative
code, to the time of this writing. As of December 2003, the
administrative code stated in relevant part:
General requirements
(a) The rules in this chapter supersede all rules in effect
prior to July 6, 1998 pertaining to students with disabilities.
(b) The purpose of this chapter is to:
1. Ensure that all students with disabilities as defined in
this chapter, including students with disabilities who have
been suspended or expelled from school, have available to
them a free, appropriatepublic education as that standard
is set under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA)
and, in furtherance thereof to:
i. Ensure that the obligation to make a free, appropriate
public education available to each eligible student begins
no later than the student's third birthday and that an
individualized education program is in effect for the
student by that date;

386 Id. at 1189 (citations omitted) (quoting 21 N.J.R. §§ 1385, 1391 (May 15, 1989)).
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ii. Ensure that a free, appropriate public education is
available to any student with a disability who needs
special education and related services, even though the
student is advancing from grade to grade;
iii. Ensure that the services and placement needed by
each student with a disability to receive a free,
appropriate public education are based on the student's
38 7
unique needs and not on the student's disability.
It is abundantly clear that the state DOE did not want a
heightened mandate, and eventually the Supreme Court of New
Jersey put its power behind the department's interpretation of
state law.
Despite the Supreme Court's adoption of the
department's clarification, the effect of the earlier Third Circuit's
decisions lingered, as is evident in the next case.
388
2. S.V. and the Ewing Township Board of Education

S.V. was neurologically impaired, had difficulty learning, and
suffered emotionally on that account. He attended public school
from kindergarten through fourth grade, and received
supplemental special educational services. From fifth grade
through ninth grade, he attended different schools outside of his
district where he continued to experience learning problems.
After his ninth grade year, S.V.'s parents placed him in a
residential school, the Pathway School, in Pennsylvania and
requested that his school district pay for this placement. The
district countered with a proposed placement into a motivational
program in the public high school.38 9 Unable to reach an
387 N.J. ADMIN. CODE 6A §14-1.1 (2004) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). I want to
thank Kristin McCarthy of the New England School of Law library staff for her efforts in
locating state administrative law materials used for this article and for background
material.
388 Ewing Township Bd. of Educ. v. S.V., No. CIV. 89-462, 1991 WL 186691 (D. N.J.
Sept. 16, 1991).
389 The court also stated:
This was a special program designed for students achieving at an average level who
wanted to go to college. This program was not specifically designed for handicapped
students, but was intended for students who had difficulty in their study skills. The
students in this program were to attend regular education programs for English,
math, and biology, but additional time in English and math would be provided, as
would additional counseling, help and instruction.
Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
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agreement with the school district, S.V.'s parents demanded a
due process hearing.
An administrative law judge awarded reimbursement for costs
expended in placing S.V. at the Pathway School, using as a
rationale the "can-best- achieve-success" standard. 390 The school
district went to federal court seeking to overturn this decision,
arguing, inter alia, that a mistaken interpretation of the state
mandate had been applied against it. On that point, the district
judge agreed (in light of John Lascari's case), 391 but the rejection
of New Jersey's so-called heightened mandate did not require
reversal, in the judge's opinion, where a preponderance of
credible evidence established "that the JEP proposed by plaintiff
[school district] was inappropriate under the FAPE standard,
and that the residential placement was the least restrictive
environment for S.V."392 Hence, in S.V.'s case the fact that New
Jersey was operating under FAPE made no difference. This
interpretation of FAPE strikes me as considerably above de
minimis.
An evolving understanding of the FAPE mandate filled the
space left by the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in
Lascari. Differently stated, when the power went out of the state
mandate, the courts made the FAPE mandate do what the state
mandate had done. This growth of the meaning of the federal
mandate in the Third Circuit decisions is a phenomenon readily
observable in subsequent cases. 393 I will return for an
390 See id. at *6 (stating the findings of the administrative law judge).
391 The court also stated:
Defendants [parents] argue that New Jersey, in implementing the Act, did adopt a
higher, "can-best-achieve-success-in-learning" standard that this court should apply
to determine whether plaintiff provided appropriate educational services for S.V. in
1987. The court in Parent Information Ctr. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ.,
determined that it was irrelevant whether previous New Jersey statutes provided for
a higher level of education than that required under the Act; the new regulations
clearly indicated that any such interpretation was erroneous. This court agrees.
Ewing, 1991 WL 186691, at *5 (citation omitted).
392 Id. at *8.
393 See e.g., Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 817 F. Supp. 14, 14-16, 19 (D.N.J.

1993); affd in part, 42 F.3d 149, 161, n.11 (3d Cir. 1994). In a story reminiscent of the
case of John Lascari, J.H. languished for years in a public school system that did not meet
his needs. His parents eventually placed him at Landmark School in Massachusetts and
demanded a due process hearing wherein they sought reimbursement. After an Aid held
for the parents the school district went to federal court, but the district judge affirmed.
Because of the parents' tardiness in demanding due process, the Third Circuit disallowed
two years reimbursement but affirmed as to third year. The court plainly acknowledged
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examination of Third Circuit cases, and selected cases from other
circuits, bearing upon the meaning of FAPE in Part VIII of this
article.
D. Conclusions

1. The first lesson to glean from the foregoing study of case
law is that it is difficult for a heightened state mandate on
special education to survive the disapproval of a state
educational establishment. It would be interesting to study
internal memoranda generated within the New Jersey DOE
while the meaning of its own regulation was in issue. Whether
the regulatory "clarification" was driven chiefly by economic
concerns or something else, I cannot state on the basis of
materials readily available, but I can conclude that if any state
legislature wants a heightened mandate, the terms thereof must
be stated with unmistakable clarity in enabling legislation.
2. Parents and guardians of special needs children should not
necessarily assume that the state DOEs are fighting for their
interests. We should remember that the DOEs were created to
serve the needs of all children, not only children with disabilities.
If funding is tight, DOE personnel will be tempted to lower the
mandate, which means that we should therefore be vigilant
about proposed state regulations bearing upon children with
disabilities.
3. The FAPE mandate is neither self-defining nor limited to
the minimalist interpretations some feared in the wake of
Rowley. The federal district judges and appellate judges of the
Third Circuit proved to be perceptive, creative, and maybe a little
devious, first in their interpretation of state law, and second in
their adjustment of the FAPE mandate to fill the space left after
that the ALT had wrongly used the discarded regulatory language relied upon in Geis v.
Board of Education, but further stated that the federal FAPE standard justified the result
stating, "Because we agree with the district court that the Board of Education failed
under either standard, we need not address the parties' contentions as to which standard
applies." See also J.C., M.C. and G.C. ex rel J.C. v. Central Regional School District, 81
F.3d 389, 392-93, 397 (3d Cir. 1996). J.C. was a young man with a serious mental
handicap. An ALJ denied a residential placement. A federal district judge reversed and
the Third Circuit upheld the reversal because the ALJ had required too little, namely,
"some educational benefit" under the Rowley case. The Third Circuit anchored its ruling
in Board of Education v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1986).
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the limiting decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Lascari
394
v. Board of Education.
4. In this context, it may be appropriate to mention that in
other circuits, federal courts failed to develop state legislative
mandates embedded in language sufficiently strong to sustain
holdings requiring more than Rowley. Apart from the states
discussed in the text of this article, there are at least four states
in which the legislatures enacted language susceptible of
interpretation as heightened mandates, namely: Kansas,
Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. 395 With respect to school
obligations in each of these states, federal district judges (in
three cases affirmed by federal appellate judges) held that the
396
state's obligations did not exceed the federal FAPE mandate.
The state courts did not develop the mandates either.
5. In light of the legislative repeals of the heightened
mandates in Massachusetts and Missouri, and the regulatory
clarification coupled with the Supreme Court of New Jersey's
decision in Lascari, parents and advocates for children with
394 560 A.2d 1180 (S.Ct. N.J. 1989); see Weber, supra note 100, at 353. When I use the
word "devious" I do not mean to imply something repugnant; rather, the lower courts
have displayed a marvelous creativity in probing for Congressional purpose and
discerning sensible social policy in a manner that goes far beyond what one can find on
the surface of Rowley. There is an interesting process at work here described by Professor
Weber with reference to the Act as "deradicalizing" by the Supreme Court and
"reradicalizing" by the lower courts.
395 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-962(f) (2002) (specifying the state's policy on special
education); 70 OKLA. STAT. §13-101 (1989) (defining the state's duty to provide education
to children with disabilities); MINN. STAT. § 125A.03 (2003) (defining special education);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-10 (2003) (codifying the state's education for children with
disabilities policy).
396 See Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4 of Bixby, 921 F.2d 1022, 1030 (10th Cir.
1990). Johnson involved a young woman suffering from autism and retardation. The
district court held, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, an administrative decision denying
year-around programming. In the course of its opinion, the Tenth Circuit judges stated
that the Oklahoma requirements were equivalent to the FAPE mandate. In O'Toole v.
Olathe Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 144 F.3d 692, 699-701 (10th Cir. 1998), the panel
reached the same result with respect to a Kansas statute. The case involved a girl with a
severe hearing loss. The district court overturned an administrative decision favorable to
the disabled girl and the Tenth Circuit affirmed stating that the Kansas statute in
question did not bind the state to anything higher than a FAPE. In Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
283 v. S.D. by J.D., 948 F. Supp. 860, 884-88 (D. Minn. 1995), a federal district judge in
Minnesota adopted a Magistrate's report holding that under Minnesota law the school
district was under no obligation to go beyond the federal standard for the education of a
student with dyslexia. In Doe v. Thllahoma City Schs., 9 F.3d 455, 457-58 (6th Cir. 1993),
the Sixth Circuit upheld a district court decision that disallowed reimbursement for
private placement of a young man with learning disabilities. The panel decided that the
special education laws of Tennessee did not require more than the federal mandate
required.
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disabilities must not over-estimate popular sentiments as being
favorable to our children. While special education and the
quality thereof is of great importance to several million
Americans who are either disabled or whose families have
disabilities, the cause of special education does not especially
dazzle or attract either the right or the left in the current
political climate.
6. After examining the law arising from four states with
legislative mandates susceptible of interpretations outrunning
FAPE, we have found that in three of these four, the higher
mandate disappeared by legislative reaction or was clarified out
of existence when it was discovered to be a law with teeth.
Advocates for children with disabilities should not naively place
undue hope in linguistic formulae, whether statutory or
regulatory, that appear to chart loftier goals than a FAPE.
VII.NORTH CAROLINA: THE MANDATE FOR A "FAIR AND FULL
OPPORTUNITY To REACH HIS FULL POTENTIAL"

A.

The Mandate

The North Carolina legislature acted to implement the federal
mandate by enacting a special education law codified at G.S. §
115-363 (1977). Chapter 115 provided that, "[t]he policy of the
State is to provide a free appropriate publicly supported
education to every child with special needs." At this point there
was no discernible heightened state mandate. Later, by Chapter
423, § 1, Session Laws 1981, special education law was rewritten
and codified at Chapter 115C. Section 115C-106 states in
relevant part:
The General Assembly of North Carolina hereby declares
that the policy of the State is to ensure every child a fair and
full opportunity to reach his full potential and that no child
as defined is this section and in G.S. 115C-122 shall be
excluded from service or education for any reason
whatsoever.
By setting a statutory full potential mandate, the legislature
arguably intended to push the state's mandate above the federal
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mandate. If one were to inquire whether or not this apparent
legislative intention was accomplished, only a good reading of the
case law can give an answer.
B. Recognizing the Higher State Mandate
3 97
1. Marguerite Harrell and the Wilson County Schools

Although Marguerite was hearing impaired, her school district
proposed an IEP placing her in a regular sixth grade class with
support services. Her parents requested that the school district
finance her education for a year at the Central Institute for the
Deaf (CID) in St. Louis, Missouri. The school district refused, so
Marguerite's parents sought a due process hearing. The hearing
officer held for the school district, a decision was affirmed on
administrative appeal.
Marguerite's parents filed suit in the Superior Court in Wilson
County, North Carolina, where the trial judge affirmed the
administrative decision to place Marguerite in the public school.
Marguerite's parents sought review by the North Carolina Court
of Appeals. 398 The parents' lawyer argued, inter alia, that federal
and state law required that "[t]he local school agency ... provide

'399
a handicapped student with the most appropriate education.
The argument may have been a linguistic formulation that
attempted to combine the state and federal mandates. The court
recognized a heightened state mandate but rejected the parents'
position in the following language:

Although our statute was designed, in part, to bring the
state to conformity with the federal statute, the Rowley
Court's interpretation of Congress' intent does not control
our interpretation of our General Assembly's intent. We
believe that our General Assembly "intended to eliminate the
effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that the child
will be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is
reasonably possible." Under this standard a handicapped
child should be given an opportunity to achieve his full
397 Harrell v. Wilson County Schs., 293 S.E.2d 687 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
398 See id. at 688-89 (stating the numerous appeals Marguerite's parents presented).
399 See id. at 689 (emphasis added) (highlighting the parent's argument).
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potential commensurate with that given other children.
Nothing we have said, however, helps the plaintiff on the
facts of this case. Our statute, as progressive as it may be,
was not designed to require the development of a utopian
educational program for handicapped students any more
than the public schools are required to provide utopian
educational programs for non-handicapped students. We
believe that the Wilson County School System has fulfilled it
to provide Marguerite with a free appropriate
obligation 400
education.
By this language, in North Carolina's first appellate opinion
attempting to blend state and federal special education law, the
appellate court significantly limited the impact of the state's full
potential mandate, and ironically did it by borrowing from the
dissent in Rowley. The opinion is reminiscent of the Nelson
opinion from a Michigan appellate court. 40 1 By plucking the
equality strand from Justice White's dissent in Rowley, and
weaving that strand with the language of the state statute, the
North Carolina court blunted the "full potential" language of the
state statute, making the mandate subservient to the equal
opportunity theme. Despite an overt acknowledgment that the
state standard was progressive, the court found no requirement
that made any difference for Marguerite. 4 2 The disposition of the
case coupled with the language quoted, supra, tended thereafter
to dampen the development of the state mandate somewhat.

400 Id. at 690-691 (citations omitted).
401 See Nelson v. Southfield Pub. Schs., 384 N.W. 2d 423, 426 (Ct. App. Mich. 1986)
(holding that the state review official abused his discretion by refusing to hear arguments
from the school district).
402 See generally Harrell,293 S.E.2d 687, at 690-91 n.1. After several readings, the
court's explanation of the 1981 legislative change remains puzzling:
Chapter 115, under which this action was brought, was rewritten by Session Laws
1981, c. 423, s.1, effective 1 July 1981, and has been recodified as Chapter 115C. In
Chapter 115C, the General Assembly clearly spelled out its intent by declaring "that
the policy of the State is to ensure every child a fair and full opportunity to reach is
full potential..." Harrell, 293 S.E.2d 687, at 690-91 n.1; see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§115C-106 (2003). The reference to "spelling out" legislative intent may mean that
the revision was a clarification, not really a change, in which event free and
appropriate always meant something more than the Rowley majority required. On
the other hand, the statutory revision may have intended a heightened standard tied
to Justice White's dissent.
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40 3
2. James Hall and the Vance County Board of Education

An appellate judge described James as a "bright sixteen yearold boy of above average intelligence" who "at age eleven, as he
prepared to enter the fifth grade... was functionally illiterate,
unable to distinguish between the words 'ladies' and 'gentlemen'
on restroom doors, or to go to the store to make small purchases
for his mother."40 4 James's troubles with school started early. He
had trouble learning to read, and consequently repeated second
grade.
His third grade teacher, recognizing his learning
When James was
difficulties, recommended an evaluation.
diagnosed as learning disabled, his school recommended an IEP
which his parents accepted, keeping James in a regular
He made no
classroom for his third and fourth grades.
meaningful progress. 40 5 As he was about to enter fifth grade, as a
functional illiterate, the school presented an IEP with no
meaningful changes from prior years at which point his parents
understandably grew very frustrated.
So James's parents placed him in a private school.
Unfortunately, this school proved unequipped to handle his
disability, and he left after two months with the school's
recommendation that he have further testing. At this point,
James was finally diagnosed as dyslexic. 40 6 Not surprisingly, his
repeated failures at school had caused him emotional harm, and
he had developed a genuine fear of school. In this context, the
Halls learned of Oakland School, a private school in Virginia,
which accepted learning disabled children such as James. While
they awaited an opening, James's parents tutored him at home
and made multiple requests that the school district fund the
Oakland School residential placement when became available.
School officials rebuffed them, but when a opening arose, the
Halls placed James at Oakland where he began to make
progress.
403 Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1985).
404 Id. at 630. This description did not bode well for the school that James had
attended.
405 See id. at 631 (discussing James also received special services at a resource room
four times a week for thirty minute periods during his fourth grade year).
406 See id. at 630 (explaining "James suffers from dyslexia, a severe learning
disability that hinders his ability to decipher written symbols").
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No doubt concerned about the costs of an out-of-state
placement, the district countered with a proposed IEP pursuant
to which James would return to his district and spend most of his
time in specialized classes. Satisfied with the Oakland School
placement the Halls resisted and rejected the proposed IEP, and
went to a due process hearing. The hearing officer decided that
the school's proposed IEP was appropriate, with modifications. A
state reviewing officer agreed. 40 7 The upshot of the
administrative process was that Halls should bring James home
to his public school where he had always been a failure as a
student.
The Halls filed an action in federal district court. The federal
judge turned the administrative decision around by ruling that
(i) the district's current proposal would not provide a FAPE; (ii)
the district was liable for the costs of sending James to Oakland
School for that year; (iii) the district had failed to provide a FAPE
at any time up to the due process hearing and; (iv) the parents
were entitled to reimbursement for costs previously incurred. 40 8
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in all
respects against the arguments of the school district and state
defendants both of which argued that the district judge had erred
"by disregarding Rowley's rule that the EAHCA does not require
schools to provide an education that will allow a handicapped
40 9
child to fulfill his maximum potential."
In essence, the defendants argued that it was error for a trial
judge to apply any standard other than the minimum Rowley
requirement, a strained argument it would seem in light of North
Carolina G.S. s. 115C-106. The Court of Appeals replied:
Nowhere, however, does the district court's opinion suggest
that it held the defendants to the impermissible standard.
Instead, it properly considered the evidence introduced at
trial, including two independent evaluations and the results
of several standardized tests, in determining that James'
education was not reasonably calculated to enable him to
receive educational benefits, as required by the Act and
407 See id. at 632 (stating the reviewing officer acknowledged that the school district
had failed to meet its obligations in earlier years but believed he had no authority to
provide any relief for those failures).
408 See id. at 632-33 (summarizing the trial court's decision).
409 Hall, 774 F.2d at 635.
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Rowley... Rowley recognized that a FAPE must be tailored
to the individual child's capabilities and that while one
might demand only minimal results in the case of the most
severely handicapped children, such results would be
insufficient in the case of other children. Clearly, Congress
did not intend that a school system could discharge its duty
under the EAHCA by providing a program that produces
minimal academic advancement, no matter how trivial.. 410
Whether the judges believed that North Carolina had a
heightened mandate is not apparent, but it is certain that the
court did not need anything beyond FAPE to affirm the district
court's decision against the school system. By stressing that the
trial judge had not used an impermissible standard, the court
might have been casting doubt on whether North Carolina did
have a higher mandate that applied to the case. In any event,
the court reached an excellent result by raising the Rowley
standard above the minimum "some benefit" test.

C. Autistic Children: The Mandate and Competing Pedagogical
Theories
1. Christian Lee Denton and the Burke County Board of
4 11
Education
This case takes us once more into an extended quarrel about
what is appropriate for an autistic child. 4 12 Christian (Chris) was
described as having severe problems in communication and selfcontrol. 413 He resided in a home for autistic persons where he
received educational services at a nearby school. The residential
and school programs were coordinated and highly structured.
Chris made progress in learning and controlling his aggressions.
As he neared age eighteen, and funds for his placement were
about to cease, Chris's parents began planning his return to the

410 Id. at 635-36 (emphasis added).
411 Burke County Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1990).
412 See supra Part IV. B. & C. for a review of cases arising in Michigan involving the
educational programs for autistic children and more particularly, the Lovaas method.
413 See Denton, 895 F.2d at 975 (asserting "Chris cannot manage his own behavior;
his behavior at all times must be managed by others").
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family home and therefore sought a workable IEP. 414 The district
developed an IEP that in most respects replicated the school
program from which Chris was being transferred, including a
one-to-one aid. The sticking point was this: Chris's parents
requested in-home services for 24 hours a day, 365 days a year,
asserting that such services were appropriate for Chris and were
required under federal and state law. 4 15 At this request, the
school district balked.
Chris's parents went to a due process hearing where the
hearing officer determined that the district's proposed IEP was
sound with certain minor modifications. 4 16 Critically, the hearing
officer did not order 24-hour home care services.
A state
reviewing officer accepted the facts as found by the hearing
officer but made an opposite conclusion, granting everything that
Chris's parents wanted. 417 In effect, the reviewing officer ordered
a "residential placement" with the Denton home being the
"residence" staffed by aides at the school district's expense. The
school board went to federal court as the "party aggrieved" under
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2); Chris's parents counterclaimed "seeking
365-day services during Chris' waking hours. . ."418
The district judge reinstated the hearing officer's decision,
which had allowed something short of a "residential"
placement. 4 19 Chris's parents appealed to the Fourth Circuit,
which upheld the trial court by focusing mainly upon statutory
420
definitions.
414 See id. (noting Chris was included in the 'Willie M" class which by consent decree,
was entitled to funding for certain services, but because funding under the "Willie M"
decree ran out at eighteen, Chris's parents began to plan for means of otherwise funding
appropriate services).
415 See id. at 977 (emphasizing the fact that the "Willie M" funds for residential
services were ending must have been a factor in the parents' request).
416 See id. at 977-98 (clarifying the hearing officer ordered the school to establish a
mechanism to facilitate the exchange of information in order to coordinate the home and
school environments, for example, a notebook going back and forth would probably
suffice).
417 See id. at 978 (granting the parents their claim of full time in-house care).
418 Id.
419 See Denton, 895 F.2d at 978. Two facts were crucial for the trial judge: first, Chris
was making progress, and second, the home aides were not strictly following behavioral
modification techniques, but were simply taking ordinary care of Chris. Id. Thus, the
parents had really set up a childcare system rather than a truly educational plan.
420 See id. at 980 (highlighting the requirement of the statute is met by "providing
personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit
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The court stated that in light of the Rowley standard:
The question in this case is, then, whether the Board's IEP,
which does not include a home instruction component, is
reasonably calculated to enable Chris to receive educational
benefits. Congress recognized that in some instances home
instruction or residential placement would be required for
the handicapped child to benefit educationally .... Where
medical, social, or emotional problems are intertwined with
educational problems, courts recognize that the local
education agency must fund residential programs if the
requirements of the EHA [sic] and Rowley are to be met. The
determination whether services beyond the regular school
day are essential for the child to receive any educational
benefit is necessarily fact and case specific....
The district court found that since Chris returned home and
enrolled in a Burke County school, he has continued to make
educational progress despite the failure of the home care
aides to follow rigorously the successful behavior
management program. This finding was not clearly
erroneous.. .and undermines the Dentons' factual premise
that an absolutely consistent in-home behavior management
educational progress
program is required for Chris to make 421
and is therefore an educationalexpense.
By sustaining the finding that educational progress had been
a rigorous behavioral management
accomplished without
program at home, the court not only decided that the Rowley
standard was met but also decided that the home services were
The court stated
not essentially educational in nature.
explained, "If residential placement is necessitated by medical,
social, or emotional problems that are segregable from the
learning process, then the local education agency need not fund
the residential placement." 4 22 Legal counsel's fallback to
423
procedural arguments also failed.
educationally from that instruction") (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203
(1982)).
421 Id. at 980 (emphasis added).
422 Id. (emphasis added).

423 See id. at 981-82. Counsel argued that the district court had failed to give due
weight to the decision of the state reviewing officer and, further, that monetary costs to
the school district had wrongfully influenced the decision. Id. Nevertheless, the court
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Regarding the state mandate, Denton's lawyer argued that
North Carolina law required an IEP designed so that Chris had
an opportunity to reach his "full potential." But again, the
court's careful differentiation of educational and rehabilitative
services helped to sustain the trial court's decision. 424 The court
concluded:
North Carolina apparently does require more than the EHA
[sic]. The special education program must provide the child
with an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably
possible, ensuring that the child has an opportunity to reach
her full potential commensurate with the opportunity given
other children. But, North Carolina law still recognizes the
difference
between
special
education
services
and
habilitation services. Although the state statutory definitions
of "special education" and "related services" are more
expansive than the EHA definitions of those terms, the
services the Dentons seek do not fall within the definitions.
Special education is defined to include certain services
categorized as related services under federal law; "related
services includes" "school social work services, parent
counseling and training, providing parents with information
about child development and assisting parents in
understanding the needs of their child." The district court's
factual findings compel the conclusion that the in-home
services sought by the Dentons are not the kind of services
which must be provided, under federal or North Carolina
425
law, by the local education agency.
Thus, Chris's parents lost their claim for in-home services
because the Fourth Circuit judges deemed the services requested
to be habilitation, not education. The tone of the appellate
opinion leaves me with the impression that the judges thought
the parents were overreaching. 426 In any event, Chris Denton's
determined that, in sum, Chris was benefiting under his IEP without the 24-7 services
demanded. Consequently, the federal mandate was met.
424 See id. at 982-83 (acknowledging, however, more stringent North Carolina
mandate).
425 Id. at 983 (referring to North Carolina statutory language). See N.C. GEN. STAT. §
115C-108 (2003) (defining "special education" and "related services").
426 See id. The opinion, for example, discusses the Dentons' application for a license
to operate their home as a residential care facility pursuant to the state law governing
Human Resource programs. The court referred to this evidence as "confirming the
appropriate categorization of the home care services sought for Chris as habilitation, not
education."
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case illustrates yet another limiting technique, to wit: a careful
judicial construction of statutory definitions to push the
requested services outside the realm of special education.
427
2. C.M. and the Board of Education of Henderson County

The opinions generated in C.M.'s case and in the related case of
C.E., joined on appeal, would be sufficient for a course in special
education law, partly because an especially able trial judge
delved deeply into both the facts and the law, 428 and partly
because the parents of each child fought heart and soul - perhaps
obsessively - for the Lovaas approach. The judicial resolution of
these intense conflicts about pedagogical methods can be very
enlightening on the meaning of FAPE and the North Carolina
mandate. I will concentrate only on C.M., an autistic girl,
inasmuch as a separate discussion of C.E.'s case would add
nothing enlightening. Moreover, the parents' struggle to find the
right program for C.M. resonates with me because it parallels the
struggles my wife and I had to find the best program for our
autistic daughter, Ingrid.
When C.M. was of pre school age, her parents moved from New
Hampshire to North Carolina so that C.M. could gain an
educational advantage under the innovative TEACCH program
developed at the University of North Carolina. 429 Soon after
427 Due to the multiple opinions generated in the litigation and administrative
processes, this North Carolina special education case presents significant analytical
difficulty. The following cases underlie this textual treatment: CM v. Bd. of Educ. of
Henderson County, 1999 WL 33117438, at *1 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 4, 1999); CM v. Bd. of Educ.
of Henderson County, 85 F. Supp. 2d 574 (W.D. N.C. 1999); CM v. Bd. of Educ. of
Henderson County, 241 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 818 (2001); CM v.
Bd. of Pub. Educ. of Henderson County, 184 F. Supp. 2d 466 (W.D. N.C. 2002); and ME v.
Bd. of Educ. for Buncombe County, 186 F. Supp. 2d 630 (W.D. N.C. 2002).
428 The presiding judge in the following cases was Judge Lacy H. Thornburg: CM v.
Bd. of Educ. of Henderson County, 1999 WL 33117438, at *1 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 4, 1999); CM
v. Bd. of Educ. of Henderson County, 85 F. Supp. 2d 574 (W.D. N.C. 1999); CM v. Bd. of
Pub. Educ. of Henderson County, 184 F. Supp. 2d 466 (W.D. N.C. 2002); and ME v. Bd. of
Educ. for Buncombe County, 186 F. Supp. 2d 630 (W.D. N.C. 2002).
429 See CM, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 578. Judge Thornburg summarized the TEACCH
program based upon testimony provided in CM's case by Dr. Lee Marcus, then director of
the TEACCH center in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. See 184 F. Supp. 2d at 474-76. While
the summary is lengthy, I emphasize only that TEACCH is distinguished from the Lovaas
method by the requirement of structuring an environment based upon a child's assessed
needs and does not rely upon Discrete Trial Training (DTT) as does the Lovaas technique.
It is fair to say that the differing techniques are based upon differing views about the
nature of autism and that implementation of a TEACCH program is generally cheaper
than implementing a Lovaas program.
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moving, C.M.'s parents discovered the Lovaas program and
began Discrete Trial Training (DTT) in their home. 430 In the
months following, C.M.'s parents became increasingly convinced
of the efficacy of the Lovaas method and sought district funding
for its fuller implementation. The school district was generally
accommodating until C.M.'s parents became convinced that
Lovaas was the only acceptable method. Their conviction led to
an impasse, their own funding for DTT, consequent demands for
reimbursement, complicated administrative hearings, and finally
lengthy litigation - all of which is difficult to understand fully due
to the multiple and complicated reported opinions. Fortunately,
the federal district judge who presided wrote two good opinions,
43 1
one of which makes the main points readily discernible.
It appears that, in 1996, as negotiations between the parents
and school broke down, C.M.'s parents filed two requests for due
process hearings. The first sought reimbursement for the costs of
an Independent Educational Evaluation (IEE).
The second
sought reimbursement for Lovaas therapy provided to C.M.
during previous years, 432 and also sought a placement with a
stress on Lovaas therapy during the 1996-97 school year, or what
remained of it. The petitions were consolidated. For purposes of
this article, only one ruling was critical: that the school district
had offered an appropriate IEP for the 1996-97 school year under
federal and state law. 433 Plaintiffs filed an administrative appeal.
The state review officer affirmed.
Plaintiffs then filed their action in federal court. 434 In a pretrial
ruling, the trial judge disposed of everything except the core
question: Had the school district proposed an appropriate IEP for
the 1996-97 school year? 435 In a very careful analysis, Judge
430 Compare this case with those arising in Michigan, discussed supra in Part IV. B.
& C.
431 See CM, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 468-69 (summarizing procedural history of case).
432 See id. at 468 (seeking reimbursement for Lovaas treatment during 1993-94,
1994-95, and 1995-96 school years).
433 See id. at 489; see also CM, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 577. The opinion does not so state,
but as a practical matter this claim had turned into a claim for reimbursement inasmuch
as the year had passed before the decision was made. With regard to the other requests
in the consolidated petitions, an ALJ denied reimbursement of over $1200 for an IEE and
ruled all reimbursement claims prior to 1996-97 were time-barred.
434 See CM, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 576-577 (noting procedural history of case).
435 See id. at 577. The judge sustained the administrative ruling that limited
reimbursement for the IEE to $1200 and agreed that claims for the years prior to 1996-97
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Thornburg decided that C.M.'s parents had not met their burden
of showing that a Lovaas program (as opposed to TEACCH) was
required under federal or state law, and therefore affirmed the
administrative decision that through the IEP proposed for 1996436
97 the school district had met its obligations.
CM's parents took an appeal to the Fourth Circuit where the
case was consolidated with another appeal by parents of an
autistic boy identified only as C.E. 437 The issue in common was
procedural, namely: "whether a state statute, providing that a
request for a due process hearing must be filed within sixty days
of an agency decision, is inconsistent with the Individuals with
Disabilities Act (IDEA).'' 438 Behind the procedural question
lurked a common substantive question: Did state or federal law
allow the parents to insist upon Lovaas instead of TEACCH and

were time-barred. As to the main issue, the question of the appropriateness of the 1996-97
IEP raised subsidiary questions about process, i.e., the timeliness of the administrative
decisions and the alleged "vagueness" of the school's proposed IEP. Instead, the court
rather summarily dispensed with these questions, concentrating on the proposed
placement and support services.
436 The judge's frustration with CM's parents, legal counsel, and the Lovaas
proponents seems evident at several points in the opinion, especially in the strong
language favorable to the school district:
Finally, in the third meeting for the 1996-1997 school year, the County basically
offered the plaintiffs everything they had requested: CM would go into a regular
classroom despite Ms. McDanel's [special education teacher's] misgiving that she
could handle the size of the class. She would receive one-on-one and guided •
instruction for a total of 12.5 hours per week, a figure close to the 15 hours suggested
by Dr. Boyle. Her speech services would be increased. And, an aide would accompany
CM at all times while she was in the kindergarten class....
The fact that the Lovaas program may be better than TEACCH or provide the
maximum opportunity for CM's development does not mean that the IEP offered
would not have provided a FAPE.
The undersigned finds the Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of establishing
a violation of the IDEA. The preponderance of the evidence supports the findings of
fact and conclusions of law of the AUJ and SRO.
Plaintiffs also allege a claim pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-106(b)... this
higher standard does not require a school district to develop a "utopian educational
program" for the student with special needs any more so than would be required if
the student were not handicapped. Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, 58 N.C. App.
260, 293 S.E.2d 687 (1982). To the extent reasonably possible, the student with
special needs should be given an equal opportunity to learn.
Id. at 577.
437 See CM, 241 F.3d at 379. The State of North Carolina intervened, arguing for the
validity of the sixty day limitation period, and the United States also intervened, arguing
against the limitation period. Id.
438 Id. at 376. Stated differently: Within what time limit must a demand for a due
process hearing be filed?
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require reimbursement when the school districts refused? 43 9 On
the procedural question, the court decided that the sixty day
period for filing a request for a due process hearing was valid,
provided the parents had adequate notice. However, in neither
C.M.'s case nor C.E.'s case did the record establish adequate
notice to trigger the sixty day period; hence, an issue about
proper notice had to be resolved on remand. 440 Near the end of
the opinion, the court affirmed Judge Thornburg's decision that
C.M.'s district had proposed an appropriate IEP for the 1996-97
school year, but contingent on a decision regarding notice of the
filing time, there remained the question of whether the district in
the prior years had complied with federal and state requirements
44 1
with its proposed IEPs.
On remand, Judge Thornburg determined that the school
district had not provided any due process notice for the years
1993-1994 and 1994-1995,442 but went on to find that the parents
had not met their burden of showing that any notice was
owing. 443 The parents had consented to an IEP in 1993, and after
three months had unilaterally removed C.M. to implement the
Lovaas program. Yet, they had not revoked consent nor made
any demands challenging the approved IEP until November
1996. 444 Hence, failure of a due process notice for those years
caused no harm.
The parents' unilateral action without
complaint precluded their claim. Moreover, the court found that

439 Id. at 377. In CE's case, the reimbursement for the Lovaas therapy was the only
issue since the parents and schools officials agreed that CE had fully recovered and was
no longer disabled.
440 See id. at 384-85. The court stated that the North Carolina legislature had
explicitly selected the sixty day period for demanding a due process hearing by crossreference to the state administrative procedures act. However, the sixty day period was
not triggered until notice to the parents of appeal rights was clearly given.
441 See id. at 388 n.12. C.E.'s case was also remanded. The Supreme Court of the
United States denied certiorari. 534 U.S. 818 (2001). Trials were held on remand.
442 See C.M., 184 F. Supp. 2d at 483-84 (finding that written notice to the parents of a
child is required when the school "proposes to initiate or change or refuses to initiate or
change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child... or the
provision of a free appropriate public education to the child...").
443 See id. at 483 (reasoning that the withdrawal of C.M. from school and the request
for additional speech therapy by C.M.'s parents was insufficient to trigger a requirement
of due process notice by the school).
444 Id. at 484 (finding the November 1996 petition for a contested hearing did not
revoke consent retroactively and thus did not apply to the previous years in question).
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the district had offered a FAPE for the years in which due
44 5
process notice was lacking.
Finally, with painstaking close attention to the details of
C.M.'s program, the judge made conclusions with respect to the
1995-1996 year, assuming a timely claim, and stated:
The fact that the Lovaas program may be better than
TEACCH or provide the maximum opportunity for CM's
development does not mean that the IEP offered would not
have provided a FAPE. The undersigned therefore concludes
that a FAPE was offered to CM for the 1995-1996 school year
and the Plaintiffs are not entitled to reimbursement.
And with respect to the requirements of the North Carolina
statute, Judge Thornburg wrote in relevant part:
However, "North Carolina apparently does require more
than the [IDEA]. The special education program must
provide the child with an equal opportunity to learn if that is
reasonably possible, ensuring that the child has an
opportunity to reach her full potential commensurate with
the opportunity given other children." Nonetheless, this
higher standard does not require a school district to develop
a "utopian educational program" for the student with special
needs any more so than would be required if the student
were not handicapped. To the extent reasonably possible, the
student with special needs should be given an equal
opportunity to learn. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs
were offered an educational program which would have
provided CM an equal opportunity to reach her full potential
commensurate with the opportunity given other children.
Indeed, it may well be that the TEACCH program would
have provided a superior model for CM's emotional and
social development. 446
With this, the long-enduring quarrel over C.M.'s program
reached closure. 44 7 Once again, parents had insisted upon Lovaas
445 See id. at 485. The undersigned therefore concludes that the IEP for the 19931994 and 1994-1995 school years would have provided CM with a FAPE.
446 Id. at 489 (citations omitted) (reasoning that the Board of Education of Henderson
County followed the requisite North Carolina laws and thus dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaint in its entirety).
447 See M.E. v. Board of Education, 186 F. Supp. 2d 630, 642 (W.D.N.C. 2002). Judge
Thornburg also disposed of the parents' reimbursement claim in the case involving C.E.,
which had been consolidated with C.M.'s case on appeal to the Fourth Circuit.
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treatment to the exclusion of any other approaches and had
failed to make their case successfully in court under the federal
or state mandates.
More case law could be examined but I have found nothing that
contradicts or further illumines the meaning of the state and
federal mandates as explicated in the foregoing decisions.
D. Conclusions
After studying cases from the North Carolina courts and the
federal courts, the limitations judicially placed upon the North
Carolina mandate are few but significant.
1. The courts applied the equality theme in special education
law in a way that parallels the emphasis on access in Rowley.
According to the courts, North Carolina special education law
was designed to equalize opportunities for gaining an education,
and since non-handicapped students are not entitled to a utopian
or model educational programs, it follows that the opportunities
for the children with disabilities may be accordingly limited.
Thus, the equality theme worked in two ways. First, the quest
for equal opportunity well grounded in the state mandate, helped
a little to raise the minimum requirement. On the other hand, it
did take force out of claims for the maximum possible benefit.
2. The opinions show a judicial deference to schools on
pedagogical methods, a factor which figured prominently in
C.M.'s case and the related case involving autism. Recognizing
that the courts should leave decisions about pedagogical methods
to the educational experts, the courts simply refused to choose
one program over another, most notably Lovaas over TEACCH.
This deference, in combination with the requirement of giving
due weight to administrative decisions, made the parents'
burdens to prove that proposed IEPs did not meet the mandates
nearly impossible to carry. In this the Fourth Circuit reviewing
cases from North Carolina took the same path as the Sixth
Circuit reviewing cases from Michigan.
3. In the case of Chris Denton, courts carefully parsed the
language of the definitions in state and federal statutes and
thereby pushed the parents' claims beyond the range of special
education into the categories of medical and habilitation services.
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I do not suggest that any judge parsed wrongly, but do stress
that the definitions can be a powerful source for limitations as
well as expansions of obligations of schools toward children with
disabilities.
4. The courts have imposed a reasonableness limitation as a
limit upon against over- zealous parents.
Eschewing any
meaningful dialogue about pedagogical adjustments that might
help their children, perhaps at reduced costs to the districts, did
not help the parents' cases. Attitudes perceived as parental
zealotry hurt the causes and children for whom they advocated.
On this theme, there is a parallel to the First Circuit case law
448
applying Massachusetts law.
5. The "full potential" mandate did not lead to unreasonable
decisions. Moreover, in the decisions, which I have analyzed and
others reported from North Carolina, I doubt that the state
mandate was essential for any decision made favorable to a child
with a disability. People within the educational culture in North
Carolina might see it differently since it is quite possible that the
state mandate enriched that educational culture in ways not
easily quantified or documented.
6. Through state and federal opinions, the state mandate was
leveled off to be virtually indistinguishable from the FAPE
mandate as interpreted by the best decisions of the Fourth
Circuit. That could explain why there has been no political push
to repeal the state mandate in North Carolina.
As this
comparative study has demonstrated, of the five states studied,
only two, North Carolina and Michigan, still have heightened
statutory mandates, and in those states the courts have made the
mandates workable by making them reasonable.
7. We should not conclude that the North Carolina mandate
has failed to achieve any worthwhile purpose. But case law does
suggest that state legislation designed to outreach the federal
mandate, whether in North Carolina or elsewhere, is of limited
impact - far less than commonly perceived. To an advocate for
448 See e.g., Frank S. v. Sch. Comm. of the Dennis-Yarmouth Regional Sch. Dist., 26
F. Supp.2d 219, 231 (D. Mass. 1998) (affirming the magistrate judge's decision, finding
that the Massachusetts standard was more strict than the IDEA standard, and holding
that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing that the IEP was inadequate under
Massachusetts or federal law).
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children with special needs, these developments are not on first
glance necessarily inspiring. But, it is important to observe, that
while state mandates were being repealed or leveled, some
federal judges were pumping life into the federal FAPE mandate,
a laudable development worthy of investigation and comment.
VIII. POST-ROWLEY DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL MANDATE
The judges of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit have
been most notable in developing the meaning of FAPE as a
matter of federal law. 44 9 In writing this part, I owe a debt to
Professor Mark Weber, who more than a decade ago discerned
450
the beginning of this very positive trend in federal case law.
A.

Third Circuit Cases
1. Christopher Polk and the Central Susquehanna
Intermediate Unit 16451

The case arose from a simple question arising from
Christopher's need for physical therapy: Did the federal mandate
require hands on physical therapy or was a consultative model
whereby a physical therapist instructed his teacher in the
techniques of physical therapy sufficient? The case arose in
Pennsylvania, which did not have a heightened state mandate.
At the age of seven months, Christopher contracted
encephalopathy; he was also mentally retarded. 452 By his midteens, his mental development and functional abilities were those
449 In discussing New Jersey law, I have previously considered the Third Circuit case
Diamond v. Board of Education (see discussion at Part VI.B.2. of this article). Here, I will
take up three more Third Circuit cases important for the development of FAPE and will
then make brief references to selected cases from other circuits
450 See Weber, supra note 100 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Board of
Education v. Rowley, how the ruling restricted the purpose of the Education for the
Handicapped Act, and how lower courts have reacted to the ruling).
451 Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 172 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989) (reversing a summary judgment in favor of the
school district, reasoning that a genuine issue of material fact still existed as to whether
the school district violated the procedural requirements of the Education of the
Handicapped Act by refusing to consider direct physical therapy for Christopher Polk).
The case arose in Pennsylvania which did not have a heightened mandate.
452 See id. at 173. Though unclear from the opinion, I believe his mental retardation
preceded the infection at seven months old. Of course, the sequence of events leading to
his troubles really made no difference for his special education needs.
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of a normal toddler. Christopher needed help developing basic
life skills, such as feeding himself, dressing, and using the toilet.
While the record is not totally clear, it appears that
Christopher's school provided one-to-one physical therapy by a
licensed physical therapist in his early years, and in 1980
switched to the consultative model. 453 Because Christopher's
parents believed that he had made dramatic improvements when
he received direct one-to-one services from the physical therapist,
they objected to the change and sought at least one session per
week with a licensed therapist. When the school district refused,
they hired a therapist privately and challenged the school
district's refusal in a due process hearing. 454
A hearing officer determined that Christopher was gaining
some benefit, and was therefore receiving a FAPE as required by
Rowley. On administrative appeal, the Pennsylvania Secretary
of Education affirmed. Christopher's parents brought suit in
federal court. The judge granted summary judgment for the

453 See id. at 174 n.2. The court provides the following description of the consultative
model, and noted that the record was fuzzy about the school's provision of direct physical
therapy and its cessation:
In the consultation model, the therapist interacts with the classroom teacher and/or
other educators who deal with the child on a regular and consistent basis and who
are ultimately responsible for the child's educational performance. The therapist as a
consultant increases the teacher's awareness of a handicapped child's need. The
therapist instructs the teacher on appropriate methods and strategies to attain both
physical therapy/occupational therapy goals and enhance the child's ability to benefit
from classroom educational experiences.
Id.
454 See id. at 174 summarizing the parents' position:
In support of this position, plaintiffs adduced evidence that direct physical therapy
from a licensed physical therapist has significantly expanded Christopher's physical
capacities. In the summer of 1985, Christopher received two weeks of intensive
physical therapy from a licensed physical therapist at Shriner's Hospital in
Philadelphia. According to Christopher's parents, this brief treatment produced
dramatic improvements in Christopher's physical capabilities. A doctor at Shriver's
prescribed that Christopher receive at least one hour a week of direct physical
therapy. Because the defendants were unwilling to provide direct physical therapy as
part of Christopher's special education program, the Polks' hired a licensed physical
therapist, Nancy Brown, to work with Christopher at home. At the time of the
hearing, she was seeing Christopher twice a week.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that the school program has benefited Christopher to some
degree, but argue that his educational program is not appropriate because it is not
individually tailored to his specific needs. . .. plaintiffs have maintained that to
comply with the EHA [IDEA] defendants must provide, as part of Christopher's "free
appropriate public education," one session a week with a licensed physical therapist.
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school defendants 455 because "Christopher derived some
educational benefit." 456 Thus, the district court tracked Justice
Rehnquist's language from Rowley and applied it literally. The
Third Circuit reversed with a lengthy and piercing opinion that
revisited Rowley in light of Christopher Polk's special needs and
declared in eloquent language why a de minimis standard missed
the Act's purpose.
The clash between Christopher's parents and his school district
was set forth as follows:
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court applied the
wrong standard in measuring the educational benefit of
Christopher's program and that the case should be remanded
for further proceedings consistent with the correct standard,
one that requires more than a de minimis benefit.
Defendants rejoin that Rowley's announcement of a "some
benefit" test precludes judicial inquiry into the substantive
education conferred by the Act, so long as the handicapped
child receives any benefit at all. Noting that Christopher's
parents acknowledge that he derives some benefit from his
education, defendants submit that the inquiry is over and
that the457district court's summary judgment must be
affirmed.
Here, the court had to consider the question of what the Act
required under the word "appropriate" and could take no refuge
in a heightened state mandate. 4 58 In revisiting Rowley to flesh
out the meaning of "appropriate" in Christopher's case, the court
picked up linguistic strands from Rowley and produced an
opinion that has provided guidance for subsequent cases. First,
the court focused upon the word "meaningful" and quoted the
Rowley decision as follows: "By passing the Act, Congress sought
primarily to make public education available to handicapped
children... Congress did not impose upon the states any greater
substantive educational standard than would be necessary to
455 Id. at 172. Summary judgment was ordered for the defendants, who included the
local school district and an intermediate administrative unit that covered a five county
area for the supervision of special education programs.
456 Id. at 172.
457 Id. at 180-181.

458 See Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(c) (1982).
Pennsylvania has never had any mandate more demanding than the federal mandate.
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make such access meaningful."45 9 Second, the court focused upon
the fact that the Supreme Court had explicitly acknowledged
that the Act requires services as necessary to assist a child to
benefit from special education. 46 0 Meaningful access means of
necessity, not merely a chance to be physically present, but a
chance to gain a meaningful benefit from schooling. Third, upon
entry into a public school system a handicapped student is
entitled to an individualized program. 4 61 Finally, the court called
attention to the narrowness of the Rowley holding and the
Supreme Court's self-limiting language: "We do not attempt
today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of
educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the
Act."462

With that perspective the court stated explicitly that the Act
"calls for more than a trivial educational benefit."46 3 On the
contrary, "... Rowley makes it perfectly clear that the Act
requires a plan of instruction under which educational progress is
likely". 464 Applying this understanding of a FAPE to
Christopher's case, the court reversed and remanded thus
459 Polk, 853 F.2d at 179 (emphasis added) (quoting Board of Education v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982)). Later in the opinion, the court again came around to the idea
that the education offered must be meaningful: "Implicit in the legislative history's
emphasis on self-sufficiency is the notion that states must provide some sort of
meaningful education - more than mere access to the schoolhouse door." Polk, 853 F.2d at
182.
460 The court stated:
It would do little good for Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing access to
a public education only to have the handicapped child receive no educational benefit
from that education. The statutory definition of "free appropriate public education,"
in addition to requiring that States provide each child with "specially designed
instruction, "expressly requires the provision of "such... supportive services.. .as may
be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education." s.
1401(17). We therefore conclude that the "basic floor of opportunity" provided by the
Act consists of access to specialized education and related services which are
individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.
Id. at 179 (quoting Board of Education v. Rowley 458 U.S. 176, 200-01(1982)).
461 See id. at 179 (noting that a program must be designed to target the specific needs
of the individual student and that courts must ensure a basic "floor of opportunity" under
the Act).
462 Id. at 180 (quoting Board of Education v. Rowley 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982))
(emphasis added) (commenting on the narrow holding of the Supreme Court in Rowley
and affirming that each circumstance must be determined on its own merits).
463 Polk, 853 F.2d at 180 (holding "that the EHA [EAHCA] calls for more than a
trivial educational benefit. That holding rests on the Act and its legislative history as well
as an interpretation of Rowley.").
464 Id. at 183 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 991 (3d Cir. 1986))
(emphasis in the original).
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opening the door to a possible fact finding that the federal
mandate would require one-to-one physical therapy for
Christopher. 46 5 So the narrow question whether or not federal
law required hands on physical therapy, as opposed to
consultation, gave rise to an opinion that has invigorated the
federal mandate.
2. M.E. and the Ridgewood Board of Education 466
M.E. and his parents resided in New Jersey. As early as
second grade, M.E.'s public school teachers noticed that his skills
were below those of his classroom peers. However, throughout
his elementary school years, for reasons not entirely clear, his
school district resisted classifying him as learning disabled. 467
Concerned about poor performance on standardized tests, M.E.'s
parents asked to have him transferred to a different public
elementary school (Ridge School) for third grade. The district
agreed, and he went to Ridge School, but his troubles with
schoolwork continued. An independent consultant hired by
M.E.'s parents found that his intelligence was at the 9 5 th
percentile, but that his reading skills were at the 2nd percentile,
and therefore concluded that he suffered from a learning
disability. 468 A child study team (CST) at the school
recommended increased support and counseling but refused to
recognize any disability that would have qualified M.E. for
special education.
M.E. struggled on into seventh grade where he failed English
and
received
incomplete
marks
in
other
classes.
Understandably, his self-image suffered. His parents requested
an evaluation by an independent CST to which the district
agreed only after the parents filed for a due process hearing. An
465 See id. at 186-87 (applying the new and proper standard announced by the circuit
court precludes summary judgment).
466 Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999).
467 Id. at 243 (having recognized M.E.'s learning disabilities and a great discrepancy
between his abilities and performance in school Ridgewood encouraged M.E.'s parents to
enroll him in their summer program, which they did, however, Ridgewood's Child Study
Team still refused to classify M.E. as learning disabled because they believed he was not
"perceptually impaired" under controlling state law).
468 See id. at 243 (stating the independent learning disabilities consultant concluded
that the great discrepancy between M.E.'s intellectual abilities and academic performance
was a result of being learning disabled).
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independent team diagnosed M.E. with a learning disability in
reading and writing and recommended that he be classified as
perceptually impaired. The district's personnel agreed with the
diagnosis and developed an IEP for M.E.'s eighth grade year
(1995-1996) under which M.E. was placed in a regular classroom
minimal
only
aids. 469 He made
supplementary
with
improvements. His parents regarded the IEP as a failure. 470 The
school's proffered IEP for M.E.'s ninth grade year provided
resource room instruction for all of his required academic work
coupled with regular classroom instruction for electives and
Believing that this proposed IEP was
physical education.
inadequate, M.E.'s long-suffering parents demanded a due
process hearing.
They specifically requested a private placement at Landmark
School in Massachusetts at public expense, 471 and soon after,
they started M.E. in summer school at Landmark. An ALJ took
evidence during the summer. No decision having been rendered
when his ninth grade year was about to begin, M.E. came back to
the Ridgewood District. In November, the ALJ held for M.E. and
his parents and determined, (i) that the district's proposed IEP
1996-1997 (ninth grade) did not provide a FAPE, (ii) that the
469 See id. at 244. The school district seems to have engaged in incredible footdragging as indicated in the court's summary:
Concerned that Ridgewood's CST had erred in failing to classify M.E. as perceptually
impaired, M.E.'s parents asked Ridgewood to provide an evaluation by an
independent child study team. After the parents filed for an administrative hearing,
Ridgewood agreed to the request and contracted with Bergen Independent Child
Study Teams for the evaluation. Ridgewood Director of Special Programs John
Campion ordered Bergen not to recommend whether M.E. should be classified as
perceptually impaired or how he should be educated. M.E.'s parents strongly
disagreed with these limitations and asked the Parent Information Center of New
Jersey to intervene. After the Parent Information Center determined that Bergen
could make classification and placement recommendations, Bergen agreed to make
these recommendations in the final team report it would provide to Ridgewood but
not in the preliminary evaluation reports individual team members would prepare.
Bergen's team staffing report diagnosed M.E. with a learning disability in reading
and writing and recommended that Ridgewood classify him as perceptually impaired.
M.E.'s parents allege that Ridgewood intentionally withheld this report from them
despite their repeated requests and that Ridgewood gave them the team staffing
report only after the New Jersey Department of Education ordered it to so.
Id.
470 Id. at 244-45 (describing how M.E.'s parents objected to the IEP and contended
that the IEP was inadequate as evidenced by the school placing M.E. on a pass-fail
grading system to minimize the negative impact on his self-esteem).
471 Id. at 245 (indicating that M.E.'s parents requested that Ridgewood pay for his
attendance at Landmark's summer program).
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Landmark School would provide a FAPE, (iii) that the district
was liable for tuition for summer school at Landmark, and (iv)
that the district would be liable for tuition at Landmark unless
and until the district came up with an alternative appropriate
placement.47 2 M.E.'s household must have rejoiced.
The school district sued in federal court. The district judge
reversed, finding that the proffered IEP provided "more than a
trivial educational benefit" and therefore satisfied the federal
mandate. 473 M.E.'s parents took an appeal to the Third Circuit.
After carefully reviewing the procedural history and the record
showing the facts about M.E.'s frustrating school experiences, the
court turned to fresh review of Rowley and earlier Third Circuit
case law. 474 In light of that review, the court stated:
[T]he District Court held that an IEP need only provide
''more than a trivial educational benefit" in order to be
appropriate, equating this minimal amount of benefit with a
"meaningful educational benefit." But the standard set forth
in Polk requires "significant learning" and "meaningful
benefit." The provision of merely "more than a trivial
educational benefit" does not meet these standards.
It appears also that the District Court may not have given
adequate consideration to M.E.'s intellectual potential in
arriving at its conclusion that Ridgewood's IEP was
appropriate. Although its opinion discussed the IEP in
considerable detail, it did not analyze the type and amount of
learning of which M.E. is capable. As we have discussed,
Rowley and Polk reject a bright-line rule on the amount of
benefit required of an appropriate IEP in favor of an
approach requiring a student-by-student analysis that
carefully considers the student's individual abilities.

472 See id. at 245 (discussing the holdings of the Administrative Law Judge (AI) in
favor of M.E. as well as the AL_'s refusal to order the district to pay non-tuition costs
associated with M.E.'s enrollment at Landmark, or to order compensatory education).
473 See id. at 245-46 (stating the holdings of the district judge).
474 See id. at 247 (applying a plenary standard of review the court distinguishes the
case law).
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Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the District Court on
this issue and remand for proceedings consistent with this
475
opinion.
To a parent of children with disabilities, these are words of
great encouragement. A court that follows this analytical style
must put the question about required educational services upon a
sliding scale, the answer contingent upon evaluating each child's
abilities. The IEP which provides an answer to the question,
"what services are required?", must provide more than services
slightly above de minimis. Tailored to a child's abilities, the IEP
must aim for significant learning,a truly meaningful educational
benefit. While these words and phrases do not reach the heights
of some precatory state mandates, e.g. maximum possible
development, the words from M.E.'s case make for a practical
and flexible federal mandate with which reasonable parents and
educators should be able to live peaceably and work
constructively. 4 76 The Third Circuit panel went on to decide more
questions that naturally followed from a reversal in M.E.'s case,
e.g. the appropriateness of the Landmark placement, the claim
for compensatory education, the claim for costs and fees, and
other matters. 4 77 None of these matters need detain us as none
delete from the court's decision about the meaning of a FAPE.
3. I.H. and the State-Operated School District of the City of
478
Newark
Because I.H. suffered severe to profound sensorineural hearing
loss, she was identified at age two as a child entitled to special
education. Finding nothing in-district that was appropriate,
school officials placed her out-of-district when she was three at
the Lake Drive School for Deaf and Hard of Hearing children in
Newark. For the year following, beginning in September 1998,
475 Id. at 247-48.

476 Of course, the reference to the sliding scale related to a child's potential could be
grounds for abuse were a child of low intellectual ability on that account deprived of a
meaningful IEP. But, the language in this case should be read with an eye to the infinite
variations of children with disabilities. A child of low intellectual potential should have
services reasonably tailored to that persons needs and potential, not per se lesser services.
477 See id. at 248-54 (describing the ancillary holdings of the court).
478 S.H. ex rel. I.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of the City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260
(3d Cir. 2003).
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the Newark district developed an IEP placing I.H. at the Bruce
Street School, an in-district school for the deaf located within the
George Washington Carver School, the school I.H. would have
attended, had she not been hearing impaired. 479 I.H.'s mother
protested. Following mediation, I.H. was allowed to remain at the
Lake Drive School through the 1998-1999 school year. When it
was time to prepare an IEP for I.H.'s kindergarten, the school
district, once again, proposed an IEP placing I.H. at Bruce Street
School with the justification that this was the least restrictive
environment for an appropriate education. The argument seems
plausible when one considers the district's contentions, namely:
that Bruce Street School was near I.H.'s home and that she
would naturally interact with non-handicapped children between
classes, e.g. at lunch and recess. I.H.'s mother protested, and
ultimately there was a due process hearing.
In an exceedingly careful analysis, the ALJ decided that the
district had not carried its burden of establishing by a
preponderance that its proposal would provide a FAPE. 48 0
However, since the ALJ did not award her costs and fees for the
administrative hearing, I.H.'s mother filed an action in federal
district court. The school district belatedly counterclaimed,
challenging the ALJ's decision on placement. The case was
referred to a Magistrate Judge who took no further evidence, and
summarily ruled for the school district holding, "It is entirely
clear to me that a free and appropriate public education will be
provided at Bruce Street while affording the least restrictive
environment for I.H. ...."481 I.H.'s mother appealed.
The Third Circuit was not favorably impressed with the breezy
approach of the Magistrate Judge. The court in pertinent part
declared:
479 See id. at 265-66 (listing I.H.'s progression within N.J. public school system and
noting, "The Bruce Street School was available for I.H.'s initial placement in 1997, and
the School District explains neither why it was not appropriate for the initial placement,
nor what changed in the interim making it appropriate").
480 See id. at 267-68 (discussing the conclusions of the ALl and placing the burden of
showing that the placement is appropriate on the school district in accordance with the
holding of Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Board of Education, 993 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (3d
Cir. 1993)).
481 I.H., 336 F.3d at 269 (quoting S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, No.002559, Mag. R & R. at 18-19 (D. N.J. Mar 13, 2001)).
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As the School District correctly points out, the issue is not a
comparison between the Lake Drive School and the Bruce
Street School. The IDEA does not require the School District
to provide I.H. with the best possible education. However,
the school district does not meet its burden by simply
showing that an appropriate program may be available.
Instead, the School District must show that the proposed
IEP will provide I.H. with a meaningful educational benefit.
This is an individual determination personal to I.H. The
Lake Drive School and its program are only an issue as far
as they relate to I.H.'s specific situation. Here, the school
district initially placed I.H. in the Lake Drive School. Now,
one factor of I.H.'s individual situation is her placement at
Lake Drive. In other words, if a change in her placement will
be detrimental, this is a factor in determining whether the
will achieve a meaningful educational
new placement
48 2
benefit.
After discussing the school district's argument about the least
restrictive environment and with a focus upon I.H.'s
particularized needs, the court summarized:
The School District's witnesses testified that Bruce Street
employs the same philosophy of total communication, but did
not contradict the ALJ's conclusions that there may be
significant differences in the details of the language used.
Coupled with the ALJ's finding that I.H. is at an important
stage in her language acquisition, the record supports the
ALJ's conclusion that differences in the program may be
detrimental to I.H .... In light of his factual findings, the
ALJ's conclusion that the School District did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the proposed IEP would
483
convey a meaningful educational benefit is not in error.
The result and the language may be partly attributable to the
magistrate judge's casual approach, especially in comparison to
the diligence of the ALJ. The allocation of the burden of proof,
and the deference assigned to the ALJ's findings helped
considerably also, but the underpinning of this case is the Third
Circuit's insistence, citing to Ridgewood (M.E.'s case), that the
IEP must be seriously individualized, focusing on the abilities of
482 I.H., 336 F.3d at 271-72 (citation omitted).
483 !.H., 336 F.3d at 273.
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the child and what will be appropriate to bring about a
meaningful educational benefit. In the normal course this will
mean demonstrable progress taking into account the disability
and the child's capabilities. With the careful inquiry demanded
by the Third Circuit, the FAPE mandate works to the advantage
of disabled children, in my opinion, rendering resort to any state
mandates unnecessary.
B. Beyond the Third Circuit:Positive and Negative
Interpretationsof Rowley
While the judges of the Third Circuit have blazed a trail that
leads to a positive and meaningful application of the federal
mandate, bright spots elsewhere should not be ignored. The
Fourth Circuit's work cited in the cases arising from North
Carolina and the Sixth Circuit's work in cases arising from
Michigan have already been mentioned. Over the past twenty
years, especially in hard cases, federal district and appellate
judges working in these and other circuits have sometimes
creatively used the federal mandate in the service of children
with severe needs. An example is the First Circuit case that
follows.
48 4
1. Daniel Hershman and the Sharon School Committee

Daniel Hershman was severely retarded and needed help to
learn basic skills in toileting, recognizing danger, and exercising
expressive and receptive communication. In due course, his
parents sought a residential placement. The Sharon School
Board (Massachusetts) resisted. A BSEA hearing officer denied
relief, partly because the services sought were not "educational".
The State Advisory Commission agreed that a day school
placement met the federal mandate. 4 5 But, a federal district
judge reversed and ordered a residential placement.

484 Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983).
485 See id. at 231. There is no indication in the case report that the Massachusetts
mandate was argued as a basis for relief. However, in the last paragraph of its opinion,
the First Circuit did make reference to the Massachusetts special education statutes
noting, "The district court's decision is entirely consistent, moreover, with Massachusetts
legislation authorizing residential placements for the handicapped." Id. (citation omitted).
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The First Circuit sustained the district judge with this
explanation:
[W]e think that the district court supportably construed
Daniel's needs for a residential placement as "educational"
within the meaning of the Act. And in so doing, we find no
lack of due deference to the state, even though the BSEA
held to a contrary opinion. The construction of a statutory
48 6
term traditionally falls within the scope of judicial review.
So, the results were favorable to the child without any resort to
the then existing Massachusetts mandate.
2. Blaise Stockton and the Barbour County Board of
48 7
Education
In the context of my earlier discussion of the North Carolina
mandate, 488 I reviewed Hall v. Vance County Board of
Education4 9 where the Fourth Circuit required that under the
federal mandate an individualized program must produce more
than a "minimal academic advancement." 490 Many years later,
Hall proved very helpful to parents in West Virginia struggling
with the issues arising from their son's Tourette's Syndrome and
serious behavioral disorders in the reported case of Stockton v.
Barbour County Board of Education.491 Due to the severity of his
issues, Blaise's mother home-schooled her son through the sixth
grade. Since Blaise's entry into seventh grade in a public school
proved disastrous, his parents reverted to home schooling, but
sought a residential placement at the school's expense. A due
process hearing officer decided that the residential placement
486 Id. at 231.

487 Stockton v. Barbour County Bd. of Educ., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9877, at *1 (4th
Cir. May 5, 1997) (holding school board required to bear cost of disabled student's private
education, since public school did not have appropriate educational resources for student).
488 See Part VII, supra, for a study of cases arising from the North Carolina mandate.
489 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding federal statute permitted parents of a
handicapped child to recover for tuition reimbursement costs when transferring child
from public to private school).
490 Id. at 636.

491 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9877, at *2. The court's summation of the facts shows a
very serious set of disorders. The court stated: "Karl Blaise Stockton suffers from a
number of disabilities including Tourette's syndrome (a neurological disorder), obsessivecompulsive disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. He has specific learning
disabilities related to spelling and mathematics. Blaise also becomes easily depressed, to
the point of being suicidal." Id.
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would be unnecessary, provided the public school furnished
appropriate therapy and instructors. Somehow, the school could
not create a program that met Blaise's needs, or so his parents
felt. 492 Yet, a second hearing officer found that a residential

program was unnecessary. Frustrated, his parents enrolled him
in a private school where he began to perform very well.
When the family's money ran out, Blaise's mother filed suit in
federal court to maintain her son's private placement at the
public school's expense.
A federal district judge issued a
preliminary injunction whereby the school district was required
to pay for the private placement pending a final resolution. 493
The Fourth Circuit affirmed and in so doing employed language
lifting the meaning of FAPE above the minimalist
interpretation. 494 When the need was severe, the court found

flexibility in the FAPE mandate to meet the need.
3. Drew P. and the Clarke County School District 495
The Eleventh Circuit responded to severe needs in the case of
Drew P., an autistic and severely mentally retarded young man
who resided with his parents in Georgia. 496 When Drew was
three, a diagnostician at Emory University recommended a
residential placement. Indeed, from an early age, Drew was in
residential placements, but except for one year, he never received
help from anyone with experience in working with autistic
492 Id. at 2-5. A reasonably careful reading of the Fourth Circuit's opinion leaves the
impression that school officials were either confused or very apathetic about the school's
obligations to Blaise. Consultants necessary for his program were not even contacted by
the time their services were required. Multiple IEP meetings were unfruitful.
493 Id. at 1, 5. The parents and school must have reached a settlement after the
Fourth Circuit decision because nothing appears in the subsequent case reports showing
further litigation.
494 The court stated:
The record here supports the district court's conclusion that Pathway [private school]
was an appropriate placement while the public school was not. A "free appropriate
public education" is one "sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the
handicapped child," but it must produce more than "some minimal academic
advancement." Furthermore, an IEP must be "reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits." Blaise's public school education and the August
1994 IEP fell discernibly short of the Rowley standards.
Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted).
495 Drew P. v. Clarke County Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 927, 931 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding
federal statute required school district to provide autistic child with education and
placement at residential facility).
496 See id. at 928-29 (providing background facts).
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children. 497 When his behaviors at home became unacceptably
aggressive, his parents placed him in a residence for the severely
mentally retarded because the state did not have residential
facilities for the autistic. Yet, his school district refused to
reimburse Drew's parents for the residence's expense.
Drew's parents demanded a due process hearing. The hearing
officer and a state reviewing officer denied reimbursement
finding a residential placement was unnecessary. Meanwhile,
Drew's parents placed him in Tokyo, Japan, at the Hagashi
School designed for autistic children, where he resided for two
years, until he was transferred to a newly opened sister school
near Boston. Drew's parents went to federal court and sought,
inter alia, reimbursement for tuition and fees paid to the schools
in Tokyo and Boston. Although the judge was a little troubled
about the 8000 mile trip to the first residential placement, since
Georgia offered nothing comparable, he ordered appropriate
reimbursement. Rejecting a minimalist reading of Rowley, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed and referred to the federal requirement
of
"personalized instruction" and "meaningful educational
progress."

498

By positive comment on this case, I do not mean to imply that
courts ought be expected routinely to approve placements in East
Asia; rather, I mean that the Fourth Circuit's approach was in
these limited circumstances appropriate and that it struck a hard
blow against an overly pragmatic and minimalist reading of
Rowley.
499
4. Rosalind Fox and the County of San Diego

More recently, decisions from the Ninth Circuit illustrate a
judicial willingness to invigorate the federal mandate, as in the

497 See id. (pointing out that Drew received training from an individual with
experience in working with autistic children in just one year).
498 Id. at 930-31. For these requirements, the court cited to its prior decision in
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853 (11th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied 864
F.2d 795 (11th Cir. 1988), and stressed that the school must provide a setting in which the
child can receive an educational benefit.
499 County of San Diego v. California Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 1458 (9th
Cir. 1996). Rosalind Fox appears in the insufferably long and complex caption as counterdefendant/appellee.
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case of Rosalind Fox. 500 Rosalind suffered severe emotional
problems that were intertwined with school difficulties. A
psychiatrist diagnosed her as having intermittent explosion
disorder and dysthymia, defined as a "morbid anxiety and
depression accompanied by obsession." 50 1 During eighth grade,
her emotional issues led to hospitalization in a psychiatric unit.
In her high school years, her life took a terrible downturn as
evidenced by her IEP goals which included: "decreased
inappropriate behavior such as lying, stealing, and truancy;
improved self-concept and social self-esteem; and increased
50 2
ability to handle academic work."

Rosalind's behavior ran afoul of these goals when she
physically abused her mother, damaged the family home, avoided
school, lied, sometimes stole, and finally was arrested for
shoplifting. 503 Eventually, her mother acted unilaterally and
made a residential placement and sought reimbursement. 50 4
When mediation failed, Rosalind's mother filed for a due process
hearing. The hearing officer agreed with her, and decided that
Rosalind "required residential placement for educational
purposes."5 5 The school district (San Diego County) brought an
action in federal court against the California Special Education
Hearing Office, which raised the issue of whether or not the
residential placement was properly ordered. 506
500 See id. at 1468 (holding county does not have right to challenge child's emotionally
disturbed classification or residential treatment status where county financially obligated
to pay for child's expenses).
501 The court stated:
In January 1990, at the beginning of the second semester of Rosalind's eighth grade
year, her mother, Paula Tanner, hospitalized Rosalind in the psychiatric unit of Mesa
Vista Hospital for violent outbursts related to preparing a school science report.
Rosalind's frustration with the assignment led her physically to abuse her mother
and to break windows in the family's home.
Id. at 1462.
502 Id. at 1463.
503 See id. at 1463 (discussing Rosalind's behavior, including instances when she was
arrested for shoplifting, threw tantrums, broke windows, made threats to damage the
home, and physically assaulted her mother and younger sister).
504 See id. (noting that Rosalind's mother successively placed her into two residential
centers, the first for a month and the second for about six months, from September 20,
1991, to June 10, 1992).
505 Id. at 1464 (stating that the hearing officer's decision agreed with Rosalind's
mother's opinion and suggested residential placement for educational purposes).
506 See id. (noting that an action was filed by the County of San Diego challenging
Rosalind's classification, which the hearing officer had rebuffed).
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The district judge sustained the hearing officer. The County
appealed. One of the County's strong arguments was that the
residential placement
ran against the least-restrictivealternative requirement of federal law. The strength of the
Ninth Circuit's opinion lies mainly in its careful disposition of
that argument in light of its own precedent. The court stated:
The hearing officer's decision also addresses the question of
financial responsibility when both educational and noneducational issues compel residential placement. When
confronted with the necessity of residential placement where
the need involves a mixture of educational and noneducational concerns, the courts have struggled to develop
tests to determine when the special education system is
responsible for the costs of the placement. In Clovis Unified
School District v. California Office of Administrative
Hearings, 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990), this circuit identified
three possible tests for determining when to impose
responsibility for residential placements on the special
education system: (1) where the placement is "supportive" of
the pupil's education; (2) where medical, social, or emotional
problems that require residential placement are intertwined
with educational problems; and (3) when the placement is
primarily to aid the student to benefit from special
education. The hearing officer applied all three tests to the
present case and found that Rosalind's
placement at the
50 7
residential facility satisfied all three.
Rosalind's mother won her reimbursement claim and the case
was remanded for a hearing on her award of attorney's fees. So
often
in
earlier
cases
the
least-restrictive-alternative
requirement defeated pleas for residential placements, even
under heightened state mandates. In Rosalind's case, however,
when the need was severe, the Ninth Circuit adroitly overrode
that requirement in favor of an educational setting suitable for
her particularized needs illustrating that children with
disabilities are not in dire need of state mandates (which can
help); but far more, they are in need of strong advocacy and
perceptive judges who can parse the statutes and discern what is
required to build a meaningful program for the unique needs to
507 Id. at 1468.
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each child. Other Ninth Circuit case law has put strength into

the federal mandate in other settings. 508 Moreover, strong Third
Circuit case law discussed earlier, especially Ridgewood, is being
favorably cited within that circuit and beyond.50 9
Some courts have regrettably reiterated a very minimalist view
of Rowley, dealing with the federal mandate mechanically. 510 The
federal circuits are uneven in their approach to the meaning of a
FAPE. However, in light of the Third Circuit cases and bright
spots elsewhere, there is a possibility of a continuing positive
evolution of the law under the federal mandate, given strong
advocacy and application of the best of the precedent. A positive
evolution of the meaning of FAPE in Massachusetts is a real
possibility, as the next case illustrates.
C. Massachusetts Under the FAPE Mandate: A Close- Up
Assessment

I concluded Part III. E. with a discussion of the Massachusetts
legislature's rejection of the heightened state mandate and the
508 See Amanda J. v. Clarke County Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 895 (9th Cir. 2001)
(deciding that when a school district failed to disclose records showing that a child was
autistic, the school egregiously failed on its procedural obligations under the Act, as the
court held, "because... this failure in and of itself denied Amanda a FAPE, we do not
address the question of whether the proposed IEPs were reasonably calculated to enable
Amanda to receive educational benefits").
509 See G., ex rel SSGT v. Fort Bragg Indep. Schs., 343 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 2003)
(stating that the court remanded for more intensive fact-finding in light of the federal
FAPE mandate as authority of awards for compensatory education); see also Molly L. v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 194 F. Supp.2d 422, 426-30 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (citing Ridgewood as
authoritative even though the result went against the child and parents); Gregory R. v.
Penn Delco Sch. Dist., 262 F. Supp. 2d 488, 492 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (noting that Ridgewood is
authoritative on compensatory education law).
510 See, e.g., Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1292-93 (11th
Cir. 2001). Devine held for the school board in a case involving an autistic child,
overturning a due process hearing officer's determination that the school had not provided
a FAPE and that a residential placement was required. Id. The Eleventh Circuit on
appeal affirmed. The tone of the opinion is very disappointing. The parents' main
argument was that the IEP did not help their son to generalize across environments, a
problem that is severe with many autistic children. The court concluded, "If 'meaningful
gains' across settings means more than making measurable and adequate gains in the
classroom, they are not required by [IDEA] or Rowley," (quoting JSK v. Hendry County
Sch. Bd., 941 F.2d 1563, 1573 (11th Cir. 1991)). The opinion seems to poke fun at the
parental claim that respite care would help in their son's education, an unnecessary cheap
shot at the parents. See also supra notes 301, 306-10 and accompanying text. The
majority in Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 1997), joined in a
disappointing result and opinion, though the dissent was strong.
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substitution of the FAPE standard, a change effective on January
1, 2002. Here I will briefly explore the implementation of that
modified state mandate by examining a decision issued by BSEA
hearing officer William Crane after a hearing involving a
learning disabled girl and the Arlington, Massachusetts, School
District. The hearing officer took great care to articulate the
meaning of the modified mandate, making the decision worthy of
serious consideration. 511 Throughout the decision,5 12 the girl with
the learning disability was referred to simply as "Student" and
her mom was referred to simply as 'Iother". I will designate the
parties accordingly.
In his profile of the Student, the hearing officer stated: "She is
a nine year old, 'adorable' and well-adjusted child who has
attended the third grade at Arlington's Hardy School during this
past year (2001 - 02). She has a learning disability with deficits
in expressive and written language. Her cognitive skills are in
the average to low-average range." He also quoted from a multidisciplinary evaluation done by Franciscan Children's Hospital
and Rehabilitation Center in Boston: "The evaluation report
indicated weaknesses on tasks of verbal reasoning in which
increased levels of verbal expression were required, she had
difficulty with sequencing and attention to visual detail...
The Arlington District proposed placing Student in a
specialized, self-contained classroom in the Dallin Elementary
School for her fourth grade year where she would have daily,
specialized, multi-sensory services for reading and math. The
Student's Mother pressed for her daughter to repeat third grade,
mainstreamed in a regular classroom at Bishop School in
Arlington, with limited special services. The Mother's lawyer
514
argued the case with heavy stress upon the LRE requirement.
With an exceedingly careful consideration of the evidence and
the law, the hearing officer approved the school's proposed
511 See In re Arlington Pub. Schs., BSEA #02-1327, 8 MASS. SPECIAL EDUCATION REP.
187 (2002). No judicial action followed this administrative decision.
512 See generally id. The hearing officer wrote a multi-page opinion styled merely a
"Decision" so when I refer to the "Decision" in the text the document referred to is akin to
a judicial opinion rather than a mere disposition by an order.
513 Id. at 6.

514 See id. Bishop School was the school closest to home. The argument is reminiscent
of that made on behalf of Emma McLaughlin against the Holt Public Schools in Michigan.
See also supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
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placement, denying Mother the mainstreaming she sought. The
hearing officer justified this decision by reliance upon the
substantive requirements for a FAPE. For the purposes of this
article, the meaning of the newly adopted state FAPE mandate is
of chief importance.
The hearing officer introduced his
explication of the meaning of the modified mandate as follows:
The Massachusetts legislature recently changed the
standard relevant to what special education and related
services must be provided to children with disabilities. I have
not previously issued a decision governed by the new
standard. Therefore, I take this opportunity to identify
several principles within the new Massachusetts standard,
prior to applying those principles to the dispute in the case
before me....

The state and federal statutes defining FAPE provide a
useful starting point. Massachusetts law defines FAPE as
follows: "Free appropriate public education" special
education and related services as consistent with the
provisions set forth in 20 U.S.C. §1400 et. seq. [the IDEA],
its accompanying regulations, and which meet the education
standards established by statute or established by
regulations promulgated by the board of education....
To summarize several of these principles, a free appropriate
public education (FAPE) means special education and
related services (i) tailored to meet a student's unique needs
and (ii) reasonably calculated to permit the student to make
meaningful educational progress in the least restrictive
environment .... As explained above, meaningful educational
progress includes "effective results" and "demonstrable
improvement", and is evaluated in the context of the
student's educational potential.5 15
It is immediately self-evident, that after the abolition of the
heightened state mandate, providing a FAPE meant more than
providing some educational benefit, a minimalist reading of
Rowley.
For the requirements listed in the quotation,
"meaningful educational progress", "effective results", and
"demonstrable improvement", the hearing officer turned to two
515 Id. at 8-10.
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sources, namely, a state DOE advisory and federal case law.
Reading the cited DOE advisory, I marvel at the manner in
which the educational establishment dealt with the change, for
example, in the following language:
The FAPE standard has been part of the federal special
education law since 1975, and it is well-established in
education practice and case law. In amending the
Massachusetts special education law to align it with the
federal standard, the Massachusetts legislature indicated its
intent was to ensure that our public education system
provides high standards for all students, including students
with disabilities. The Education Reform Act underscores the
Commonwealth's commitment to assist all students to reach
their full educational potential. Improving educational
outcomes for students with disabilities is a goal of the state
and federal special education laws, and improving
students
educational outcomes for all students, including
516
with disabilities, is central to education reform.
The advisory went on to stress that the "central principles and
requirements of state and federal education law in
Massachusetts will be unaffected by the change to the FAPE
standard in January 2002."517 There appears to have been a
strong effort within the DOE to minimize the impact of the
518
legislative change.
516 See Massachusetts Department of Education, Administrative Advisory SPED
2002-1, 4 (providing guidance on the change in special education standard of service from
"maximum possible development" to "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE")), at
www.doe.mass.edu/sped (last visited Feb. 28, 2003).
517 Id. at 2. See In re Arlington Pub. Schs., BSEA #02-1327, 8 MASS. SPECIAL
EDUCATION REP. at 3-4, where the hearing officer stated:
Both the state and federal definitions of FAPE... refer to special education and
related services that meet state education standards. The state standards include not
only the requirements of the Special Education Regulations (603 CMR 28.00) but also
the learning standards that Massachusetts has established through the state
curriculum frameworks. All students in the Commonwealth's public education
system, including students with disabilities, are entitled to the opportunity to learn
the material that is covered by the academic standards in the Massachusetts
curriculum frameworks....
State and federal law continue to require school districts to focus on the unique needs
and strengths of the individual student through the Team evaluation and IEP
process. The change to the FAPE standard maintains that focus. State and federal
law have required, and will continue to require, the school to provide a program that
will benefit the student educationally.
518 Cf. supra notes 386-87 and accompanying text. While the N.J. DOE successfully
lowered the state mandate, the MA DOE has sought to raise FAPE above a de minimis
level.
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Along with reference to the DOE advisory, the hearing officer
relied upon federal case law stating, "The lower federal Courts
have further articulated their understanding of what minimal
benefit or progress is acceptable, typically concluding that FAPE
requires the opportunity for meaningful educational benefit or
meaningful educational progress." 519 For the expressions
"effective results" and "demonstrable improvement," the hearing
officer turned to the First Circuit Court of Appeals case of Lenn
v. PortlandSchools.5 20 By blending the state DOE's advisory with
the best of federal case law, the hearing officer developed a
respectable mid-level meaning for the state FAPE mandate
thereby making it a workable standard.
Recent case law indicates that the BSEA hearing officers are
continuing to put teeth into the FAPE mandate as it pertains to
school districts in Massachusetts. 521 There is some cause for
alarm about implementation of the mandate on the local level,
based upon recent commentary. A practicing lawyer from Boston,
Robert K. Crabtee, recently wrote:
Some school systems have flouted special-education students'
clear entitlements under IDEA, cynically viewing special
education as an area in which to cut funds and services. In
5 19

In re Arlington Pub. Schs., BSEA #02-1327, 8 MASS. SPECIAL EDUCATION REP. at n.
16 (citing Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2002)).
520 988 F.2d 1083 (1st Cir. 1993) ("benefit conferred need not reach the highest
attainable level or even the level needed to maximize the child's potential").
521 See Boston Public Schools, BSEA # 03-0340, 9 MASS. SPECIAL EDUCATION REP.
324 (2003) (wherein the hearing officer found that the Boston Public Schools had failed to
provide a FAPE and ordered that referral forms be sent to potentially appropriate out of
district placements); Concord-Carlisle Regional School District, BSEA #02-3458, 9 MASS.
SPECIAL EDUCATION REP. 364 (2003) (wherein the hearing officer ordered reimbursement
for a residential placement because the district's proposed placement at the regional
public high school failed to address the young woman's disability which generated a need
for a small-class setting with similarly intelligent students). The hearing officer's
language in the latter case is especially instructive because two academic years were
involved: one before the legislative change (2001-2002) and one after the legislative
change (2002-2003). Regarding the change the hearing officer, Sandra Sherwood, stated:
Thus, although C-C's 2001-2002 IEP must be reasonably calculated to maximize
Melanie's educational development, its 2002-2003 IEP and Eagle Hill's program must
be reasonable calculated to enable Melanie to achieve educational benefits. It must
provide for significant learning and confer meaningful benefit through personalized
instruction with sufficient support services. Some of C-C's concerns may be justified,
however, in weighing the benefits with such concerns, the benefits are clear. This is a
setting in which Melanie has an excellent opportunity to further her learning and
strengthen her social/emotional skills. As such, it provides her with an appropriate
educational program, and the parents should be reimbursed for their out-of-pocket
expenses. Id. at 378 (citations omitted).
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that direction some districts have used the change in legal
standard from "maximum possible development" to FAPE as
an excuse to cut back, despite the fact that the standard, as
it is interpreted by courts and hearing officers, really hasn't
changed all that much ....

We take heart that, in those cases

they do decide, Hearing Officers are insisting on evidence of
a student's meaningful and effective progress in their
application of FAPE. Their commitment to a FAPE with
good results of several of
teeth is evident in the analyses and
522
the decisions issued this quarter.
I read this as confirmation that the change of mandate is not
inherently problematic. Rather, lack of good faith in developing
IEPs to provide a FAPE raises its head when a district is
severely squeezed for funds. Our daughters did not suffer any
In
negative impact from the legislative change to FAPE.
developing IEPs subsequent to the change, there has been no
attempt whatsoever by our district to reduce services or provide
lesser educational opportunities for our daughters than they
formerly received. From my perspective, the FAPE language is
acceptable when school personnel, the state DOE, and BSEA
hearing officers seek in good faith to meet the FAPE mandate in
a manner tailored to each child's unique needs. There can be no
substitutes for good faith and adequate resources.
IX. WHERE SHOULD THE BATTLES BE JOINED?

If a person reflects upon the case law discussed in the foregoing
parts of this article, several conclusions follow in the natural
course. These conclusions are strengthened by considering the
Massachusetts experience following the legislative reduction of
the state mandate.
A. GuardingPoliticalCapital:Fightingfor Heightened State
Mandates Would be an Improvident Course of Action
Of the five states surveyed earlier in this article, the
heightened state mandates survived in only two, Michigan and
522 Robert K. Crabtree, Commentary, 9 MASS. SPECIAL EDCUATION REP. C-11 (2003).
Mr. Crabtree is a partner in the firm of Kotin, Crabtree & Strong, LLP concentrating in
special education law.
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North Carolina. I would not suggest to anyone in those states
that they should modify their mandates. While those mandates
may not have achieved all that advocates for children with
disabilities have sought, nor what critics occasionally suggest,
the mandates are positive statements of public policy that can
only help (and in no way harm) children with disabilities. One
the other hand, in Massachusetts, Missouri, and New Jersey,
events indicate a public opinion and legislative consensus against
heightened mandates; hence, it would be improvident to expend
energies to attempt re-enactments. Such efforts would almost
certainly fail. In our current fiscal climate, with horrific stress
on state and local budgets, attempting to enact heightened
mandates in other states (which have not had heightened
mandates) would be quixotic, at best. In any event, in Michigan
and North Carolina, where the heightened mandates remain
intact, the state and federal courts have resorted to multiple
interpretive devices that lessen the fiscal impact of those
mandates.
B. Preservingthe FAPE Mandate is Imperative
As parents or advocates for children with special needs, we
should monitor and be vigilant about Congressional reauthorizations of the IDEA. 523 If tampering or tweaking is
suggested with regard to FAPE, it must be toward moving the
meaning of the federal mandate above a de minimis reading of
Rowley, never to lower the mandate to mere access. Moreover,
we should be vigilant and resist any legislative or administrative
movements toward pushing any category of children beyond
FAPE whether for disciplinary or medical reasons. 524 Wittingly or
unwittingly, legislators might yield to pleas that would result in
special education legislation aimed at serving "ideal" special
education students, ignoring the self-evident fact that children on
the fringes need the mandate most. Above all, we should resist
523 See generally Gregg, Kennedy Introduce Bipartisan Special Education Legislation,
News Release Judd Gregg (June 2003) (noting the creation of legislation to reauthorize
the IDEA) at http://gregg.senate.gov/press/press061203.pdf.
524 See Alan G. Osborne, Special Issue: Education Law And Policy: Discipline Of
Special-Education Students Under The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 536 (2001) (expressing concern regarding the disciplinary
process and loss of educational opportunity under "FAPE").
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to the utmost any and all attempts to repeal the FAPE mandate
or to under-fund it to the point of extinction. Let me stress with
all the personal conviction that I can bring to bear upon this
matter: the continuation and meaningful development of the
FAPE mandate is, and will be, vitally important to millions of
American children with disabilities. We must not lose the federal
mandate!
C. Funding for Special Education:A Modest Proposal
The energies of legislators favorable to the cause of educating
children with disabilities should be directed toward increased
and equitable funding for special education and related services.
Anybody involved on the local level soon realizes that placement
fights are mainly about money. Special education directors are
not stingy people; they are often squeezed unmercifully between
limited funds and children's needs that know no bounds. For
school board or school committee members, choices can be
agonizing: Which programs for so-called regular education must
be trimmed or cut in order to meet the state and federal
In one fashion or another,
mandates on special education?
pitted
against funding for all
funding for special education is
other education, and children with disabilities are made the
scapegoats for under-funding the whole educational enterprise.
Unless we are of a mind to try lotteries or other gaming, which
are notoriously regressive, there must be funding from property
taxes, sales taxes, or income taxes or some combination thereof.
Let me in this context suggest a linkage of sorts, which I have
not seen explored in any writings, namely, income tax surcharges
that link the most fortunate, and the most challenged in the
lottery of life. Either on the state or federal level (or both) why
not consider seriously a surcharge, for example, on personal
incomes in excess of $200,000. Genetic good fortune and an
ability for maneuvering around life's most treacherous shoals are
not disconnected from life's highest material rewards. To be
sure, self-discipline from youth upward and great prudence and
self-sacrifice in private affairs play substantial roles in attaining
monetary success. Yet, it is an inescapable fact that generally
the most gifted can rise higher on the economic ladder than the
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most challenged. Many of the most challenged will never have
any idea that there is an economic ladder, which others can climb
and they cannot.
I suggest, therefore, that tax-generated trust funds from
surcharges at the top should be pooled to enhance the chances of
the persons at the bottom by funding experimentation and
enhancements in special education. Special education mandates
should be funded in a way that reduces competition for funds on
the local level and removes critical funding choices a little
distance from year-to-year demands upon school administrators
and even legislators. In effect, the strongest should be given a
responsibility for, and a stake in educating, the most vulnerable
for life's battles. Figuring out reasonable and equitable funding
plans on the state and federal levels is a legislative task that can
occupy the best of minds for a generation or more. Let us hope
525
that our generation proves worthy of the task.
D. The Need for Advocacy in IEP Development and Due Process
Hearings
The genius of IDEA and its predecessor lies in part in the
provisions for parents and guardians to be involved in developing
an IEP. This piece of the law has made parents and guardians
and educators partners in ways that were certainly not the norm
before the Act. Hundreds of thousands of parents and guardians perhaps millions - annually work with educators and as
necessary advocate for their disabled children's needs. Many
parents and guardians are able and zealous advocates. Yet, given
the tremendous variance in economic circumstances, linguistic
competence, and self-confidence in speaking to school officials, it
is incontrovertible that some disabled children are disadvantaged
for want of advocacy in the development of IEPs. The need is
525 See Weber, supra note 100, at 952-55. Professor Mark Weber has argued very
credibly and persuasively for specific legal changes designed to shift the costs of
disabilities to society to a degree that is not done today. His specific proposals include job
set-asides, wage subsidies, universal health insurance, and subsidies for accommodations.
While these proposals are far beyond the scope of this article, his theoretical
underpinnings for such proposals coincide with my views of the justifications for funding
special education. See also Mark C. Weber, Workplace Harassment Claims Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A New Interpretation,14 STANFORD L. & POLY REV. 241
(2003); Mark C. Weber, Exile and the Kingdom: Integration, Harassment, and the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 63 MD. L. REV. 162 (2004).
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more acute when children are in the custody of state social
service agencies. Parents' organizations and organizations
established to advocate for the disabled have sought to bridge the
gap by providing training.
At this point I believe that the state and local bar associations
and the law schools can do more. Neither clinical programs nor
internship programs at law schools routinely reach into the area
of advocacy for appropriate IEPs for disabled and otherwise
disadvantaged children. 526 Bar associations often have admirable
programs that reach to the indigent, but advocacy for IEPs seems
to have slipped by most peoples' attention. The task can be gritty
and tedious, but consistent grass roots advocacy for the most
disadvantaged children with disabilities in the IEP development
process could achieve more than multiple linguistic refinements
of state mandates. The possibilities present a special challenge to
law schools and the practicing bar. The same need exists for
advocacy in due process hearings despite an increasing supply of
able lawyers practicing "school law".
E.

States Should Continue to Develop Professionaland
Independent HearingOfficers

The IDEA's requirement that participating states create
administrative review tribunals coupled with the exhaustion
requirements of state and federal law mean that the trial courts,
state and federal, do not see special education cases until they
have been processed through administrative law channels.
Indeed, state and federal trial judges reviewing cases under the
Act have the discretion to take evidence beyond the
administrative law record, and as noted in this article,
sometimes do so. But, in the main, the records that get into court
are developed at the administrative law level, and decisions at
that level are entitled to due weight. 527 It follows that the
expertise and independence of men and women serving as
hearing officers or Administrative Law Judges on special
526 See generally April Land, Dead to Rights: A Father's Struggle to Secure Mental
Health Services for His Son, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY 279, 283-93 (2003)
(discussing challenges of preparing disabled for employment).
527 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982) (establishing strict standard
of statutory implications for disabled).
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education cases is of prime importance. In this context, the
question arises whether specialization is important. That is,
should persons hearing special education cases hear other types
of cases routinely? Or should panels be chosen from the bar and
from educators much as arbitration panels are chosen in
construction cases? The cases discussed in Parts III through VIII
illustrate a considerable variation from state to state.
Given the intricacies of the state and federal laws, and the
desirability of consistency and avoidance of delay, the case for
specialization is strong. Specialization will breed independence
and confidence as hearing officers or administrative law judges
build up a knowledge of statutes, regulations and case law. This
may not favor parents and children in every case, but on the
whole, deep expertise should prove beneficial and comforting to
parents and to school districts. Thus, the state legislators who
might never dream of voting for a heightened mandate should in
good conscience be able to support legislation that undergirds a
strong and independent corps of specialists to make the critical
decisions about IEPs and placements when schools and parents
cannot work things out. This is an area worthy of investigation
and possibly changes in some states, and consequently an area
where the energies of politically-minded parents and guardians
might be invested.
F. Law Schools Can Make a Difference: Training Lawyers for the
Task

In countless close cases, strong advocacy before a hearing
officer or judge can make all the difference. Advocacy has
assuredly been a key factor in the development of federal case
law fleshing out the meaning of FAPE in many factual
variations. Lawyers can, and do, develop knowledge and skills
on their own or in continuing legal education programs.
However, in the belief that law school courses can make some
difference in molding lawyers, especially by instilling attitudes
toward areas of the law, I make my plea for law school courses
and clinics on special education law. Law schools can enter the
area of special education law with more power and vision than
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has traditionally been the case. 528 Courses and clinics for
environmental law and health care law are generally more
numerous than those pertaining to education law. Yet, law
bearing directly upon education grows more abundant and
complex by the day. The interpretation, implementation, and
improvement of this law are of great importance to millions of
children and their parents, as well as to taxpayers. "Education
and the Law" should become a generally available elective in all
law school curricula.
G. A Matter of Major Importance:Meaningful Development of
the FAPE Mandate in FederalCourts
This sub-part is not intended to disparage any state tribunals.
Yet, the case reports show that a huge burden in developing the
federal mandate is being carried by the federal judiciary. The
results in the several circuits are uneven with some circuits
Given the
allowing a minimalist interpretation of Rowley.
necessity of individualizing educational programs to meet the
unique needs of millions of children with disabilities, there will
be great variations from case to case. However, tone, depth of
inquiry, and analytical style in construing the federal mandate
for every child is important, and in my view there is an
unjustifiable unevenness among the circuits. As I sought to show
in Part VIII, the Third Circuit has in several cases outrun others
in creatively applying FAPE to serve the children with
disabilities. If any federal judge (or a hard working law clerk)
finds this article, and pays any heed, my labors will be
worthwhile if the Third Circuit cases requiring that a school
528 See e.g., Franklin Pierce Law Center, at http://www.piercelaw.edulprofs
/REDFIELD.htm (last modified Jan. 1, 2003). This website describes the career of
Professor Sarah Redfield, to whom I want to pay my respects. Professor Redfield has
labored over a decade to develop a very comprehensive program in Education Law at
Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord, New Hampshire. She has helped me considerably
in suggesting materials for starting a course in Education and the Law at New England
School. Some courses offered at Franklin Pierce are open to educator-students not
pursuing law degrees as well as students pursuing advanced degrees in law. The idea of
bringing together school administrators and practicing lawyers in the classroom strikes
me as a very valuable enterprise. I am also grateful that the administration at New
England School of Law has approved a course in Special Education Law for the 2004 2005 academic year as a supplement to my seminar which only provides a survey of a
general nature.
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provide a meaningful educational benefit are taken seriously
where a de minimis view has previously held sway.
As a practical matter, the question is whether the federal
mandate will be applied mechanically with little regard to what
really goes on in school or whether the federal mandate will have
teeth that makes it an instrument for the real development of
children with disabilities. Phrased another way: Will the federal
mandate be implemented to raise expectations and school
performance beyond the requirement of "some benefit"? In the
years since Rowley was decided, there have been developments in
state and federal law to which federal judges should look for
means of enhancing the meaning of the mandate. On this
subject, a recent law review article authored by Scott Johnson
Esq., a practicing attorney from Concord, New Hampshire,
published in the Brigham Young University Education and Law
Journal, is of great value. 529 Mr. Johnson argues persuasively
that three post-Rowley legal developments have greatly changed
the legal landscape, namely: (i) developments in state
Constitutional law, (ii) the development of content and
proficiency standards at the state and national level, and (iii)
1997 amendments to IDEA. 530 It will be recalled that the federal
definition of a FAPE in part "means special education and
related services that ... meet the standards of the state
educational agency."5 31 When a state court determines that a
state's
constitution requires furnishing an educational
opportunity above de minimis, that state's raised requirement
flows into the federal definition of a FAPE. Likewise, when a
state DOE promulgates content and proficiency standards, these
will generally will flow into the FAPE definition.5 32 Finally, as
Scott Johnson has stated with reference to the 1997 Amendments
529 See Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education
Law, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 561, 561-85 (2003) (examining the current implications of
Supreme Court decision in Rowley).
530 See id. at 561-84 (discussing evolution in law since Rowley decision).
531 Education of Individuals With Disabilities, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (2003).
532 See Johnson, supra note 529, at 561-87. This section discusses the application of
standards and procedures. Moreover, this can be tricky, as we have found with Josephine
and Ingrid whose limitations have prevented them from ever doing grade level work or
following the prescribed curricula for different grades. Nonetheless, the state created
contents and achievement criteria may in many cases be applicable to children being
educated under IEPs.
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to IDEA, "The statute now explicitly mandates that states
establish performance goals for children with disabilities that are
consistent with other goals and standards set for all children.
The IDEA now requires states to establish performance
indicators that assess progress toward achieving these goals." 33
Therefore, judges charged with construing the FAPE mandate
must look through the definition into pertinent state law and
should likewise blend the definition with subsequent
requirements of federal law. In this way the fullness of the
meaning of the mandate will be brought to bear upon individual
cases. To the extent that the FAPE mandate is construed in
state courts, the same pathway ought be followed.
The funding problem is not essentially a judicial problem. It is
a problem that needs to be solved politically at the local, state,
and federal levels. Yet, the federal bench in applying the Act
might point out from time to time just where the funding
responsibility lies and should not bow to cries of fiscal woes!
Putting real power into the meaning of FAPE is in no sense illicit
judicial activism; rather, it is carrying out a Congressional
purpose of inestimable importance to millions of children.
X. A PLEA FOR CONTINUING COMMITMENT
Special education has cost lots of money and will continue to be
expensive. In this time of severe budget stress on state and local
governments, and in light of very high projected federal deficits,
it is inevitable that special education programs and services will
be subjected to increasing scrutiny.
Scrutiny is warranted
because the most expensive program is not necessarily the most
appropriate for any particular child. Debates about levels of
funding and the relative contributions of the local, state, and
federal governments will and ought to continue.
It is not beyond imagination, however, that the federal
mandate and the state mandates (heightened or not) will be
subjected to a re-evaluation in two ways. First, I can foresee
attempts to pull back the federal mandate or equivalent state
mandates to access and de minimis programs, either by under533 Id. at 578 (explaining proper application of legislation).
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funding or tweaking language in the statutes and regulations.
Second, I can foresee a vigorous debate about whether the federal
government should be making a less-than-fully- funded mandate
or whether the federal government should be funding special
education at all. I would rather such debates would never occur,
yet in this context, I offer the following reflections and arguments
as social and moral justifications for heavy governmental
involvement, including federal involvement, in special education.
A. The Widespread Recognition of Children with Disabilities
The federal mandate for special education is premised upon the
simple fact that our country has millions of person with
disabilities. Hearings in Congress prior to the Act demonstrated
this clearly. 534 The causes of disabilities are multiple, and often
the best science is not able to explain causation, or to offer much
hope for reduction in rates of occurrence. 535 It takes little life
experience to understand that children laboring under physical
and mental and emotional disabilities will be in our midst
whether we choose to acknowledge them or not.
Since the era of President Lyndon Johnson, when federal aid
for educating persons with disabilities was initiated, 536 rights for
children with disabilities has come into focus as never before.
There are several reasons for this. First, modern medical
practice allows for the survival of many children who would have
died as infants in an earlier era. 537 For example, our Josephine
would probably have died of hydrocephalous if shunts had not
been invented and perfected before her birth in 1983. Second,
diagnostic criteria for disabilities are more sophisticated. 538 For
534 See Education of Individuals With Disabilities, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (2003) (stating
Congressional Findings regarding mental disabilities).
535 See generally J. Madeleine Nash, The Secrets of Autism; The Number of Children
Diagnosed With Autism and Asperger's in the U.S. is Exploding. Why?, TIME, May 6, 2002,
at 46 (noting that best scientific research presently cannot fully grasp causes of apparent
galloping increase in autism).
536 See generally Kathryn E. Crossley, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of
Lawyers: Inclusion: A New Addition to Remedy a History of Inadequate Conditions and
Terms, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 239, 239-59 (2000) (discussing early efforts in federal
funding of mentally disabled).
537 See Jean Seligmann, An Idea Schools Can Use: Lessons From Special Education
Legislation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 759, 770-71 (2001) (referring to progressive effects of
medicine).
538 See id. at 770-71 (noting improvements in educational diagnostic testing).
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example, children once described merely as fidgety or naughty
will be often be rightly diagnosed as suffering from attentiondeficit disorders. Children's issues with learning are seen more
in medical terms and less in moral terms than formerly. Thus,
children with relatively minor learning disabilities have been
added to the pool of children perceived as needing some special
education services. Finally, as indicated in the beginning of this
article, the Civil Rights Movement, aimed at bringing racial
minorities into the educational mainstream, 5 39 inspired advocates
to fight for expanding the rights of children with handicaps (later
called disabilities) and were quite successful in litigation and
with the passage of the Act by Congress. Now the question
emerges: Was this success in fighting for educational rights for
the children with disabilities a sentimental American journey for
prosperous times or is there an underlying social or moral
mandate?
B. IntegrationInto Society on Multiple Levels
The quintessential American virtue seems to be participation
in the work force.
The quest for access to meaningful
employment opportunities without regard to race, gender, or
sexual orientation has consumed vast legislative and judicial
resources. While unhappiness remains in many quarters, who
can honestly say that the American workplace has not
significantly been altered in the past thirty to forty years? There
is greater racial and gender diversity in the work force, including
the professions, than in earlier generations. Now we are in the
midst of another struggle: How, and to what extent, can persons
with disabilities be meaningfully integrated into our work force?
The question calls for multiple answers and patient

experimentation. 540
The path to the workplace is through the schools, public and
private. Middle class Americans strive and sacrifice heroically to
539 See e.g., Phyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 206-32 (1982) (holding that denial of free
public education to undocumented children requires showing of substantial state
interest).
540 See generally Amy Renee Brown, Mental Disabilities Under the ADA- The Role of
Employees and Employers in the Interactive Process, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 341-69
(2002) (discussing employment of mentally disabled).
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send their children to colleges and universities, often with
professional aspirations in mind. Some children with disabilities
can be channeled into colleges and universities, given supports at
an early age. For example, children with Asperger's Syndrome
often display exceptional talent in computer programming. For
millions, workplace goals must remain more modest. But, let us
make no mistake: a societal system that excludes millions from
meaningful participation in the work force condemns itself to
carrying long-term, burdens that could be avoided by integrating
persons with disabilities into the work force. And, the pathway
to meaningful integration is through funding, enhancement, and
vigorous implementation of educational programs that can
channel disabled young persons toward realistic opportunities for
gainful employment.
Our Josephine is twenty-one years old. Her measurable I.Q.is
not above 50. But, Josephine can do many useful tasks, and she
wants to do useful tasks wherever she is placed. As with so
many children and adults with disabilities, she displays splinter
skills. She has an uncommonly good ability to negotiate her way
through the corridors of complex clusters of buildings to make
deliveries as assigned. She can read enough words to identify
common signs. She helps to clean the apartment that she shares
under supervision with three young women with developmental
issues. She can do simple cooking and clean-up with help. She is
gentle with young children and patient with older people
confined to nursing home care. Through years of "production"
contracted for by the programs in which she has been placed,
Josephine has learned a rudimentary work ethic. She cannot
realistically seek employment competitively, but she can work if
given the chance and realistic supports. Ingrid is becoming very
fast at filing according to letters and numbers. She can type
reasonably well.
So it is with millions of persons with
disabilities: provide a meaningful education and they can be
integrated into a workplace.
Without the benefits of special education, it is highly doubtful
that Josephine would have the capabilities she exhibits today.
Hence, special education and related services can and do prepare
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children with disabilities for useful, working lives. 541 Yet, many
vocational possibilities need vastly greater exploration and
experimentation.
Integration of people with disabilities,
especially cognitive disabilities, into the workplaces of our
country will occur at best sporadically without increasing
linkages between thoughtfully constructed special education
programs and insightful employers.
Basic academic skills,
money skills, behavioral controls, habits of working with others,
pride in simple achievements, and special vocational training are
within the reach of incalculable numbers of children with
disabilities. Development of simple strengths and virtues can
feed young people into work sites. Programs that result in
integration into the workplace can and should continue because
such programsallow people to be useful and prevent meaningless
lives in institutional care, or lives as helpless street people.
Thus, an investment in special education rightly made is an
investment in our collective future. The yield is unknowable but
this investment will not be a loser.
C. Beyond Usefulness: A Moral Argument for the Education of
Those Hardest Hit By Life's Assaults
There are those cases, of course, where before birth or
otherwise, something went awry, and possibilities of usefulness
of a life in any conventional sense are difficult to discern. Severe
retardation or physical impairment can render a person so
severely impaired that steady employment, or any employment,
is not possible. In such a case, why should anyone insist upon a
mandate for a special education? Of what services should a
program consist? At this point, defending a mandate for special
542
education gets tough.
I want to tread lightly here because issues about resource
allocations are not only politically touchy but also morally
difficult. Yet, I believe there is a moral mandate for bringing
public money to bear upon the education of persons with very
541 See generally Land, supra note 526, at 283-93 (examining employment for
disabled).
542 See generally Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954, 954-73 (1st
Cir. 1989) (holding school district required to provide public education to severely
handicapped child).
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severe disabilities. While I believe that the mandate is broader
than any particular faith community, 543 I find an anchor in the
expressions of a modern theological thinker, namely, Dietrich
Bonhoeffer. 544 So far as I know, Bonhoeffer never wrote anything
about special education, yet he wrote extensively about rights
inherent in being human, and wrote eloquently that the rights
are not contingent upon perceived social usefulness. Moreover,

tending carefully to lives not useful in any conventional economic
sense can bring forth a marvelous flowering of good things.
He wrote:
The idea of destroying a life which has lost its social
usefulness is one which springs from weakness, not from
strength. But, above all, this idea springs from the false
assumption that life consists only in its usefulness to
society.... We cannot indeed ignore the fact that precisely

the supposedly worthless life of the incurably sick evokes
from the healthy, from doctors, nurses and relatives, the
very highest measure of social self-sacrifice and even
genuine heroism; this devoted service which is rendered by
sound life to sick life has given rise to real values which are
of the highest utility for the community.
From an economic point of view a people's standard of living
will never be seriously impaired by providing for these
sufferers. A people's expenditure for the care of patients of
this kind has never come near to equaling the sums spent on
articles of luxury. And, indeed precisely the healthy man will
always be ready to make certain limited sacrifices for the
sake of the sick, if only because of uncertainty about his own
545
personal future, in other words for quite natural reasons.
The quoted language is aimed mainly at the extreme
situations, harder than the more challenging special needs cases
discussed in Parts III through VIII of this article. Moreover,
Bonhoeffer was writing about care for the severely disabled, that
they might live and not be left to a natural but premature
543 See generally Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA L. REV.
599, 599-650 (2000) (discussing notion of autonomy, postulated as a basic good, as
grounds for allocating societal resources toward persons with disabilities).
544 See DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ETHICS ix-xi (Eberhard Bethge ed., The MacMillan
Company 1964) (1955) (discussing life and work of author).
545 Id. at 163-64.
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death. 546 But, once we grant that conventional usefulness is not
the criterion for basic human rights, we move quite naturally to a
consideration of participation in the life of the culture. Even
when education can only lift a child to rudimentary skills in selfcare, minimal interchange with others, and limited access to
meaning conveyed by written or spoken words or by pictures and
sounds, that education tends to humanize both the recipient and
the givers. Here, Bonhoeffer's comments about expense of care
versus expenditures on luxuries are pertinent. 547 Private wealth
and its abundance at the top end is a self-evident feature of
current American society. To foster policies that allow unlimited
pursuit of luxury alongside of policies that bar the disabled from
lives of any meaning is a sign of cultural sickness, not health. It
is a sign of weakness, not of strength, to pretend that the
severely disabled either do not exist, or that they ought to have
no existence as legal claimants on societal resources beyond that
which next of kin can provide.
CONCLUSION

Like the poor, children with a wide spectrum of disabilities will
always be with us. The children will grow up to be adults with
disabilities. With the Act, our country made a bold stride into a
better future for persons with disabilities by opening the
Yet,
schoolhouse doors and otherwise mandating services.
neither the mandate in the Act nor state mandates are selfexecuting. There is a continuing moral mandate for parents and
guardians, legislators, educators and the courts, to pursue the
never-ending task of making the FAPE mandate meaningful for
every child whatever the disability.

546 See generally id. at 163-64 (discussing moral implications of care for mentally
disabled).
547 See generally id. at 79-171 (exploring characteristics of ethical life).

